
Joint Legislative Audit Committee May 25, 2022—9:00 a.m. House Hearing Room 1



Lindsey Perry Auditor General



ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE

INTERIM MEETING NOTICE OPEN TO THE PUBLIC

JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT COMMITTEE

Date: Wednesday, May 25, 2022

Time: 9:00 A.M.

Place: House Hearing Room 1

AGENDA

- 1. Arizona Auditor General's (Office) statutory responsibilities
- 2. Office work regarding COVID-19 federal relief funding and spending
- 3. Office workforce update
- 4. Office special audits update
- 5. Next 2022 JLAC meeting
- 6. Adjourn

Members:

Representative Joanne Osborne, Chair Representative Russell "Rusty" Bowers, Exofficio

Representative Timothy M. Dunn

Representative Steve Kaiser Representative Jennifer L. Longdon Representative Pamela Powers Hannley Senator Nancy Barto, Vice Chair Senator Karen Fann, Ex-officio

Senator Rosanna Gabaldon

Senator David Livingston Senator Martin Quezada Senator Kelly Townsend

05/18/2022 DF

People with disabilities may request reasonable accommodations such as interpreters, alternative formats, or assistance with physical accessibility. If you require accommodations, please contact the Chief Clerk's Office at (602) 926-3032 or through Arizona Relay Service 7-1-1.



MELANIE M. CHESNEY DEPUTY AUDITOR GENERAL

LINDSEY A. PERRY AUDITOR GENERAL

- DATE: May 25, 2022
- TO: Representative Joanne Osborne, Chair Senator Nancy Barto, Vice Chair Members, Joint Legislative Audit Committee (JLAC)
- FROM: Lindsey Perry, Auditor General
- SUBJECT: Auditor General's Office (Office) statutory responsibilities

Background

As a legislative agency, we are appropriately positioned to fulfill our many mandates, the most important of which is to provide independent, impartial, accurate, and timely information to the Legislature. Our audits, reviews, and investigations of State agencies, universities, counties, community college districts, school districts, and other government entities help:

- Hold these entities accountable for the funding they receive.
- Determine how effectively and efficiently they perform and serve Arizona citizens.
- Deter and detect fraud, waste, and abuse.
- Assure compliance with State and federal laws and regulations.
- Provide recommendations to improve performance and compliance with laws and regulations.

Through our work, we also provide timely and useful information to various government officials for decision-making purposes; help to ensure that federal monies, including COVID-19 monies, continue to flow to critical State and local programs; and inform the public about how taxpayer monies are used. Our reports contain recommendations designed to improve State and local government operations, including school districts. Not only do we provide recommendations, but we also follow up with the audited entities to assess their efforts to implement the recommendations and, consistent with the intent of our recommendations, often find their implementation improves performance, ensures compliance with laws and regulations, and yields cost savings.

For a summary of the Office's fiscal year 2021 results for specific responsibilities, see our attached annual report. We issue this report each year to highlight the audits, reviews, investigations, and followups we conducted throughout the fiscal year. The annual report also highlights other ways the Office provides value by lowering costs, uncovering fraud, helping government work better, and providing high-impact training.

To meet our mission of providing impartial information, impactful recommendations, and stakeholder education to improve Arizona government, we employ highly knowledgeable and skilled professionals who care about Arizona's citizens and the quality of programs that serve

them. Because of our staff, we have become leaders in the government auditing field, and our work is nationally recognized. We have developed and continue to work diligently to maintain an excellent reputation for the accuracy and quality of our work and the information that we provide. This reputation extends nationally among audit organizations at all levels of government.

I am honored to be your appointed Auditor General and to lead my team of 180 professionals who believe in making a positive difference by promoting better government.

Action required

None. Presented for JLAC's information only.

We Make a Positive Difference

uditor General

Making a Positive Difference

RIZONA

We help State agencies, universities, community college districts, counties, school districts, and other governmental entities work better by analyzing their operations and recommending improvements, so they spend and account for public monies appropriately, efficiently, and effectively. In fiscal year 2021, we issued 171 audits, reviews, investigations, and followups with 624 recommendations.

Performance audits and sunset reviews

These audits and reviews assess how various State governmental entities, such as State agencies and school districts are performing—that is, how well they are fulfilling their statutory mandates and serving Arizona's citizens. Sunset reviews help the Legislature decide whether to continue or terminate ("sunset") an agency. We include recommendations to guide these entities so they can better serve the public.

Followups

32 followups

After issuing our performance audits and sunset reviews, we follow up with the State governmental entities at regular intervals to assess the status of our recommendations and issue follow-up reports showing implementation progress.

Agency/school district recommendations implemented: 80%

Financial investigations and alerts

These financial investigations occur when we receive allegations that public officials or employees within Arizona governments have potentially committed criminal violations, such as theft, fraud, misuse of public monies, and conflict of interest. We look into these allegations, and if we uncover potential criminal violations, we submit our findings to prosecutors for independent reviews, and after the prosecutor files a criminal indictment or complaint, issue reports with this information to the public. We also help protect public monies by issuing timely fraud prevention alerts designed to help Arizona governments deter and detect fraud.

Financial and federal compliance audits

These annual audits help ensure State agencies, universities, community college districts, and counties properly spend, account for, and report public monies. Federal compliance audits also help ensure federal monies are being used for intended purposes in accordance with federal requirements, including federal monies allocated to the State for COVID-19 response and relief efforts. Our annual financial and federal compliance audits allow us to provide ongoing assistance that helps ensure these entities implement our recommendations.

Accountability reviews

These reviews, such as school district compliance reviews and county and community college district expenditure limitation reports, check to help ensure public monies are protected and accounted for and that government entities are following certain State laws and regulations.

Special audits/reviews

7 reports | 12 recommendations

We conduct these reviews when specific laws require them, or when the Joint Legislative Audit Committee directs us to perform them. In 2021, these reviews included a study to determine the effectiveness of career and technical education districts (CTEDs) in preparing students for jobs in high-demand technical fields. We found that CTEDs and CTED member districts spent \$67 million in fiscal year 2019 on their programs but do not have accurate and complete data to show whether they are effective. We recommended that the Legislature consider revising statute to clarify and enhance reporting requirements for CTEDs and member districts. We also recommended CTEDs, member districts, and the Arizona Department of Education (ADE) fully implement a previous audit recommendation to consistently collect accurate, complete, and comparable data to help evaluate the effectiveness of their programs in preparing students for jobs. Further, we recommended that ADE implement the annual CTED achievement profiles it had been statutorily required to do since 2016 and partner with organizations and State agencies to collect data in easier and more reliable ways to improve its accuracy and completeness.

23 reports | 286 recommendations

3 reports | 7 recommendations

60 reports | 7 recommendations

46 reports | 312 recommendations

We Add Value by...



Lowering Costs

In our school district performance audits, we recommended that districts reduce costs by reviewing high salaries, staffing levels, and excess school building space. For example, in our performance audits of <u>Bowie Unified</u> and <u>Hackberry Elementary</u> School Districts, we identified about \$377,000 and \$145,000, respectively, that the districts

could save annually by addressing higher staffing and pay, excess building space, and inefficiencies in their food service and transportation programs. Additionally, we reported that <u>Quartzsite Elementary School District</u> continued to operate 1 of its schools even though it did not need the space, costing the District an estimated \$115,000 annually and posing significant safety concerns to students and staff.

Uncovering Fraud

We investigated an allegation of financial misconduct at <u>Joseph City Unified School District</u> that revealed the former high school attendance secretary may have embezzled \$40,436 of District monies by taking cash and falsifying District records to conceal her actions. This former employee was indicted on 3 felony counts related to

theft, misuse of public monies, and fraudulent schemes. We also investigated an allegation involving a former <u>Coconino County</u> employee who allegedly used his County purchasing card to make personal purchases totaling \$82,550. He was later hired at <u>Navajo County</u>, where he allegedly continued this unlawful practice. He was indicted on 16 felony counts related to theft, misuse of public monies, and fraudulent schemes.



Helping Government Work Better

Our performance audit of the <u>Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections (ADJC)</u> found that it did not always follow its policy for sending delinquent youth in its care to temporary stabilization units (TSUs), which are intended to isolate and stabilize youth who are in imminent danger of inflicting substantial injury to themselves or others.

This noncompliance may increase youths' exposure to a range of negative consequences associated with isolation, including psychological, physical, and developmental harm, potentially undermining ADJC's mission to rehabilitate delinquent youth. During our audit, ADJC implemented new procedures that it reported have resulted in fewer TSU referrals.

We also completed a <u>financial risk analysis</u> of Arizona's school districts, issued in an interactive, user-friendly, web-based format, that identified the districts at the highest risk based on current and potential future financial difficulties. We analyzed 10 financial risk measures related to districts' risk levels of continuing operations within its available cash resources and budget constraints. As of December 2020, 13 Arizona school districts were at a higher financial risk. We communicated with those districts to help their decision makers recognize their financial risks and encouraged them to take actions necessary to improve their financial position.

Conside

Informing Stakeholders

Considering the COVID-19 pandemic and the increased amounts of federal monies allocated to the State of Arizona and its local governments, businesses, and individuals for response and relief efforts, we prepared a <u>Special</u> <u>COVID-19 Funding Report</u>. This report provides in-depth information to help inform stakeholders on the intended

federal allocation purposes and the results of our audit of the allocated monies Arizona State government directly spent and distributed during fiscal year 2020.

We also completed our annual State-wide analysis of school district spending that looks at State- and district-level spending. In our most recent <u>report</u>, we found that the State's per pupil spending and instructional spending percentage continued an upward trend, and the State's average teacher salary increased to \$54,814—a 13.3 percent increase over 2017's average, but short of the 15 percent cumulative budgeted goal.

We Provide High-Impact Training



Our staff provide free trainings, webinars, technical assistance, and other outreach to Arizona governments to help them improve their services to the State's residents. We train other government employees from different State agencies, counties, school districts, community colleges, cities, and towns.





MELANIE M. CHESNEY DEPUTY AUDITOR GENERAL

LINDSEY A. PERRY AUDITOR GENERAL

DATE: May 25, 2022

- TO: Representative Joanne Osborne, Chair Senator Nancy Barto, Vice Chair Members, JLAC
- FROM: Lindsey Perry, Auditor General
- SUBJECT: Office work regarding COVID-19 federal relief funding and spending

Background

Considering the COVID-19 pandemic and the significant amounts of federal monies allocated to the State of Arizona and its local governments, school districts, and charter schools for COVID-19 response and relief efforts, we were asked to present an overview of our work regarding COVID-19 federal relief funding and spending.

Attachment A, titled Special COVID-19 Funding Report, provides information regarding the money the federal government allocated through various acts to the State of Arizona and its local governments, businesses, and individuals for COVID-19 response and relief efforts. Adam Tillard, Financial Audit Division Manager, will provide an overview of this special funding report, including the nearly \$75 billion in federal amounts allocated to Arizona, the intended purposes and the recipients of those allocations, and the results of our audit of the allocated monies Arizona State government directly spent and distributed during fiscal year 2020, which is the latest fiscal year we have data for.

Attachment B, titled District, charter, and ADE COVID-19 spending special report, resulted from Laws 2021, Ch. 408, §54, and was produced in an interactive, web-based report format. Cris Cable, Accountability Services Director, will provide an overview of this special web-based report including the Arizona Department of Education's and Arizona school districts' and charter schools' reported spending through June 30, 2021, and these entities' future planned spending of allocated/awarded COVID-19 federal relief monies.

Action required

None. Presented for JLAC's information only.




Special COVID-19 Funding Report October 2021

Federal COVID-19 monies allocated to Arizona

Since March 2020, early in the COVID-19 pandemic, and through October 2021, the federal government has allocated through various acts \$74.9 billion to the State of Arizona and its local governments, businesses, and individuals for COVID-19 response and relief efforts. This special COVID-19 funding report presents information on the amounts, intended purposes, and recipients of those allocations. It also presents the results of our audit of the allocated monies Arizona State government directly spent and distributed during fiscal year 2020.

Federal acts from March 2020 through March 2021 resulted in \$74.9 billion of federal COVID-19 monies allocated to Arizona through October 2021¹




¹ Allocated means amounts set aside for the State of Arizona. In order to receive the allocated monies, recipients, such as Arizona State government, businesses, or individuals, have to apply for and/or be awarded specific grants or aid from the federal agency designated to oversee the associated federal programs. Additional amounts may be allocated from these acts to Arizona after October 2021.

² The PPP and Health Care Enhancement Act and the CAA resulted in a combined total allocation of \$3.8 billion for PPP loans to Arizona. However, the specific allocation amount for PPP loans to Arizona from each act is unavailable. Therefore, we included the total \$3.8 billion allocation as part of the April 24, 2020, PPP and Heath Care Enhancement Act allocation.

³ The \$74.9 billion does not include tribal government allocations. According to the Arizona Joint Legislative Budget Committee (JLBC), the acts resulted in approximately \$4.8 billion allocated to tribal governments that are located wholly or partially within Arizona's geographical boundaries (see page 5, footnote 8). However, the JLBC does not have a complete list of tribal government allocations, so this number may not be accurate.

Amounts and purposes of federal COVID-19 monies allocated to Arizona March 2020 through October 2021




\$74.9 billion total allocated to Arizona

Annual federal compliance audit of Arizona State government

For fiscal year 2020—through June 30, 2020—we audited the \$6.3 billion Arizona State government spent or distributed of the \$31.1 billion of federal COVID-19 monies Arizona State government was allocated. We audited these monies as part of the annual compliance audit of federal monies the State spent and distributed, which we performed in accordance with State law and federal regulations and in conjunction with our audit of the State's financial statements.⁴ The illustration below indicates the uses of the federal COVID-19 monies we audited that Arizona State government spent or distributed in fiscal year 2020, which is the year they were required to be audited, and the amounts that will be subject to audit in later years when Arizona State government spends or distributes them.

Amount and purpose of Arizona State government federal COVID-19 monies spent/distributed and audited, and may be spent/distributed and subject to audit in future years Fiscal years (FY) 2020 and later



⁴ Arizona State government reported a total of \$26.4 billion of federal monies spent or distributed during fiscal year 2020, including COVID-19 and non-COVID-19 monies. This special COVID-19 report addresses only the \$6.3 billion in federal COVID-19 monies Arizona State government spent or distributed in fiscal year 2020.

Audit findings

Summarized below are our findings related to the Arizona State government's use of federal COVID-19 monies that are included in the *State of Arizona 2020 Report on Internal Control and on Compliance* (Internal Control and Compliance Report) and *Single Audit Report* (Single Audit Report), which contain further information and the State's responses.⁵

• The Department of Economic Security (DES) did not put all critical identity verification or other anti-fraud measures in place before paying federal CARES Act unemployment insurance (UI) benefits and reported it paid over \$1.6 billion in fraudulent identity theft claims out of the \$5.1 billion in claims it had paid as of June 30, 2020. As of October 4, 2021, DES estimated it paid \$2.8 billion in fraudulent claims after June 30, 2020, through the end of its paying federal CARES Act UI benefits on September 4, 2021, for a total

of \$4.4 billion of fraudulent claims paid. See finding 2020-01 in the Internal Control and Compliance Report and finding 2020-102 in the Single Audit Report.

DES estimated it paid over \$4.4 billion in fraudulent federal CARES Act UI benefits.

- DES paid claimants an estimated \$57 million of COVID-19 UI benefits that exceeded the minimum weekly benefit but has not yet determined whether claimants were qualified for them as required; therefore, it does not know how much in potential overpayments it may have paid and would need to recover and then return to the federal government. See finding 2020-02 in the Internal Control and Compliance Report and finding 2020-102 in the Single Audit Report.
- DES was required to comply with certain federal requirements when it administered the State's federal CARES Act UI programs. DES did not fully comply with some of these requirements when it reported incorrect financial information totaling over \$100 million to the federal government, inappropriately requested and received a net total of \$191 million in federal monies before it needed monies to pay claimants, and did not establish a process for billing and recovering any amounts it overpaid to claimants. Further information regarding this noncompliance is explained in our federal findings 2020-103, 2020-104, and 2020-105 in the Single Audit Report.
- Of the State's \$642.8 million expended and distributed Coronavirus Relief Fund (CRF) monies as of June 30, 2020, the Arizona Governor's Office of Strategic Planning and Budgeting (OSPB) approved the State to expend \$22.4 million and to distribute \$3.1 million to at least 7 local governments for unallowable costs—costs that were not incurred in response to the COVID-19 public health emergency as defined by federal regulations. As of August 2021, as permitted by federal regulations, the OSPB had worked with State agencies to replace all their \$22.4 million in unallowable costs with allowable costs the State incurred. Further, according to OSPB, 7 local governments had replaced their \$3.1 million in total unallowable costs. See finding 2020-101 in the Single Audit Report.
- The Arizona Department of Administration (ADOA) submitted the Single Audit Report to the federal audit clearinghouse 29 days later than allowed by the COVID-19 related single audit extension of September 30, 2021, which caused the federal agencies that administer programs to not have timely information to monitor them and impose corrective actions for the findings we reported. Further, the State, including its 3 universities, could potentially face federal agency actions that may affect the State's and universities' future federal awards. The late report submission was primarily

ADOA's late federal Single Audit Report submission could potentially cause federal agencies to take actions that may affect Arizona State government's and its 3 universities' future federal awards. because State agencies experienced personnel and resource challenges throughout the year responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, including administering the COVID-19 federal program monies and navigating their new requirements. See finding 2020-111 in the Single Audit Report.

⁵ Arizona Auditor General. (2020). Report on Internal Control and on Compliance, June 30, 2020. Phoenix, AZ. Arizona Auditor General. (2020). State of Arizona. Single Audit Report. June 30, 2020. Phoenix, AZ. (<u>https://www.azauditor.gov/reports-publications/state-agencies/arizona-state/report/state-arizona-june-30-2020-annual-financial</u>).

Methodology and sources

We used various methods to identify and summarize the information included in this report on the federal COVID-19 pandemic monies allocated to Arizona. These methods included reviewing information and summarizing amounts in the federal acts listed on page 1, which can all be obtained from https://www.govinfo.gov/features/coronavirus. We also determined various purposes and amounts from the *State Allocations Spreadsheet* obtained through our subscription to the nonprofit Federal Funds Information for States, Incorporated.⁶ We also obtained, analyzed, and summarized information and amounts from various federal resources, such as the COVID-19 spending database available at USAspending.gov, Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PRAC) information, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services COVID-19 funding database, and the federal assistance listing database available at SAM.gov.⁷ Lastly, we used the information and amounts reported by the JLBC on various dates.⁸

⁶ Federal Funds Information for States, Incorporated. State Allocations Spreadsheet. Last retrieved on 10/12/2021 and is available to members from https://fis.org/COVID-19.

⁷ USAspending.gov. COVID-19 Advanced Search Filter. Last retrieved on 10/21/2021 from https://www.usaspending.gov/search/?hash=cb5e8ac7c53462a14d81c114ee7409cb.

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PRAC). Interactive Dashboards – Pandemic Response Funding. Last retrieved on 10/5/2021 from https://www.pandemicoversight.gov/data-interactive-tools/interactive-dashboards/pandemic-response-funding.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. *Tracking Accountability in Government Grants System – HHS COVID-19 Funding*. Last retrieved on 10/21/2021 from https://taggs.hhs.gov/Coronavirus.

U.S. General Services Administration. U.S. Government System for Assistance Listings. Last retrieved on 10/21/2021 from <a href="https://sam.gov/search/?index=cfda&sort=-relevance&page=1&keywords=93.069&date_filter_index=0&date_rad_selection=date&pageSize=25&sfm%5Bstatus%5D%5Bis_active%5D=true&sfm%5Bstatus%5D%5Bis_inactive%5D=null.

⁸ Arizona Joint Legislative Budget Committee. (2021). Federal Coronavirus Response Funding. 2/25/2021 as updated through 8/31/2021. Phoenix, AZ. Last retrieved on 10/6/2021 from <u>https://www.azleg.gov/jlbc/COVID-19.htm</u>.

Arizona Joint Legislative Budget Committee. (2021) Allocations of American Rescue Plan Act Funds. 3/16/2021 and as updated through 10/22/2021. Phoenix, AZ. Last retrieved on 10/22/2021 from https://www.azleg.gov/jlbc/COVID-19.htm.

Attachment B

District, charter, and ADE COVID-19 spending special report

azauditor.gov/District_charter_ADE_COVID-19_spending_special_report


Arizona school districts' and charter schools', and ADE's discretionary, COVID-19 federal relief spending—through June 30, 2021

This special report provides summary information and 3 interactive dashboards with Arizona school districts' and charter schools' (districts and charters) reported spending through June 30, 2021, and planned spending of allocated/awarded COVID-19 federal relief monies (awards), as required by Laws 2021, Ch. 408, §54.

This special report also provides Arizona Department of Education (ADE)-reported spending through June 30, 2021, and planned future spending of the discretionary COVID-19 federal relief monies that it received, as required by the law. This information is included below the dashboards.

Summary

Districts and charters reported spending nearly \$1.1 billion, or 24.8 percent, of their just over \$4.3 billion allocated COVID-19 federal relief monies through June 30, 2021. Districts and charters reported spending and planning to continue spending the largest portion of COVID-19 federal relief monies, 57.6 percent and 43 percent, respectively, on maintaining operations. ADE has identified spending priorities for its \$401.1 million of discretionary COVID-19 federal relief monies, of which \$383.1 million, or 95.5 percent, remained to be spent as of June 30, 2021.



Districts' and charters' COVID-19 federal relief spending and planned spending interactive dashboards

To access information, first choose which of the 3 dashboards you want to use—Total, Districts & Charters, or Districts & Charters per pupil—by selecting the applicable button along the top. Along the left side, you can select different options to filter the data by several categories, such as district or charter, as desired. To enlarge a table or chart, choose the focus mode option at the item's top-right.

Gauge chart—Provides total spending of awards for the group selected on the Total dashboard, or for the district or charter selected on the other 2 dashboards.

Data table—Provides grant award information in total for the selected group by legislative district on the Total dashboard, or by district or charter on the other 2 dashboards. You can expand the detail shown to the grant level using the plus-sign (+) to the left of the first column of data, which will be either the legislative district, grant name, or district or charter name. See the "Grant allocation amounts, federal enabling acts, and allowable spending time frames" section below the dashboards for additional information about reported grant awards.

Pie charts—Provide spending through June 30, 2021, and planned future spending by category. Hover over a pie piece to see that category's dollar amount and percentage. See the "Dashboard footnotes and district and charter spending category descriptions" section below the dashboards for additional information.

ADE spent \$18 million of its \$401.1 million discretionary COVID-19 federal relief monies through June 30, 2021

Between March 2020 and November 2021, ADE received a total of \$401.1 million in discretionary COVID-19 federal relief monies, of which \$220.2 million was categorized as administrative and discretionary monies and \$180.9 million was required set-aside money for State-wide strategic projects and investments that support schools' recovery needs and increase learning opportunities for students.

ADE reported spending \$18 million, or almost 4.5 percent, of its discretionary monies through June 30, 2021. Most of this spending, \$11.4 million, or 63 percent, was provided to districts and charters for additional relief funding with an additional \$100 million, or 26.1 percent of the \$383.1 million total remaining amount, planned to be spent for the same purpose. ADE's reported spending through June 30, 2021, and planned future spending, by

category, and goals and descriptions are provided below. ADE's website contains additional spending details at <u>https://www.azed.gov/esser-setaside</u> and <u>https://www.azed.gov/esser-arp-application</u>.

	ADE spent/distributed through June 30, 2021 ADE planned future spending			
Addit all pul	Additional relief funding to public schools—Goal: Baseline levels of relief funding for all public schools.			
511.4 million	Provide additional funds to ensure a baseline level of relief funding for public- school districts, non-profit charter, and career and technical education districts.			
	\$11.4 million			
	\$100 million			
Student equity and achievement —Goal: Increase proficiency for all students and close achievement gaps.				

512 million	Engaging and empowering Arizona students to reach their full potential and providing opportunities for equitable academic outcomes so all students have access to multiple pathways to achieve life-long success.					
	\$170 thousand (or \$0.17 million)					
	\$11.83 million					
	ator recruitment and retention—Goal: Every student has access to qualified ators and leaders.					
	Inadequate retention and recruitment of teachers and other professionals providing specialized student support, such as school counselors, has led to a staffing shortage in schools. Highly effective teachers in the classroom are the biggest predictor of student success. Arizona must foster a robust, statewide teaching profession where educators can grow and thrive professionally and personally.					
	\$0					
	\$11 million					
Safe and healthy schools— Goal: All students will learn and grow in a safe and healthy environment.						

L5 ndton	Integral to every child's education is their social-emotional well-being, of which mental and physical health and safety have a primary role. Schools need resources and information to sustain safe, healthy, supportive, and inclusive environments for students, families, and educators.					
\$20 thousand (or \$.020 million)						
Soni	ng the Arizona echoel communities and families through the pendemia.					
Help	ng the Arizona school communities and families through the pandemic—Goal: schools and families address disruptions resulting from the emergency of the					
pande	emic.					
50.3 million	Schools also need support to help prepare for safe school openings, as well as future disruptions to health and access to learning.					
	\$3 million					
	\$5.3 million					
	ing the digital divide and providing access to digital resources—Goal: Bridge gital divide and provide access to broadband.					

S272 million	Provide relief to meet immediate needs and address ongoing needs and solutions that strengthen connectivity across Arizona and its school communities.					
	\$2.5 million					
	\$24.7 million					
	Post-secondary access and attainment— Goal: All students are prepared to access, and succeed in, post-secondary learning opportunities.					
R2 1 million	Post-secondary access and success is vital to ensuring all students reach their full potential.					
	\$10 thousand (or \$0.010 million)					
	\$2.09 million					
Admi	Iministration					

833.1 million	Supporting ADE's grant oversight operations.					
	\$385 thousand (\$0.385 million)					
	\$19.7 million					
indire	r and indirect costs—Goal: Other & Indirect Costs includes funds allocated for ct cost recovery and state projects that are in process for finalization and/or public uncement.					
	Indirect costs represent the expenses of doing business that are not readily identified with a particular grant, contract, project function or activity, but are necessary for the general operation of the organization and the conduct of activities it performs. ADE recovers indirect costs on funds allocated for ESSER State Projects per ADE's U.S. Department of Education (USED) approved Indirect Cost rate agreement.					
	\$465 thousand (or \$0.465 million)					
	\$2.7 million					
ESSER III required set-aside monies						

Set-aside funds will be allocated in FY 2022 toward statewide strategic projects and investments that will support schools' recovery needs and increase learning opportunities for students through 2024, primarily per a Request for Grant Proposal Application (RFGA) process based on the recommendations of the Equitable & Effective Schools Taskforce and ADE's ESSER III State Plan, approved by USED on 10/07/2021.				
\$0				
\$180.9 million				

Expand All | Collapse All

Dashboard footnotes and district and charter spending category descriptions

(1) Charter closed after fiscal year (FY) 2020. We reported all data that was available and used FY 2020 number of students to calculate per pupil spending in the 3rd dashboard.

(2) Charter closed after fiscal year 2021. We reported all data that was available.

(3) District or charter did not submit completed COVID reporting forms to report their spending and planned spending. We reported only known allocated award amounts provided by applicable grantors.

(4) District or charter reported total spending by category that did not agree to its reported total award spending from all COVID-19 federal relief grants. We adjusted category spending in maintaining operations or other allowable spending categories as applicable to align category spending to total award spending.

(5) Seven districts transport all their students to other districts. We have reported 1 student attending to calculate per pupil spending.

(6) District or charter reported grant award spending that exceeded the allocated award amount for ESSER or CRF/ESG grants. We moved excess spending to another ESSER grant to avoid reporting negative remaining grant amounts.

Maintaining operations and continuity of educational services—Including payments to continue employing existing staff and payments for planned operating costs.

New programs/curriculum to address learning loss and unique student needs— Including academic progress assessments, instructional delivery modifications, summer enrichment, after-school programs, etc.

Mental and medical health services and support for students and/or staff— Including counseling, COVID-19 testing, and vaccinations.

Personal protective equipment (PPE) and cleaning and sanitizing—Including face masks; plexiglass barriers and shields; cleaning and sanitizing supplies and equipment; contracted cleaning services; and additional cleaning personnel costs.

Technology-related spending—Including hardware, software, and connectivity equipment and fees.

School facility repairs, improvements, and additions—Including allowable inspection, testing, maintenance, and upgrade projects to existing facilities or renting new space.

Food service programs—Including staff, equipment, supplies, and transportation costs to deliver meals to students.

Miscellaneous—Including staff training and other allowable grant purposes.

Grant allocation amounts, federal enabling acts, and allowable spending time frames

ESSER grants—Districts and charters reported more than \$3.7 billion allocated in Elementary and Secondary School Emergency Relief (ESSER) grants from ADE through the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental Appropriations (CRRSA) Act, and American Rescue Plan (ARP) Act. As required by the federal acts, ADE allocated 90 percent of ESSER monies proportionately to districts and charters based on federal Title I, Part A, eligibility. Title I, Part A, of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, as amended by the Every Student Succeeds Act, provides financial assistance to districts and charters with high numbers or high percentages of children from low-income families to help ensure that all children meet challenging State academic standards. ADE reported using its discretion over the 10 percent remaining ESSER monies to allocate amounts to non-Title I districts, including career and technical education districts, and nonprofit, non-Title I charters.

CRF/ESG grants—The Arizona Governor's Office determined districts' and charters' Coronavirus Relief Fund Enrollment Stability Grant (CRF/ESG) allocations based on enrollment losses between FY 2020 and the FY 2021 40th-day, and awarded districts and charters nearly \$370 million in November 2020. CRF/ESG monies were required to be used no later than December 2020. However, some districts and charters reported spending less than their CRF/ESG grant award resulting in reported remaining amounts to spend. **Other grants**—Various other federal, State, and local governments have provided more than \$225 million to districts and charters from monies specified in the federal acts related to the COVID-19 pandemic, with allowed spending from March 2020 through various end dates.

Grant	Federal enabling act	Allocation amount	Allowable spending end date
ESSER I	CARES Act	\$ 262,897,967	9/30/22
ESSER II	CRRSA Act	1,081,207,269	9/30/23
ESSER III	ARP Act	2,363,957,958	9/30/24
ESSER grants total		3,708,063,221	
CRF/ESG	CARES Act	367,265,895	12/30/20
Other grants	Various acts	225,183,708	Various dates
Total grants		\$4,300,512,824	

Grant application, award, and payment process

As shown below, districts and charters must apply for their grant allocations to be eligible to receive reimbursement for allowable grant spending.

Grant payment cycle

	Grant award spent		
Application submitted and allocation awarded		Report on award spending submitted	Award recipient reimbursed





Grant recipient or subrecipient applies for grant, after which federal grant allocation is awarded. Once awarded grant allocation, recipient is authorized to spend grant monies for allowable purposes. Grant recipient is required to report spending to awarding agency during or after the fiscal year spent. If awarding agency approves reported spending, grant recipient is reimbursed.

Allowable uses and monitoring

Grantor agencies are responsible for communicating federal allowable spending guidance, approving grant applications, and monitoring districts' and charters' spending for allowable use. For example, ADE provides guidance and monitoring for ESSER grants, which in total represented the largest portion of the COVID-19 federal relief monies allocated to districts and charters through November 2021. Grantor agencies are responsible for federally required reporting and monitoring of the allowable uses of grant monies through monitoring processes, including reviewing related findings in grant recipients' audit reports. Under federal and State law, most districts and all charters are required to have independent auditors perform annual financial and compliance audits. Arizona Revised Statutes §15-914 describes districts' and charters' audit requirements. Further, districts and charters that expend more than \$750,000 in federal monies in a fiscal year are subject to federal single audit requirements.

We worked with ADE, other grantors, districts, and charters to develop the spending categories for district and charter total COVID-19 federal relief grant spending and planned spending across all related grants as shown in the 3 dashboards. Although ESSER grants, in total, allow spending that could be classified in each of these categories, not all COVID-19 federal relief grants allow spending in each of the spending categories. For example, allowable uses of monies reported as Other grants, including Federal Emergency Management Agency grants and Small Business Administration Paycheck Protection Program monies, were more restricted and likely fit in only 1 of the spending categories.

Scope, methodology, and sources

We compiled 236 districts' and 436 charters' reported spending and planned spending by category from their FYs 2020 and 2021 COVID-19 reporting forms we developed and required districts and charters to complete and submit to ADE. The 236 districts included transporting districts, career and technical education districts, and accommodation districts and the 436 charters operated in either or both FYs 2020 and 2021. Data used in the dashboards is included in this <u>data file</u>.

We reported information from the following sources:

District/Charter name—Our analysis of ADE-provided district and charter names used in its school report card website. We added a location to the end of some charter names to distinctly identify charters with otherwise identical names operated under separate charter contracts.

County—Our analysis of ADE-provided county data. For district boundaries encompassing more than 1 county, the county in which the district office resides is presented.

Number of schools—Our analysis of ADE-provided school report card information, including online schools and preschools.

Students attending—Our analysis of ADE-provided, district- and charter-reported FY 2021 student attending counts, rounded to the nearest whole number. Districts that transport all their students to other districts were shown with 1 student attending to calculate per pupil spending in the 3rd dashboard. For charters that operated in FY 2020 but not in FY 2021, we reported FY 2020 student attending counts.

Legislative district(s)—Our analysis of district and charter locations within legislative district boundaries based on ADE-provided school addresses.

We performed limited validation on the districts' and charters' unaudited, reported COVID-19 federal relief spending information. We compared district and charter reported spending by grant and by category, in total, and we compared reported grant allocation/awards to data obtained from grantor agencies described below:

ESSER I, II, and III—ADE-reported ESSER allocations and awards.

GEER—ADE-reported Acceleration Academies Grant provided from Governor's Emergency Education Relief (GEER) grants and Arizona Governor's Office-reported other GEER grants.

CRF/ESG—Arizona Governor's Office-reported CRF/ESG awards.

Other COVID-19 grants

DEMA—Arizona Department of Emergency and Military Affairs (DEMA)-reported Federal Emergency Management Agency Public Assistance Program Grant and Express Pay payments.

National School Lunch Program—ADE's Health and Nutrition Services Division reported district and charter food service program cost reimbursements from COVID-19 federal relief monies for March through September 2020.

Paycheck Protection Program (PPP)—Small Business Administration PPP Ioan forgiveness data as of December 1, 2021.

We compiled ADE's use and planned use of discretionary monies from the federal acts related to the COVID-19 pandemic and reported them by category with the goals and descriptions ADE provided.



MELANIE M. CHESNEY DEPUTY AUDITOR GENERAL

LINDSEY A. PERRY AUDITOR GENERAL

DATE: May 25, 2022

- TO: Representative Joanne Osborne, Chair Senator Nancy Barto, Vice Chair Members, JLAC
- **FROM:** Lindsey Perry, Auditor General
- SUBJECT: Office workforce update

Background

We were asked to present an update of our Office's workforce. The Office provides our staff the opportunity to make a positive difference in Arizona government, while at the same time taking advantage of a healthy State retirement system and a variety of cost-efficient health insurance benefits that support a career within and life outside of the Office. In addition, the Office offers hybrid and flexible work schedules, generous paid leave, and top-notch training, mentorship, and paid tuition programs for ongoing education.

However, similar to the Legislature and the State, the Office is not immune to the current great resignation period, including experiencing significant difficulties in recruiting and retaining qualified, experienced auditors. In 2021, the Office lost several experienced auditors who left for other State and local governmental agencies or private entities paying higher salaries. Many cited their reason for leaving was "compensation package below market value." The Office filled some of these positions with new auditors who generally came to the Office after graduating college with no audit experience. In 2021, we received 41 percent fewer job inquiries and applications compared to 2019, prior to the pandemic. To date, the Office is down 34 auditors, mostly experienced auditors, which represents 23 percent of our auditor workforce, or more than 50,000 lost audit hours.

We understand that matching private sector salaries is not financially feasible. However, the inadequate compensation affects all professional staff, and compared to other State and local government agencies, the Office's salaries are low. Therefore, we have requested an increase to the Office's fiscal year 2023 appropriation to fund targeted salary increases and employee-related costs for our professional staff.

Action required

None. Presented for JLAC's information only.



MELANIE M. CHESNEY DEPUTY AUDITOR GENERAL

LINDSEY A. PERRY AUDITOR GENERAL

DATE: May 25, 2022

- TO: Representative Joanne Osborne, Chair Senator Nancy Barto, Vice Chair Members, JLAC
- **FROM:** Lindsey Perry, Auditor General
- SUBJECT: Office special audits update

Background

Our Office receives some of its audit assignments through statutory mandates and legislative requests. Increasingly, the Office has received more special audit assignments each year, including one-time and ongoing special audits and reviews, all of which have an impact on the Office's workload. For example, from 2019 through 2021, the Office was assigned 4 new special audits and reviews including a one-time audit of the Arizona Department of Education's (ADE) Empowerment Scholarship Accounts Program; a multiyear special report on Arizona school districts' and charter schools', and ADE's discretionary, COVID-19 federal relief spending in fiscal years 2021 and 2022; an ongoing special review of the State-wide and county voter registration databases and early voting lists, and expenditures made for voter registration programs and events (Laws 2021, Ch. 405, §25, were later ruled unconstitutional); and a one-time audit of private, nongovernmental grant monies used for the State's 2020 elections.

We were asked to present an overview of the special audit required by Laws 2021, Ch. 408, §54, regarding private, nongovernmental grant monies used for the State's 2020 elections (see law citation below for specific audit requirement). As outlined in <u>Attachment A</u>, titled *Arizona Secretary of State, Maricopa County, and Pima County—Use of Private, Nongovernmental Grant Monies and Maricopa County Voting System Procurement*, we found that the 3 audited entities used the private, nongovernmental grant monies for election-related purposes allowed by grantors; and Maricopa County complied with procurement requirements to obtain a new voting system and relied on system certifications, testing, and pilot deployment for security and technical analysis. Adam Tillard, Financial Audit Division Manager, will provide an overview of this special audit including the Office's audit of financial and related information of private, nongovernmental grant monies used for Arizona's 2020 elections by the Arizona Secretary of State's Office, Maricopa County, and Pima County, and Maricopa County's procurement of its new voting system and security and technical analysis.

Pursuant to Laws 2021, Ch. 408, §54

The auditor general shall conduct a special audit of financial and related information of any private, nongovernmental grant monies used for this state's 2020 elections and Maricopa

county's procurement of voting systems. On or before March 31, 2022, the auditor general shall submit a report to the governor, the president of the senate and the speaker of the house of representatives on all of the following:

1. Private, nongovernmental grant monies received and expended by the Secretary of State's Office for the 2020 elections and any balance remaining unexpended on June 30, 2021, for the following:

- a. Educating voters how to sign up for the permanent early voting list or how to request an early ballot. The report shall include the type of information provided and where the information was provided.
- b. Recruiting poll workers. The report shall include where the recruitment was targeted and advertised and the requirements for poll worker selection.
- c. Combating misinformation and disinformation about the 2020 elections. The report shall include the methods used, the type of information provided and where the information was provided.
- d. Personnel and employee-related expenses. The report shall include an analysis of why the monies were used for these specific purposes.

2. Private, nongovernmental grant monies received and expended by Maricopa County on programs and processes for the 2020 elections, including the purpose of the expenditures, the amount spent for personnel and employee-related expenses and any balance remaining unexpended on June 30, 2021.

3. Private, nongovernmental grant monies received and expended by Pima County on programs and processes for the 2020 elections, including the purpose of the expenditures, the amount spent for personnel and employee-related expenses and any balance remaining unexpended on June 30, 2021.

4. Maricopa County's process to acquire Dominion Voting Systems, including information regarding:

- a. Compliance with the county's procurement code.
- b. Agreement terms, including acquisition costs, time frames, and machine maintenance and security.
- c. The Maricopa County Board of Supervisors meetings to discuss the acquisition, including any public comment. The security and technical analysis that occurred before the acquisition.

Action required

None. Presented for JLAC's information only.

Attachment A

Arizona Secretary of State, Maricopa County, and Pima County

Use of Private, Nongovernmental Grant Monies and Maricopa County Voting System Procurement

The 3 entities used the monies for election-related purposes allowed by grantors; Maricopa County complied with procurement requirements to obtain new voting system and relied on system certifications, testing, and pilot deployment for security and technical analysis



Lindsey A. Perry Auditor General



The Arizona Auditor General's mission is to provide independent and impartial information and specific recommendations to improve the operations of State and local government entities. To this end, the Office provides financial audits and accounting services to the State and political subdivisions, investigates possible misuse of public monies, and conducts performance audits and special reviews of school districts, State agencies, and the programs they administer.

The Joint Legislative Audit Committee

Representative Joanne Osborne, Chair Representative Tim Dunn Representative Steve Kaiser Representative Jennifer L. Longdon Representative Pamela Powers Hannley Representative Rusty Bowers (ex officio)

Audit Staff

Donna Miller, Director Maureen Bell **Ricardo Carrillo** Michael Stelpstra, Manager Adam Tillard, Manager **Christy Evers**

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Barry Gabbard



LINDSEY A. PERRY AUDITOR GENERAL MELANIE M. CHESNEY DEPUTY AUDITOR GENERAL

March 30, 2022

Members of the Arizona Legislature

The Honorable Doug Ducey, Governor

The Honorable Katie Hobbs, Secretary of State

The Board of Supervisors of Maricopa County

The Honorable Stephen Richer, Maricopa County Recorder

The Board of Supervisors of Pima County

The Honorable Gabriella Cázares-Kelly, Pima County Recorder

Transmitted herewith is the Auditor General's report, A Special Audit of the Arizona Secretary of State, Maricopa County, and Pima County—Use of Private, Nongovernmental Grant Monies and Maricopa County Voting System Procurement. This report is in response to Laws 2021, Ch. 408, §54. I am also transmitting within this report a copy of the Report Highlights to provide a quick summary for your convenience.

The Secretary of State, Maricopa County, and Pima County have each provided a brief response to the report.

My staff and I will be pleased to discuss or clarify items in the report.

Sincerely,

Lindsey A. Perry

Lindsey A. Perry, CPA, CFE Auditor General

Arizona Secretary of State, Maricopa County, and Pima County

Use of Private, Nongovernmental Grant Monies and Maricopa County Voting System Procurement

The 3 entities used the monies for election-related purposes allowed by grantors; Maricopa County complied with procurement requirements to obtain new voting system and relied on system certifications, testing, and pilot deployment for security and technical analysis

Audit purpose

To audit financial and related information of private, nongovernmental grant monies used for Arizona's 2020 elections by the Arizona Secretary of State's Office (SOS), Maricopa County, and Pima County, and Maricopa County's procurement of its new voting system and security and technical analysis.

Key findings

The SOS:

• Spent \$5.0 million of \$5.1 million grant monies it received, primarily to combat misinformation and disinformation about the 2020 elections, and returned almost \$145,000 it did not spend to the grantor.

Maricopa County:

- Spent \$1.9 million of \$3.0 million grant monies it received for temporary staffing and other election-related uses and returned \$1.1 million it did not spend to the grantor.
- Formed an elections work group that recommended acquiring a new voting system in 2019 pointing to newer technology affording greater flexibility with ballot styles, streamlining the adjudication process, and performing the central count activities at a much faster rate.
- Complied with its procurement requirements for acquiring the Dominion voting system used in the 2020 elections and relied on federal and SOS certifications and conducted testing and pilot deployment for security and technical analysis.

Pima County:

• Spent all \$950,446 of grant monies it received for 2 uses—personnel costs for hazard pay and early voting sites.

Other counties:

• Seven other Arizona counties received a total of \$2.9 million from 1 private, nongovernmental grantor for the 2020 elections and reported they used \$1.8 million for various election-related purposes and returned \$0.5 million to the grantor.

Key recommendations

There were no recommendations for this report.

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
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Pursuant to Laws 2021, Ch. 408, §54, we conducted a special audit of (1) financial and related information of private, nongovernmental grant monies used for Arizona's 2020 elections by the Arizona Secretary of State's Office (SOS), Maricopa County, and Pima County and (2) Maricopa County's procurement of a voting system as well as security and technical analysis. (See Appendix A, page a-1, for the session law, which specifies for each entity the areas we must address in the audit.)

SOS, Maricopa County, and Pima County received private, nongovernmental grant monies from 1 or more of 3 grantors

The SOS, Maricopa County, and Pima County received private, nongovernmental grant monies for Arizona's 2020 elections from 1 or more of 3 private, nongovernmental grantors and 4 grant programs as shown in Table 1.¹ Other Arizona counties also received grant monies from 1 of these grantors and grant programs, although they were not included in the statutory scope of this audit.²

Table 1

SOS, Maricopa County, and Pima County grantors and their private, nongovernmental grant programs for 2020 elections, and grant award amounts spent June 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021

Grant recipient	Grant provider	Grant program	Grant award amount spent
SOS	Center for Election Innovation & Research (CEIR)	2020 Voter Education Grant	\$4,788,443
SOS	CEIR	Eligible But Unregistered (EBU) Refresh Grant	174,045
Maricopa County	Center for Tech and Civic Life (CTCL)	COVID-19 Response Grant	1,851,114
Maricopa County	University of Southern California (USC)—Schwarzenegger Institute	Democracy Grants for Voting Access and Election Administration	41,857
Pima County	CTCL	COVID-19 Response Grant	950,446

Source: Auditor General staff summary of grantor and grant program information and SOS, Maricopa County, and Pima County records.

Laws 2021, Ch. 408, §54, did not define private, nongovernmental grants. For audit purposes we considered private, nongovernmental grants as all grants the auditees received for election purposes other than those received from the federal government or Arizona State government.

² Nine Arizona counties received grant monies totaling \$6,810,967 from the COVID-19 Response Grant. See Appendix B, page b-1, for a list of those Arizona counties and the grant amounts they were awarded.

Information about each of the 3 private, nongovernmental grantors and their 4 grant programs that provided monies to the SOS, Maricopa County, and/or Pima County for Arizona's 2020 elections follows:

• **CEIR**—According to its website, CEIR is a nonprofit corporation founded in 2016 that works with state election officials to get more states to join the Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC), of which Arizona is a member, and helps states to secure their election technology against foreign interference (see textbox for information about ERIC).³ CEIR provided grant monies to the SOS through 2 different grant programs for the 2020 elections:

0

ERIC is a nonprofit organization with the mission of assisting states to improve the accuracy of America's voter rolls and increase access to voter registration for all eligible citizens. ERIC is governed and managed by states that choose to join and was formed in 2012 with assistance from The Pew Charitable Trusts.

Thirty-one states, including Arizona, and Washington, DC, were members of ERIC as of February 9, 2022.

Source: Retrieved from https://ericstates.org on February 9, 2022.

2020 Voter Education Grant program— According to CEIR, this grant was intended to support states' efforts to provide nonpartisan, accurate, and official voting information to the public; specifically, to provide information about voting options, polling places and hours, and how to successfully cast a ballot during the 2020 general election.⁴ CEIR reported that all states were invited to apply for the grant and 22 states, including Arizona, and Washington, DC, applied for and accepted grant monies.⁵ States determined their own budgets and the amount of monies applied for, and according to CEIR, received all monies they requested.

The grant agreement required the SOS to use the grant monies for the purposes set forth in the budget the SOS submitted to CEIR, which included paid media advertising, direct mailers for the permanent early voting list (PEVL), and other communication costs, such as public relations support and promotional materials.

EBU Refresh Grant program—According to CEIR, this grant was intended to support more effective voter registration outreach to EBU citizens conducted by ERIC member states. Specifically, the grant provided direct support to states to enable them to contact EBU voters by mail to encourage them to register to vote through official, vetted processes such as the Arizona Department of Transportation, Motor Vehicles Division's ServiceArizona website. CEIR reported that all ERIC member states were invited to apply for the grant by submitting a brief project proposal, and 2 states, including Arizona, applied for and accepted grant monies.

The State, as an ERIC member, is required to submit voter registration and motor vehicle licensee data to ERIC. ERIC uses that data to identify eligible or possibly eligible citizens who are not registered to vote (EBU voters) and provides that data to the State and, more specifically, the SOS. Pursuant to the membership agreement requirements, the SOS, acting on behalf of the State, must contact at least 95 percent of the EBU voters who ERIC identified at least 15 days before the close of registration for the next federal general election. However, the SOS does not have to contact a voter more than once at the same address. Although not required, the SOS may contact EBU voters who were still at the same addresses at which the SOS had contacted them in prior years. The grant agreement required the SOS to use the grant monies for mailings to EBU voters who were still at the same addresses.

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³ Retrieved from https://www.electioninnovation.org/ on January 31, 2022.

⁴ A September 2020 joint press release from CEIR and CTCL stated that Priscilla Chan and Mark Zuckerberg committed \$300 million—\$50 million to CEIR and \$250 million to CTCL—to promote safe and reliable voting during the COVID-19 pandemic. An October 2020 press release from CTCL stated that Ms. Chan and Mr. Zuckerberg committed an additional \$100 million to CTCL, for a total of \$350 million to CTCL. According to CEIR's website, it provided \$65 million in 2020 Voter Education Grants. According to CTCL's website, it provided \$350 million in COVID-19 Response Grants.

⁵ CEIR reported that the following 22 states and Washington, DC, received its 2020 Voter Education Grant: Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, and Washington.

 CTCL—According to its website, CTCL is a nonprofit corporation launched in 2015 to connect Americans with the information they need to become and remain civically engaged and ensure that elections are more inclusive and secure.⁶

CTCL's COVID-19 Response Grant program provided monies to be used exclusively for planning and operationalizing safe and secure election administration. All local election offices responsible for administering election activities were eligible for grant monies. CTCL reported that every eligible local election office that applied for the grant was awarded monies. As mentioned earlier, in addition to Maricopa County and Pima County, 7 other Arizona counties received this grant (see Appendix B, page b-1, for a list of those Arizona counties and the grant amounts they were awarded). The grant agreement allowed counties to use the monies for several allowable expenditure categories, such as drive-through voting and temporary staffing, and allowed the counties to allocate monies between these categories at the counties' discretion. See Appendix B, page b-1, for further information regarding allowable expenditure categories and the amounts each county spent in those expenditure categories.

 USC Schwarzenegger Institute—USC is a private university, and the Schwarzenegger Institute is 1 of USC Sol Price School of Public Policy's research centers and initiatives. According to its website, it seeks to influence public policy and public debate in finding solutions to serious challenges.⁷

Further, according to the website, its Democracy Grants for Voting Access and Election Administration program provided grants to 33 local election officials to assist with the challenges related to polling sites, COVID-19, and the November 2020 election, and Maricopa County was the only Arizona county to receive this grant.⁸ The grant agreement required Maricopa County to use the monies for the purpose for which Maricopa County applied, which was to open 14 new drive-through ballot drop-box locations (see Chapter 2, page 13, for more information on the drive-through ballot drop-box locations).

After these grant monies were spent, State and its counties statutorily prohibited from receiving private, nongovernmental grant monies for future elections

In the time since the SOS, Maricopa County, and Pima County received and used these private, nongovernmental grant monies, Laws 2021, Ch. 199, §1, was enacted, which prohibits the State and a city, town, county, school district, or other public body that conducts or administers elections from receiving or expending private monies for preparing for, administering, or conducting an election, including registering voters. Specifically, effective September 29, 2021, the State and its counties (and other political subdivisions) are statutorily prohibited from receiving the aforementioned grant monies or similar monies. The SOS, Maricopa County, and Pima County either spent the aforementioned grant monies or returned any unspent grant monies to the grantor before the new law was effective on September 29, 2021.

In 2019, work group recommended Maricopa County procure new voting system, citing faster tabulation counts and other system enhancements

In January 2019, Maricopa County, the State's largest county with 2.6 million active voters, formed a work group upon the direction of the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors to gather and compile information necessary to prepare a set of recommendations regarding the structure, staffing, and technology resources of the elections

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⁶ Retrieved from https://www.techandciviclife.org/ on October 19, 2021.

[/] Retrieved from http://schwarzenegger.usc.edu/ on January 27, 2022.

⁸ A USC Sol Price School of Public Policy news release stated that former California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger was paying for the USC Schwarzenegger Institute's Democracy Grants for Voting Access and Election Administration program. The USC Schwarzenegger Institute's website stated that grants went to counties in Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia, but did not report the total amount of the grants awarded.

department. According to the work group's May 20, 2019, report (work group report), Maricopa County had some previous reviews done in 2018 in response to issues with the 2018 primary election, including polling places not being fully operational when the polls opened. The work group report indicated that this combined with higher voter turnout exacerbated the longer wait times at some polls. It went on to say that there were fewer logistical issues in the 2018 general election, but still some public concerns were voiced regarding the length of time to achieve a final ballot count. Finally, the work group report stated that Maricopa County's election tabulation equipment had been procured in 1998 and it was outdated, which limited processing capacity.

The work group report made several recommendations for improvements to the Maricopa County elections department, including recommendations related to organizational structure, staffing, and technology. Regarding technology, the work group report recommended that Maricopa County should obtain new tabulation equipment as soon as possible, pointing to newer technology affording greater flexibility with ballot styles, streamlining the adjudication process, and performing the central count activities at a much faster rate. It acknowledged that Maricopa County was already in the process of procuring a new election tabulation system, referred to as a "voting system" in the session law requiring this report. See Chapter 4, pages 17 through 22, for information regarding Maricopa County's procurement process as well as security and technical analysis of the voting system.



SOS spent \$5.0 million of \$5.1 million private, nongovernmental grant monies received as allowed by grantor, spending \$4.5 million to combat misinformation and disinformation about 2020 elections

Legislative request: Review and report on private, nongovernmental grant monies the SOS received and expended for the 2020 elections, including any balance remaining unexpended at June 30, 2021, for combating misinformation or disinformation about the 2020 elections; personnel costs; educating voters how to sign up for the PEVL or request an early ballot; and recruiting poll workers (see Appendix A, page a-1, for session law).

Conclusion: The SOS spent \$5.0 million of the \$5.1 million of private, nongovernmental grant monies it received for 2020 election-related purposes that were allowed by CEIR, returning the \$144,587 of unused grant monies to CEIR. No balance remained unexpended at June 30, 2021. The SOS spent almost \$4.5 million, or 88 percent, of the grant monies received for combating misinformation and disinformation about the 2020 elections through an advertising contract; \$88,341 for personnel costs; \$56,836 for educating voters how to sign up for PEVL or how to request an early ballot; and \$45,301 for recruiting poll workers. Finally, the SOS spent almost \$290,000 for other uses, including mailers to eligible or potentially eligible voters to inform them how to register to vote.

SOS received \$5.1 million of private, nongovernmental grant monies and spent almost \$5 million of it as allowed by grantor

Between June 1, 2020 and June 30, 2021, the SOS received a total of \$5.1 million of private, nongovernmental grant monies from 2 grant programs to be used for the 2020 elections. As shown in Table 2, the SOS received almost \$4.8 million from the CEIR 2020 Voter Education Grant program and a little more than \$312,000 from the CEIR EBU Refresh Grant program (see Introduction, page 2, for additional information regarding these grant programs). As further shown in Table 2 (see page 6), the SOS spent almost \$5 million of the grant monies it received from the 2 grant programs in the 4 categories by which session law requires us to provide SOS grant expenditure information (reporting categories), as well as for other uses. As required by the grantor, SOS returned the unspent \$144,587, which was mainly from the EBU Refresh Grant program, to the grantor by June 30, 2021 (see Table 2, page 6).

Table 2

Private nongovernmental grant monies SOS received for 2020 elections by source and uses by reporting categories and other uses

June 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021

CEIR 2020 Voter Education Grant monies received ¹	\$4,795,000
CEIR EBU Refresh Grant monies received ¹	312,075
Total private, nongovernmental grant monies received	5,107,075
Uses by reporting categories in session law:	
Combating misinformation and disinformation ²	4,482,676
Personnel costs	88,341
Educating voters how to sign up for the PEVL or	
request an early ballot	56,836
Recruiting poll workers	45,301
Other uses:	
EBU mailing	174,045
Other communications	110,186
Other miscellaneous	5,103
Total uses	4,962,488
Unused grant monies	144,587
Returned to grantor	144,587
Remaining balance at June 30, 2021	\$0

¹ The CEIR 2020 Voter Education Grant was awarded in October 2020. The CEIR EBU Refresh Grant was awarded in September 2020.

² Spending in this category was for combating misinformation and disinformation through an advertising campaign; however, some advertisements also educated voters about how to sign up for PEVL or request an early ballot. See Photo 1, page 8, for an example.

Source: Auditor General staff analysis of Arizona Financial Information System (AFIS) and SOS records.

SOS spent \$4.5 million, or 88 percent, of private, nongovernmental grant monies it received to combat misinformation and disinformation about 2020 elections as allowed by grantor

As shown in Figure 1 (see page 7), the SOS spent most of the grant monies it received in 1 of the 4 reporting categories—almost \$4.5 million, or 88 percent—for combating misinformation and disinformation about the 2020 elections.⁹ It also spent grant monies for the other 3 reporting categories: approximately \$88,000 for personnel costs; \$57,000 for educating voters how to sign up for PEVL or how to request an early ballot;

Combating misinformation and disinformation

The National Association of Secretaries of States' website states that

... driving voters directly to election officials' websites and social media web pages...will ensure voters are getting accurate election information and cut down on the misinformation and disinformation that can surround elections.

Further, according to the federal Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency:

Election officials can help citizens avoid contributing to the spread of (mis-, dis-, and malinformation) by presenting themselves as the preferred source for election information and instilling a spirit of control, empowerment, and personal responsibility within the electorate.


Arizona Secretary of State, Maricopa County, and Pima County—Use of Private, Nongovernmental Grant Monies and Maricopa County Voting System Procurement | March 2022 | Report 22-301

⁹ Some of the advertisements within the campaign also educated voters how to sign up for PEVL or request an early ballot. However, we included the expenditures only once in Table 2 under the primary purpose the SOS reported, which was to combat misinformation and disinformation.

Source: Retrieved from https://www.nass.org and https://www.cisa.gov on December 21, 2021.

Figure 1

SOS spent 88 percent of the \$5.1 million in grant monies received for combating misinformation and disinformation as allowed by grantor June 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021



Source: Auditor General staff summary of Laws 2021, Ch. 408, §54 and analysis of AFIS and SOS records.

and \$45,000 for recruiting poll workers. Further, it spent almost \$290,000 for other uses. Finally, as mentioned earlier, the SOS returned to the grantor almost \$145,000 that it did not spend.

Specifically, the SOS spent the private, nongovernmental grant monies in the 4 reporting categories as follows:

• **\$4.5 million for combating misinformation and disinformation about the 2020 elections**—The SOS reported that it spent almost all the private, nongovernmental grant monies it received for combating misinformation and disinformation about the 2020 elections through an advertising campaign by directing voters to the SOS Arizona.Vote website and providing voters with accurate information, such as election dates and polling places and times. Specifically, the SOS used \$4.5 million of the grant monies toward the advertising agency's \$4.7 million contract for combating misinformation and disinformation and used the remaining contract's costs toward mailings to educate voters how to sign up for PEVL or request an early ballot, advertisements to recruit poll workers, and other communications (see pages 9 and 10 for further information on costs in these reporting categories and other uses).¹⁰

¹⁰ The advertising campaign ran from June 2020 through November 2020. The SOS originally planned a smaller advertising campaign using federal grant monies, but in October 2020, when the CEIR 2020 Voter Education Grant became available, the SOS increased the size of the campaign and used those grant monies instead of receiving and using any federal grant monies for it.

The SOS' advertising campaign included digital (e.g., website), newspaper, outdoor (e.g., billboards), radio, and television advertising to provide 2020 primary and general elections and post-election information throughout the State. Photo 1 is an example of a digital advertisement for the August 2020 primary election from the SOS' advertising campaign. As shown in Table 3, most of the grant monies spent on the advertising campaign for combating misinformation and disinformation were spent on the November 2020 general election and were used for digital advertisements. Appendices C through E

Photo 1

Example SOS August 2020 primary election digital advertisement for combating misinformation and disinformation



Source: SOS-provided document created by its contracted advertising agency.

provide the amounts of monies the SOS spent on the 2020 election time periods by advertising method as well as example advertisements (see pages c-1 through e-2).

Table 3

SOS spent private, nongovernmental grant monies totaling nearly \$4.5 million on advertising campaign for combating misinformation and disinformation (by advertising method and election time period)

June 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021

By advertising method		By election time period	
Digital	\$3,116,149	General election—November 2020	\$3,558,681
Newspaper	142,168	Post-election	400,727
Outdoor	298,166	Primary election—August 2020	280,471
Radio	499,983		
Television	183,413		
Total media costs	4,239,879	Total media costs	\$4,239,879
Advertising agency creative development	242,797		
Total	\$4,482,676		

Source: Auditor General staff analysis of the SOS 2020 elections media plan summary.

- **\$88,341 for personnel costs**—The SOS also spent private, nongovernmental grant monies for personnel costs, including incentive pay, temporary staff, and overtime. Specifically:
 - \$74,133 for incentive pay—The SOS provided 2 types of incentive pay to a total of 39 employees through the existing State of Arizona SPOT incentive program.¹¹ First, the SOS issued a one-time, \$250 incentive payment to 18 election customer service temporary staff and other nonelection staff who answered phone hotlines during the election cycle. Second, the SOS provided a formula-based incentive payment ranging from \$1,405 to \$7,500 to 21 employees nominated by managers and approved by upper management for the incentive award. Specifically, the SOS created a nomination form by which managers could nominate an employee for recognition. The form required a description of what the employee did to earn the incentive pay nomination. The form was reviewed by the employee's supervisor if the supervisor did not originate the nomination, and by the chief financial officer/human resources director and human resources manager. The SOS created a formula with various factors, such as the employee's pay rate, years of service, impact of the employee's achievement, and overall performance

¹¹ According to the State Personnel System Compensation Guidelines, SPOT incentives are one-time, lump sum bonuses given "on the spot" for an extraordinary achievement or moment of extraordinary individual or group performance that results in efficiency, cost savings, or improved productivity.

rating to calculate the incentive payment amount the employee would receive. An employee could receive each type of incentive payment award only once.

- \$12,790 for temporary staff—According to the SOS, it hired 57 temporary staff through the State's jobs board using a competitive process to assist with various election projects. The SOS used grant monies to pay 8 of these temporary staff's personnel costs applicable to the grant.
- \$1,418 for overtime—According to the SOS, it authorized 84 of its permanent and temporary, hourly employees to work overtime during the 2020 elections. The SOS used grant monies to pay 8 of these employees' overtime costs applicable to the grant.
- \$56,836 for educating voters how to sign up for PEVL or request an early ballot—Further, the SOS spent private, nongovernmental grant monies for educating voters about how to sign up for PEVL or how to request an early ballot through mailers it sent to voters, including a form to do so (see Appendix F, page f-1, for example mailer). According to the SOS, it asked counties if they wanted mailers sent to voters in their county, and if so, counties supplied the voter data for the mailing. For the 2020 primary election, Apache and Santa Cruz Counties participated. For the 2020 general election, Apache, Graham, Greenlee, Navajo, and Santa Cruz Counties participated.
- \$45,301 for recruiting poll workers—Finally, the SOS spent nongovernmental grant monies for recruiting poll workers, which included advertisements on Facebook and Instagram costing \$29,790, and paid Google search advertisements costing \$12,811, plus the advertising agency's creative development costs of \$2,700 (see Appendix G, page g-1, for example advertisements). For the 2020 primary election, the SOS' advertisements targeted Coconino, Graham, Navajo, Pima, and Santa Cruz Counties. For the 2020 general election, its advertisements targeted all counties. The SOS' advertisements directed individuals to a page on the SOS website that provided additional information about serving as a poll worker, including the requirements to be a poll worker (see textbox). The website also provided an online application form individuals could complete. According to the SOS, the form was forwarded automatically to an individual's county for consideration; the SOS did not evaluate applicants or select poll workers. According to the SOS, 23,124 individuals applied to be poll workers through its website in 2020. For the November 2020 election, Arizona registered 1,091 poll workers for early voting and 7,409 on election day State-wide.¹²

What are the requirements to be a poll worker?

According to the SOS website, the following are the minimum requirements to be a poll worker. Some counties may have additional requirements:

- Be a resident of the county you serve in.
- Be registered to vote in Arizona (except student program participants).1
- Be at least 18 years old (except student program participants).1
- Complete the required training.

¹ Some counties have student poll worker programs that allow 16- and 17-year-old U.S. citizen high school students to work at a polling place on Election Day. The students work together with registered voters of their county to run the polling place.

Source: Retrieved from https://azsos.gov/ on January 12, 2022.

In addition to spending the grant monies for the 4 reporting categories, as shown in Table 2 and Figure 1 (see pages 6 and 7), the SOS spent almost \$290,000 of grant monies for other uses, including \$174,045 of the CEIR EBU Refresh Grant monies on postcards to EBU voters. Specifically, in September 2020, the SOS printed and mailed 1.4 million postcards to EBU voters. The grant required the SOS to mail the postcards to EBU voters who were still at the same addresses to which the SOS had mailed such notices in prior years, which were

¹² U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC). (2021). Election Administration and Voting Survey 2020 Comprehensive Report. Washington, DC.

approximately 60 percent of the EBU voters included in the mailing.¹³ These postcards notified EBU voters that they may be eligible to vote and provided information on how to register (see Appendix H, page h-1, for example postcard). The postcards also included a website address that provided information on how to request a ballot by mail. Further, as shown in Table 2 (see page 6), the SOS also paid the advertising agency about \$110,000 of the private, nongovernmental grant monies for other communications, including \$75,000 for public relations support for media relations and social media contacts and interviews for the 2020 elections and \$35,186 for AZSOS.gov website updates. Additionally, the SOS spent about \$5,000 of the grant monies for broadcasting the electoral college meeting where Arizona's Presidential Electors cast their ballots for the president and vice president, commemorative pens for the meeting that were given to the Presidential Electors and SOS staff who planned and worked the meeting, and broadcasting virtual town halls that provided information on Propositions 207 and 208.

Finally, the SOS returned \$144,587 of grant monies to the grantor because it had not spent these monies at June 30, 2021.

¹³ The total cost of the mailers was \$290,074. In addition to the CEIR EBU Grant monies, the SOS used \$116,029 of State General Fund monies that Arizona counties reimbursed for the approximately 40 percent of the EBU voters included in the mailing who the SOS had not previously contacted at their current addresses and who the State was required to contact pursuant to its agreement with ERIC.



Maricopa County spent \$1.9 million of \$3.0 million private, nongovernmental grant monies it received as allowed by grantors, spending \$1.1 million for temporary staffing for 2020 and 2021 elections

Legislative request: Review and report on private, nongovernmental grant monies received and expended by Maricopa County on programs and processes for the 2020 elections, including the purpose of the expenditures, the amount spent for personnel and employee-related expenses, and any remaining balance at June 30, 2021 (see Appendix A, page a-1, for session law).

Conclusion: Maricopa County received \$3.0 million of private, nongovernmental grant monies and spent \$1.9 million of those monies for 2020 election-related purposes that were allowed by CTCL and USC Schwarzenegger Institute, including \$1.1 million for temporary staffing and \$267,000 for election administration equipment. At June 30, 2021, Maricopa County had more than \$1.1 million of unused grant monies remaining; however, Maricopa County did not use any of the grant monies after June 30 and returned the unused grant monies and accumulated interest to CTCL on August 4, 2021.

Maricopa County received \$3.0 million of private, nongovernmental grant monies and spent \$1.9 million of it as allowed by grantors

Maricopa County received \$3.0 million of private, nongovernmental grant monies for 2020 elections and spent \$1.9 million of it.¹⁴ Specifically, from June 1, 2020 through August 31, 2021, Maricopa County received a total of slightly more than \$3.0 million of private, nongovernmental grant monies from 2 grant programs to be used for the 2020 elections. As shown in Table 4 (see page 12), Maricopa County received almost \$3 million of grant monies from CTCL and \$41,857 of grant monies from the USC Schwarzenegger Institute (see Introduction, page 3, for additional information regarding these grantors). From June 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021, Maricopa County spent a total of almost \$1.9 million of the grant monies it received from the 2 grantors on a variety of election-related uses, such as temporary staffing to answer call center phone calls, provide polling place security, and work at drive-through ballot drop-box locations; polling place rental; and poll worker training. As required by the grantor, Maricopa County did not spend any of the grant monies after June 30, 2021, returning the unspent \$1.1 million from CTCL, plus accumulated interest, on August 4, 2021.

Arizona Auditor General Arizona Secretary

¹⁴ In February 2021, Maricopa County received approval from CTCL to expend unused grant monies it had received for the 2020 elections for other election expenses through June 30, 2021. Therefore, as approved by the grantor, Maricopa County used some CTCL grant monies for 2021 elections.

Table 4

Private, nongovernmental grant monies Maricopa County received for 2020 elections by source and use

June 1, 2020 through August 31, 2021

CTCL grant monies received ¹	\$2,995,921
USC Schwarzenegger Institute grant monies received ¹	41,857
Interest on CTCL grant monies	10,770
Total private, nongovernmental grant monies received, including interest	3,048,548
Uses of CTCL grant monies: ²	
Temporary staffing (see Table 5, page 13)	1,105,274
Election administration equipment	267,325
Polling place rental	231,780
Vote-by-mail	176,706
Poll worker training	61,064
Personal protective equipment (PPE)	8,965
Uses of USC Schwarzenegger Institute grant monies:	
Temporary staffing for drive-through ballot drop-box locations	34,370
Other costs for drive-through ballot drop-box locations	7,487
Total uses	1,892,971
Unused grant monies, including interest, remaining June 30, 2021	1,155,576
Returned to grantor, August 2021	1,155,576
Remaining grant monies as of August 31, 2021	\$0

¹ Both grants were awarded in October 2020. The Maricopa County Board of Supervisors approved Maricopa County's acceptance of the CTCL grant at its October 21, 2020, public meeting and the USC Schwarzenegger Institute grant at its November 18, 2020, public meeting.

² The uses in Table 4 describe how Maricopa County used the CTCL grant monies. However, when Maricopa County reported its expenses to CTCL, it reported them within the appropriate allowable use categories prescribed by CTCL. Appendix B, page b-1, shows how Maricopa County reported its costs under CTCL's categories.

Source: Auditor General staff analysis of Maricopa County records.

Maricopa County spent \$1.1 million private, nongovernmental grant monies it received on temporary staffing for the 2020 and 2021 elections as allowed by grantors

Of the nearly \$3 million of private, nongovernmental grant monies Maricopa County received, it spent \$1,139,644 on temporary staffing, of which \$1,105,274 was from the CTCL grant and \$34,370 was from the USC Schwarzenegger Institute grant. Specifically, Maricopa County spent its private, nongovernmental grant monies from CTCL as follows:

• **\$1.1 million for temporary staffing**—Maricopa County used \$1,105,274 of CTCL grant monies for temporary staffing, of which \$855,268 related to 2020 elections and, as allowed by the extension provided by the grantor, \$250,006 related to 2021 elections (see Table 5, page 13). Except as noted in the table, temporary staffing was provided by third-party vendors rather than Maricopa County employees.

Table 5

Maricopa County used \$1.1 million of CTCL grant monies for temporary staffing as allowed by grantor to perform various responsibilities related to 2020 and 2021 elections June 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021

	2020	2021	
	Elections	Elections	Total
On-site temporary workers	\$352,708	\$128,173	\$ 480,881
Security services	203,432		203,432
Expansion of early voting sites	136,714		136,714
Website contractors		121,833	121,833
Call center temporary workers	116,639		116,639
Troubleshooter and courier mileage	45,775		45,775
Total temporary staffing	\$855,268	\$250,006	\$1,105,274

Additional information:

- On-site temporary workers—Assisted with the increased volume of returned early voting ballots.
- Security services—Provided security for voting centers and transportation of ballots.
- Expansion of early voting sites—Assisted at additional early voting sites with expanded hours of operations because of increased early voting, all of which was personnel costs for 110 Maricopa County employees.
- Website contractors—Enhanced the functionality and user experience of the Elections Department website.
- Call center temporary workers—Provided additional support to meet the demand of expended early voting and respond to voter calls timely, including increasing the call center capacity and extending the call center's hours of operation.
- **Troubleshooter and courier mileage**—Mileage costs for temporary staff that addressed issues at various voter centers and delivered ballots from drop boxes to Maricopa County Tabulation and Election Center (MCTEC).

Source: Auditor General staff analysis of Maricopa County records.

- **\$267,325 for election administration equipment**—Maricopa County used \$267,325 of grant monies for election administration equipment, of which \$40,001 related to the 2020 general election and \$227,324 related to 2021 elections. Expenditures included capital improvements for a training room, scanners, imprinters, and software/licensing agreements for election equipment.
- **\$231,780 for polling place rental**—Maricopa County used \$231,780 of grant monies to rent private and public property for voting centers for 2020 elections. According to Maricopa County, this was to provide social distancing at polling locations in accordance with Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and Maricopa County Public Health recommendations.
- **\$176,706 for vote-by-mail**—Maricopa County used \$176,706 of grant monies for additional vote-by-mail costs above what the County originally budgeted for 2020 elections. According to Maricopa County, this was because of CDC and Maricopa County Public Health social distancing recommendations and increased voter demand.
- **\$61,064 for poll worker training**—Maricopa County used \$61,064 of grant monies for poll worker training and training materials related to 2020 elections. Completing poll worker training is 1 of 4 requirements to be a poll worker.¹⁵
- **\$8,965 for PPE**—Maricopa County used **\$8,965** of grant monies for PPE for 2020 elections. According to Maricopa County, this was done to improve the safety of poll workers and voters.

Further, Maricopa County spent all the USC Schwarzenegger Institute grant program monies it received on new drive-through ballot drop-box locations for the 2020 general election. Specifically, Maricopa County received \$41,857 from the USC Schwarzenegger Institute and used all those grant monies for the costs of 13 drive-through


¹⁵ Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §16-532(A).

ballot drop boxes located throughout the Phoenix Metropolitan Area (see Map).¹⁶ The drop-box locations were open October 24 and October 31 through November 3, 2020. Costs included \$34,370 for 57 Maricopa County employees to temporarily staff the locations and deliver ballots to MCTEC; \$4,559 for barricade and light rentals; \$1,652 for chains, locks, and tents; and \$1,276 of mileage reimbursements for couriers to retrieve sealed early ballot affidavits (green envelopes) containing early ballots.

Finally, Maricopa County returned \$1.1 million of grant monies to CTCL because it had not spent these monies at June 30, 2021.

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Maricopa County's 13 drive-through ballot drop-box locations for 2020 general election



Source: Auditor General staff analysis of drive-through ballot drop-box location information provided by Maricopa County.

¹⁶ Maricopa County had 14 drive-through ballot drop-box locations for the 2020 general election. It did not use the USC Schwarzenegger Institute grant program monies for the location at the MCTEC.

CHAPTER 3



Pima County spent \$950,446 of private, nongovernmental grant monies it received as allowed by grantor, spending \$941,408 on personnel costs for hazard pay for the 2020 elections

Legislative request: Review and report on private, nongovernmental grant monies received and used by Pima County on programs and processes for the 2020 elections, including the purpose of the expenditures, the amount spent for personnel and employee-related expenses, and any remaining balance at June 30, 2021 (see Appendix A, page a-1, for session law).

Conclusion: Pima County received and spent \$950,446 of CTCL grant monies for 2020 election-related purposes that were allowed by CTCL. Pima County spent almost all the grant monies—\$941,408—for personnel costs for hazard pay. It had no remaining balance at June 30, 2021.

Pima County received and spent \$950,446 of private, nongovernmental grant monies as allowed by grantor

As shown in Table 6 (see page 16), from June 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021, Pima County received \$950,446 of private, nongovernmental grant monies to be used for the 2020 elections, all from CTCL (see Introduction, page 3, for additional information regarding CTCL). Pima County spent all the grant monies for 2 uses—personnel costs for hazard pay and early voting sites—and had no remaining balance at June 30, 2021.

Table 6

Private, nongovernmental grant monies Pima County received for 2020 elections by source and use

June 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021

CTCL grant monies received ¹	\$950,446
Total private, nongovernmental grant monies received	950,446
Uses: ²	
Personnel costs for hazard pay	941,408
Early voting sites	9,038
Total uses	950,446
Unused grant monies	0
Returned to grantor	0
Remaining grant monies at June 30, 2021	\$0

¹ Grant was awarded in October 2020. The Pima County Board of Supervisors approved Pima County's acceptance of the grant at its November 10, 2020, public meeting.

² The uses in Table 6 describe how Pima County used the grant monies. However, when Pima County reported its costs to CTCL, it reported them within the appropriate allowable use categories prescribed and required by CTCL. Appendix B, page b-1, shows how Pima County reported its costs under CTCL's categories.

Source: Auditor General staff analysis of Pima County records.

Pima County spent almost all private, nongovernmental grant monies on election-related personnel costs for hazard pay as allowed by grantor

Of the slightly more than \$950,000 of private, nongovernmental grant monies Pima County received, it spent almost all for personnel costs for hazard pay to support the 2020 elections (see Table 6). Specifically, Pima County spent the grant monies for the following 2 uses:

- \$941,408 for personnel costs for hazard pay—Pima County paid employees performing elections responsibilities hazard pay. Pima County cited the following 2 circumstances for the hazard pay (1) the primary and secondary effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and (2) increased local threats of violence against election workers. Hazard pay included regular wage and salary costs as well as extra pay. Specifically, the Pima County Elections Department paid 89 employees each an extra \$2,920 for each of the fall 2020 elections— primary or general—that an employee worked. Further, the Pima County Recorder's Office paid regular wage and salary costs of 265 employees who worked on the elections and paid 261 of these employees an extra \$5 to \$10 per hour depending on the location where they worked. For example, employees who worked at walk-in early voting sites were paid an extra \$6 per hour for their time worked at these sites. The Pima County Recorder's Office also paid 4 salaried employees an extra \$25 per hour for their time worked on elections responsibilities.
- **\$9,038 for early voting sites**—Pima County paid \$8,933 for vehicle expenses for couriers who made more trips than in previous elections to early voting sites because of the increased number of voters using those sites. Pima County also spent \$105 for a newspaper advertisement of an early voting site location.



Maricopa County complied with its procurement requirements; obtained required voting system certifications, including security assessments; and performed pilot and stress testing of Dominion voting system prior to using it for 2020 elections

Legislative request: Report on Maricopa County's (County) process to acquire the Dominion voting system (voting system), including the County's compliance with its procurement code; County Board of Supervisors (Board) meetings to discuss the acquisition; security and technical analysis that occurred prior to acquisition; and the agreement terms (see Appendix A, page a-1, for session law).

Conclusion: The County complied with its procurement requirements when it procured the voting system that it used for the 2020 elections. The County's Board approved the contract at a public meeting on June 26, 2019. The County relied on federal and State certifications and its own testing for security and technical analysis of the voting system prior to the 2020 elections. The County made a final amendment to the agreement terms (contract) with Dominion prior to the 2020 elections on February 10, 2020, and entered into a 3-year lease of the voting system.

County complied with its procurement requirements for procuring voting system, including Board approval of contract at public meeting

Consistent with the recommendation from the work group the County formed to identify improvements to its elections department (see Introduction, page 3, for further information regarding the work group), the County issued a request for proposals (RFP) for a new voting system, which it referred to in the RFP as an elections tabulation system, and awarded a contract approved by the Board, effective August 1, 2019, to Dominion for the voting system. The County's procurement of the voting system complied with its procurement requirements we tested. The textbox provides a general definition of a voting system and information about specific components of the County's voting system, and Photo 2 (see page 18) provides photographs of 2 of its components. **Voting system**—The total combination of mechanical, electromechanical, and electronic equipment (including the software, firmware, and documentation required to program, control, and support the equipment) that is used to define ballots, cast and count votes, report or display election results, interface the voting system to the voter registration system, and maintain and produce any audit trail information.

For example, the County's voting system includes items such as precinct-based tabulators used at individual precincts, central count tabulators used at MCTEC to tabulate early ballots, various software programs, and machine and software licenses. See Appendix K, page k-1, for the full list of equipment and software included in the voting system.

Source: *EAC Testing & Certification Program* and Auditor General staff analysis of the County's contract with Dominion, as amended February 10, 2020.

Photo 2

High-Pro Central high-speed scanner



Precinct-based tabulator with tamper-evident seals attached



Source: Photographs provided by Maricopa County.

The County must follow procurement requirements when procuring goods and services, including voting systems—The Board-adopted procurement requirements, also referred to as the County's procurement code, prescribe the rules and process the County must follow to procure goods and services and include several provisions, such as:


- The County having to issue a RFP that describes the good or service requested and the necessary specifications, including the evaluation criteria.
- Vendors having to submit competitive sealed proposals.
- A County selection committee having to evaluate proposals and make a recommendation based on the criteria set forth in the RFP.
- The County's procurement officer having to recommend to the Board the award of a contract to the vendor whose proposal is determined to be most advantageous to the County based on the criteria set forth in the RFP.
- The County's having to have Board approval of the contract to award it to the vendor.

All County procurements, including those made with private, nongovernmental grant monies and those for voting systems, must follow these same procurement requirements.

The County received 3 proposals in response to the RFP and, as required, used a selection committee to evaluate them—As shown in Figure 2 (see page 19), 3 vendors submitted proposals in response to the RFP the County issued on March 28, 2019. A 6-person selection committee of County employees, including 3 from the County Recorder's Office/Elections Department and 1 each from the Office of Enterprise Technology, Internal Audit, and County Manager's Office, evaluated the proposals. Each committee member scored the proposals based on the evaluation criteria set forth in the RFP. According to the selection committee's May 13, 2019, ratings, the Dominion proposal received the highest total score for all evaluation criteria, as well as the highest score for each individual evaluation criterion (see Appendix I, page i-1, for the evaluation criteria and selection committee scores.) The County's procurement officer determined that Dominion's proposal was the most advantageous to the County and recommended that the Board approve a contract with Dominion.

Figure 2

Timeline of steps taken by County to procure, test, and acquire Dominion voting system March 28, 2019 through March 17, 2020



¹ The County's RFP referred to the voting system as an elections tabulation system. Source: Auditor General staff analysis of Maricopa County procurement records. **The Board approved contract with Dominion at a public meeting as required**—The Board's June 26, 2019, public meeting agenda included 2 items related to the voting system contract: first, an item to receive the final written report of the work group—the May 20, 2019, report previously referred to on page 4— and adopt the report's recommendations, which included the recommendation mentioned earlier to replace the County's existing election tabulation equipment and second, an item to award the voting system contract to Dominion. During the Board's discussion of the work group report, several Board members referred to the voting system contract, but Board members did not specifically discuss the contract. During the item to award the voting system contract, the Board approved the contract with Dominion, in accordance with the County's procurement requirements, without discussion. The contract with Dominion became effective August 1, 2019, with requirements for certifications and pilot deployment of the voting system. During the meeting's call to the public, 3 individuals made comments related to elections; however, none of them mentioned the voting system procurement or Dominion.

For security and technical analysis, County relied on federal and SOS certifications and conducted testing and pilot deployment of voting system to help ensure it was sufficient to support the County's election operations

The EAC certified the voting system as contract requires—On September 11, 2019, the EAC certified the Dominion voting system consistent with the contractual requirements.¹⁷ Although EAC certification of the voting system is voluntary under federal law, Arizona law requires the voting system to be tested by a laboratory that is accredited pursuant to the federal Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) as discussed below.¹⁸ HAVA created the EAC and requires the EAC to provide for the accreditation of independent, nonfederal laboratories qualified to test voting systems to federal standards.¹⁹

HAVA also required the EAC to establish the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (Guidelines), which it did on December 13, 2005.²⁰ In addition, HAVA required the EAC to operate a voting system certification program. The EAC's Testing and Certification Program (Program) is meant to assist state and local election officials by providing voting machine testing and certification.²¹ According to the EAC, the Program's purpose "is to independently verify that voting systems comply with the functional capabilities, accessibility, and security requirements necessary to ensure the integrity and reliability of voting system operation, as established in the [Guidelines]."²²

¹⁷ The specific Dominion voting system modification the County procured and that the EAC and SOS certified is Dominion's Democracy Suite 5.5-B. According to the EAC certification, the Democracy Suite 5.5-B Voting System is a paper-based optical scan voting system with a hybrid paper/direct recording electronic (DRE) option consisting of the following major components: The Election Management System, the ImageCast Central, the ImageCast Precinct, the ImageCast Evolution, the ImageCast X DRE with Reports Printer, ImageCast X DRE with voter-verifiable paper audit trail, and the ImageCast X ballot marking device. The Democracy Suite 5.5-B Voting System configuration is a modification from the EAC-approved Democracy Suite 5.5 system configuration. See Appendix J, pages j-1 through j-13, for the EAC's certification of the voting system. The EAC must approve any change to an EAC-certified voting system, including changes to hardware, software, firmware, documentation, or data. (https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/voting_system/files/DVS_5.5B_Certificate_Scope_Conformance.pdf, retrieved February 17, 2022.)

¹⁸ A.R.S. §16-442(B) requires that machines or devices used at any election for federal, State, or county offices may only be certified for use in the State and may only be used in the State if they comply with HAVA and if those machines or devices have been tested and approved by a laboratory that is accredited pursuant to HAVA.

¹⁹ HAVA requires that the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) evaluate independent, nonfederal laboratories and submit to the EAC a list of those laboratories to be accredited. Additionally, HAVA requires NIST to monitor and review the performance of EAC-accredited laboratories. NIST has chosen its National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) to carry out these duties. NVLAP conducts a review of applicant laboratories in order to provide a measure of confidence that such laboratories can perform testing of voting systems to federal standards. Additionally, the NVLAP program monitors laboratories by requiring regular assessments. Laboratories are reviewed 1 year after their initial accreditation and biennially thereafter. The EAC has made NVLAP accreditation a requirement of its Voting System Test Laboratory Program.

²⁰ The Guidelines are a set of specifications and requirements against which voting systems can be tested to determine if they provide all the basic functionality, accessibility, and security capabilities required of voting systems.

²¹ EAC. (2021). EAC Testing & Certification Program. Washington, DC.

²² EAC. (2021). EAC Testing & Certification Program. Washington, DC.

To receive EAC certification, voting systems must be tested by an EAC-accredited voting system testing laboratory for conformance to the Guidelines, which include guidance regarding design, quality, cybersecurity, transparency, interoperability, accessibility, privacy, usability, auditability, secrecy, access control, physical security, data protection, system integration, detection, and monitoring of voting systems. The EAC then verifies the evaluation in accordance with the provisions of the EAC *Voting System Testing and Certification Program Manual* and that the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the test report are consistent with the evidence.

The SOS certified the voting system as State law requires—In accordance with State law, the County's contract with Dominion required that the voting system be certified by the SOS. Specifically, State law requires the SOS to form a committee to investigate and test vote recording or tabulating machines that may be used in the State and make recommendations regarding their adoption to the SOS, who makes the final decision regarding certification.²³ The County's contract with Dominion allowed the County to terminate the contract if the voting system did not obtain SOS certification. The SOS reported that on October 25, 2019, it posted on its website, the Arizona Public Meetings website, and in its lobby a notice for a public meeting to be held on October 29, 2019, at which the SOS Equipment Certification Advisory Committee (Committee) would review Dominion's application for certification and conduct tests of its voting system. At the meeting, the Committee tested the Dominion voting system and voted unanimously to recommend its certification. On November 5, 2019, the SOS certified the voting system.

The County tested the voting system and conducted a pilot deployment to ensure it would be sufficient to support election operations—The County's contract with Dominion also required Dominion to provide the County a fully functioning voting system at no additional cost to the County to use during the pilot phase. This voting system was the actual voting system the County was contracted to purchase from Dominion, but only a limited number of machines needed to perform the pilot deployment. The County's pilot phase entailed 3 different components:

- First, the County conducted a mock election with the voting system. Specifically, from September 3 through 6, 2019, Dominion trained County staff how to use the voting system, and the County processed 7,868 test ballots through it as though it were a real election. The County completed the mock election and did not note any issues.
- Second, the County conducted an electronic adjudication write-in stress test of the voting system.²⁴
 Specifically, on October 3 and 4, 2019, the County performed a stress test to determine the speed at which ballots could be adjudicated to determine the number of adjudication machines the County would need. The County completed the stress test and did not note any issues.
- Third, as required by the contract, the County conducted a small jurisdictional election in November 2019 using the voting system.²⁵ Specifically, on November 5, 2019, the County conducted the pilot deployment of the voting system at the Madison Elementary School District election. This election was an all-mail election with 11,888 ballots submitted. The County reported that it used the voting system's precinct-based equipment and central count tabulators to count the votes at the election, and a 100 percent hand count was also done that confirmed the machine counts. Although the County's contract with Dominion allowed the County to terminate the contract if this pilot deployment was unsuccessful, the County did not need to do so.²⁶

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²³ A.R.S. §16-442(A) requires the Secretary of State to appoint a committee of 3 persons to investigate and test the various types of vote recording or tabulating machines or devices that may be used in the State. The committee is to consist of a member of the engineering college at 1 of the universities, a member of the State Bar of Arizona, and 1 person familiar with voting processes in the State, no more than 2 of whom shall be of the same political party, and at least 1 of whom shall have at least 5 years of experience with and shall be able to render an opinion based on knowledge of, training in, or education in electronic voting systems, procedures, and security. The committee submits its recommendations to the Secretary of State, who then makes the final adoption of the type or types, make or makes, and model or models to be certified for use in the State.

²⁴ According to NIST, adjudication is the process of resolving flagged cast ballots to reflect voter intent. Common reasons for flagging include write-ins, overvotes, marginal machine-readable mark, having no contest selections marked on the entire ballot, or the ballot being unreadable by a scanner. Retrieved from https://pages.nist.gov/ElectionGlossary/ on February 22, 2022.

²⁵ Although the contract allowed for a pilot deployment in March 2020, if necessary, the County did not need to do one.

²⁶ The contract does not include specific criteria for evaluating whether the pilot deployment was unsuccessful but provides that the determination of whether the pilot deployment was unsuccessful is at the County's sole discretion.

County finalized contract terms on February 10, 2020, for 3-year lease of Dominion voting system at total cost of \$5.94 million

Following the successful pilot deployment, the County twice amended its contract with Dominion before the 2020 elections. Specifically, on December 20, 2019, the County amended the contract to revise some of the quantities and voting system equipment purchased under the contract (see Appendix K, page k-1, for voting system items included in the contract and related costs). The County further amended the contract on February 10, 2020, to clarify the contract's duration—a 3-year lease of the voting system that began on January 1, 2020, at a total cost of \$5.94 million. The contract also specifies that the County has an option to extend the contract with Dominion for an additional 2 years and 7 months.²⁷

The contract requires Dominion to train the County in performing preventative maintenance. According to the contract, preventative maintenance is primarily focused on the voting system's mechanical components and consists of standard steps and checklists for each type of ImageCast Ballot Marking Devices and accessible voting system component. Dominion is also responsible for repairing any failed component under warranty and coordinating any repair or maintenance actions with the County. Dominion's warranty must also cover any software or firmware patches, fixes, and updates, including any associated installation, testing, the necessary support to implement the changes, and SOS approval.

²⁷ The contract does not specify the cost for the optional extension.



Session law

Pursuant to Laws 2021, Ch. 408, §54:

The auditor general shall conduct a special audit of financial and related information of any private, nongovernmental grant monies used for this state's 2020 elections and Maricopa county's procurement of voting systems. On or before March 31, 2022, the auditor general shall submit a report to the governor, the president of the senate and the speaker of the house of representatives on all of the following:

- 1. Private, nongovernmental grant monies received and expended by the Secretary of State's Office for the 2020 elections and any balance remaining unexpended on June 30, 2021, for the following:
 - a. Educating voters how to sign up for the permanent early voting list or how to request an early ballot. The report shall include the type of information provided and where the information was provided.
 - b. Recruiting poll workers. The report shall include where the recruitment was targeted and advertised and the requirements for poll worker selection.
 - c. Combating misinformation and disinformation about the 2020 elections. The report shall include the methods used, the type of information provided and where the information was provided.
 - d. Personnel and employee-related expenses. The report shall include an analysis of why the monies were used for these specific purposes.
- 2. Private, nongovernmental grant monies received and expended by Maricopa County on programs and processes for the 2020 elections, including the purpose of the expenditures, the amount spent for personnel and employee-related expenses and any balance remaining unexpended on June 30, 2021.
- 3. Private, nongovernmental grant monies received and expended by Pima County on programs and processes for the 2020 elections, including the purpose of the expenditures, the amount spent for personnel and employee-related expenses and any balance remaining unexpended on June 30, 2021.
- 4. Maricopa County's process to acquire Dominion Voting Systems, including information regarding:
 - a. Compliance with the county's procurement code.
 - b. Agreement terms, including acquisition costs, time frames, and machine maintenance and security.
 - c. The Maricopa County Board of Supervisors meetings to discuss the acquisition, including any public comment.
 - d. The security and technical analysis that occurred before the acquisition.

Source: Laws 2021, Ch. 408, §54.



CTCL grant monies received by Arizona counties

The following table lists the Arizona counties that received CTCL grant monies and how each county spent the grant monies, categorized by the CTCL spending categories. According to the public disclosure copy of CTCL's 2020 federal Form 990 Return of Organizations Exempt From Income Tax, posted on the CTCL website, 9 of the 15 Arizona counties received CTCL grant monies for the 2020 elections, totaling \$6,810,967.²⁸

Table 7

CTCL grant monies received by Arizona counties for the 2020 elections and amounts used, categorized by CTCL categories

June 1, 2020 through August 31, 2021

(Unaudited)

			Arizona counti	es that receiv	ed CTCL gran	t monies for 20	020 elections		
	Apache ¹	Coconino	Graham	La Paz	Maricopa ²	Navajo	Pima	Pinal	Yuma
CTCL grant monies received	\$598,700	\$614,691	\$32,450	\$17,532	\$2,995,921	\$614,420	\$950,446	\$806,042	\$180,765
Interest on grant monies					10,770				
Total grant monies, including interest	598,700	614,691	32,450	17,532	3,006,691	614,420	950,446	806,042	180,765
Uses of CTCL grant monies:									
Ballot drop boxes		25,041				216		34,165	
Drive-through voting								1,707	
Personal protective equipment (PPE) for staff, poll									
workers, or voters		32,011			8,965	687		22,870	
Poll worker recruitment funds, hazard pay, and/or									
training expenses		48,680	2,510		61,064	47,180	941,408		
Polling place rental and cleaning expenses		12,265			231,780	139			
Temporary staffing support		117,676	1,461		1,105,274	22,214		67,819	
Election department real estate costs, or costs									
associated with satellite election department office		54,104				54,602		121,705	8,173
Vote-by-mail/Absentee voting equipment or supplies		35,854			176,706	46,823	9,038	158,778	45,707
Election administration equipment		113,277		17,532	267,325	402,364		65,518	117,748
Voting materials in languages other than English		42,433				13,600			
Nonpartisan voter education		43,243				5,964			9,137
Total uses	0	524,584	3,971	17,532	1,851,115	593,789	950,446	472,562	180,765
Unused grant monies, including interest	598,700	90,107	28,479	0	1,155,576	20,631	0	333,480	0
Returned to grantor		90,107	28,479		1,155,576	20,631		333,480	
Remaining grant monies as of August 31, 2021	\$598,700	\$ 0	\$0	\$ 0	\$ 0	\$ 0	\$0	\$0	\$ 0

¹ The Apache County Chief Deputy Recorder reported as of March 3, 2022, that Apache County had not submitted a grant report to CTCL to show how it used the monies. Initial grant reports were due to CTCL by January 31, 2021.

² In February 2021, Maricopa County received approval from CTCL to expend unused grant monies it had received for the 2020 elections for other election expenses through June 30, 2021. Therefore, as approved by the grantor, Maricopa County used some CTCL grant monies for 2021 elections.

Source: Auditor General staff analysis of grant reports counties submitted to CTCL provided by each county and the public disclosure copy of CTCL's 2020 federal Form 990 Return of Organizations Exempt From Income Tax posted on the CTCL website (Https://www.techandciviclife.org/, retrieved on February 2, 2022).

²⁸ Https://www.techandciviclife.org/, retrieved on February 2, 2022.





SOS methods and related information for combating misinformation and disinformation—primary election

The following table presents the primary election advertising methods and locations the SOS purchased with private, nongovernmental grant monies. Digital advertising was available anywhere the user had internet access. Various examples of the different advertisements follow the table.

Primary election

Digital advertising—The following includes digital advertising campaigns, the target audiences, and amounts. This advertising was available anywhere a user had internet access.

Method	Target audience	Amount
Facebook, Instagram, and website advertising	Targeting registered voters on PEVL	\$ 54,800
	Targeting CRM list of people not on PEVL	24,086
	Targeting nonregistered voters	57,004
Website advertising	Targeting Independent and nonpartisan voters	18,625
Total primary election digital advertising		\$154,515

Traditional advertising—The following includes all newspaper and radio ad campaigns, the locations, and amounts.

Method	Location	Amount
Newspaper	Apache and Navajo Counties (2 newspapers, including the online editions)	\$ 5,428
Radio (English)	Apache, Cochise, Coconino, Gila, Greenlee, Graham, La Paz, Mohave, Navajo (English and Diné), Yavapai, and Yuma Counties (39 radio stations)	
	Phoenix (7 radio stations)	20,597
	Tucson (8 radio stations)	9,741
Radio (Spanish)	Maricopa, Pima, Santa Cruz, Yavapai, and Yuma Counties (8 <i>radio stations</i>)	20,779
Total primary election traditional advertising		118,004
Total primary election advertising		\$272,519

Source: Auditor General staff analysis of SOS 2020 elections media plan summary.

Primary election digital advertising examples





2020 election season! Register to vote or update your voter registration on or before July 6 for the Primary Election on August 4. Visit Arizona.Vote.



of the

Voting by mail is safe and secure. Request a one-time ballot-by-mail or join the Permanent Early Voting List at www.arizona.vote.



Request Ballot-by-Mail Vote by mail is safe & secure LEARN MORE

Source: SOS-provided document created by its contracted advertising agency.

Primary election newspaper advertising examples



Source: SOS-provided document created by its contracted advertising agency.

Request your Primary Election ballot at Arizona.Vote >

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Transcript of primary election radio advertising examples¹

English	Spanish	Diné
Hi, I'm Arizona Secretary of State Katie Hobbs. The 2020 election season is coming up fast. There is an important date to remember. July 6th. Why is July 6th so important? It's the voter registration deadline for the primary election on August 4th. Don't wait. Register to vote or update your voter registration online at <u>Arizona.Vote</u> . It's your source for trusted election information, including requesting a ballot-by-mail. Visit <u>Arizona.Vote</u> today.	Las elecciones del 2020 se aproximan. Y hay una fecha importante que debe recordar; el 6 de julio. ¿Porque es tan importante el 6 de julio? Es la fecha límite para registrarse a votar para la elección primaria del 4 de agosto. No espere, regístrese para votar o actualice su registro de votante en línea en <u>Arizona.Vote</u> . Es su fuente confiable de información electoral Y donde puede solicitar su boleta por correo. Visite <u>Arizona.Vote</u> , hoy	A Diné language version of this ad was not used.
Hi, I'm Secretary of State Katie Hobbs with a reminder for Arizonans. To vote by mail in the primary election you must request your ballot, or sign up for the permanent early voting list, on or before July 24th. We recommend mailing it back by July 29th. If you're an independent voter, contact your county recorder's office to select a party ballot. Learn more at <u>Arizona.Vote</u> .	La votación temprana para las elecciones primarias del 4 de agosto ha comenzado. La oficina de la Secretaria de Estado les recuerda, a las personas que desean votar por correo lo siguiente. Debe solicitar su boleta por correo, o inscribirse en la lista permanente de votación temprana a más tardar el 24 de julio. Se recomienda que devuelva su boleta por correo antes del 29 de julio. Si es un votante independiente, comuníquese con la oficina del registrador de su condado para seleccionar una boleta de partido. Visite <u>Arizona.</u> <u>Vote</u> para más información.	The message of this ad was consistent with the message of the English version of the ad.

¹ Diné is largely a spoken language rather than a written language. Therefore, rather than providing a transcript of each radio ad in Diné, we contracted with a Diné speaker to assess the consistency of the message of each Diné radio ad compared to the message of the English version of the ad. The results are presented in the table.

Source: Auditor General staff transcription of SOS-provided English and Spanish audio files and Auditor General contractor's assessment of SOSprovided Diné audio files all created by its contracted advertising agency.



SOS methods and related information for combating misinformation and disinformation—general election

The following table presents the general election advertising methods and locations the SOS purchased with private, nongovernmental grant monies. Digital advertising was available anywhere the user had internet access. Various examples of the different advertisements follow the table.

General election			
<i>Digital advertising</i> —The following includes digital advertising campaigns, the target audiences, and amounts. This advertising was available anywhere a user had internet access.			
Method	Target audience	Amount	
Facebook, Instagram, and	Targeting registered voters on PEVL	\$1,114,297	
website advertising	Targeting CRM list of people not on PEVL	491,052	
	AZ nonregistered voters.	253,479	
Facebook, Instagram, website advertising, and YouTube	Everyone in AZ age 18 and older	814,143	
Total general election digital a	advertising	\$2,672,971	

Traditional advertising—The following includes newspaper, outdoor, radio, and television ad campaigns, the locations, and amounts.

Method	Location	Amount
Newspaper	Apache and Navajo Counties (3 newspapers, including the online editions for 2 newspapers)	\$ 14,940
	Apache and Navajo Counties (voter registration inserts in 3 newspapers)	1,800
	Apache, Cochise, Coconino, Gila, Graham, Greenlee, La Paz, Mohave, Navajo, Pinal, Santa Cruz, Yavapai, and Yuma Counties (28 newspapers)	101,116
	Arizona Republic and Arizona Daily Star	18,884
Outdoor (electronic)	Maricopa County (includes freeway bulletins, street digital posters, digital mall ads, and digital bus shelters)	115,618
	State-wide (gas station TV)	12,819
Outdoor (print)	Apache, Cochise, Coconino, Gila, Graham, Greenlee, La Paz, Mohave, Navajo, Pinal, Santa Cruz, Yavapai, and Yuma Counties (<i>includes bulletins, posters, bus shelters, and gas pump toppers</i>)	83,925
Radio	Cochise, Coconino, Gila, Graham, La Paz, Mohave, Navajo, Pima, Pinal, and Yavapai Counties (SKYVIEW Arizona Radio News Network <i>49 radio stations</i>)	18,816
Radio (English)	Apache, Cochise, Coconino, Gila, Greenlee, Graham, La Paz, Mohave, Navajo (English and Diné), Yavapai, and Yuma Counties (39 radio stations)	\$ 105,395

General election			
Radio (English)	Phoenix (9 radio stations)	\$	49,097
	Tucson (8 radio stations)		16,080
	Phoenix and Tucson (NPR stations)		17,281
	Phoenix, Tucson, and Yuma (traffic ads)		37,551
Radio (Spanish)	Maricopa, Yavapai, and Yuma Counties (3 radio stations)		43,992
Television (English)	Cochise, Coconino, Gila, Greenlee, Graham, La Paz, Maricopa, Mohave, Navajo, Pima, Pinal, Santa Cruz, and Yavapai Counties (<i>PBS</i>)		11,367
Television (Spanish)	Apache, Cochise, Coconino, Gila, Greenlee, Graham, La Paz, Mohave, Navajo, Pima, Pinal, Santa Cruz, Yavapai, and Yuma Counties		172,046
Total general election traditional advertising			820,727
Total general election advertis	sing	\$3,	493,698

Source: Auditor General staff analysis of SOS 2020 elections media plan summary.

General election digital advertising examples



Source: SOS-provided document created by its contracted advertising agency.

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¹ According to the advertising agency, these newspaper advertisements ran prior to the federal court decision that extended the voter registration deadline from October 5 to October 15. Mi Familia Vota v. Hobbs, 977 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2020).

Source: SOS-provided document created by its contracted advertising agency.

General election outdoor (electronic) advertising example



Source: SOS-provided document created by its contracted advertising agency.

General election outdoor (print) advertising example



Source: SOS-provided document created by its contracted advertising agency.

Transcript of general election radio advertising examples¹

English	Spanish	Diné
The 2020 general election is November 3rd. That's just around the corner. Hi, I'm Arizona Secretary of State Katie Hobbs with an important message. The deadline to register to vote is October 5th. ² So don't wait, visit <u>Arizona.Vote</u> and register today. You can also request a one-time ballot by mail or sign up for the permanent early voting list. Remember the voter registration deadline is October 5th. Visit <u>Arizona.Vote</u> your source for trusted election information.	La elección general del 2020 es el 3 de noviembre. Este es un recado importante de la Oficina de la Secretaría del estado de Arizona. La fecha límite para registrarse para votar es el 5 de octubre. No espere, visite <u>Arizona.Vote</u> y regístrese hoy. También puede solicitar una boleta por correo por esta única vez; o inscribirse en la lista permanente de votación temprana. Recuerde, la fecha limita para registrarse para votar es el 5 de octubre. Visite <u>Arizona.Vote</u> .	The message of this ad was consistent with the message of the English version of the ad.
The general election is coming up. I'm Secretary of State Katie Hobbs and here's how you can vote by mail. October 23rd is the last day to request a ballot by mail for the general election. To get yours, visit <u>Arizona.Vote</u> . Voting by mail is secure, reliable, and convenient. Complete your ballot and mail it back as soon as possible. Or you can take your ballot to any official drop box or official voting location in your county. To request your ballot by mail, visit <u>Arizona.Vote</u> today.	La elección general se aproxima. Este es un mensaje de la Secretaría del Estado de Arizona. El 23 de octubre es el último día para solicitar una boleta por correo para la elección general. Para obtener la suya; visite <u>Arizona.Vote</u> . Votar por correo es seguro, confiable y conveniente. Complete su boleta y envíela por correo lo antes posible. También la puede dejar en cualquier lugar de entrega de boletas, o en un lugar de votación oficial en su condado. Para solicitar su boleta por correo, visite <u>Arizona.Vote</u> hoy.	The message of this ad was consistent with the message of the English version of the ad.
Hi, I'm Secretary of State Katie Hobbs. The 2020 general election is Tuesday November 3rd. Voting locations across the state will be open on election day from 6 am to 7 pm. Make a plan before you go to the polls. Find a voting location and bring your ID. If you still have a ballot by mail, you can return it to any official drop box or voting location by 7 pm November 3rd. For more information on how to prepare for election day, visit <u>Arizona.Vote</u> . Your trusted source for election information.	Este es un mensaje de la Secretaria de Estado. La elección general de 2020 es el martes 3 de noviembre. Los lugares de votación estarán abiertos el día de la elección de 6 am a 7 pm. Haga un plan antes de ir a votar. Busque su lugar para votar y traiga su identificación. Si todavía tiene una boleta por correo; puede devolverla a cualquier buzón electoral o lugar de votación antes de las 7 pm el 3 de noviembre. Para más información visite <u>Arizona.Vote</u> . Su fuente confiable de información electoral.	The message of this ad was consistent with the message of the English version of the ad.

¹ Diné is largely a spoken language rather than a written language. Therefore, rather than providing a transcript of each radio ad in Diné, we contracted with a Diné speaker to assess the consistency of the message of each Diné radio ad compared to the message of the English version of the ad. The results are presented in the table.

² According to the advertising agency, these radio advertisements ran prior to the federal court decision that extended the voter registration deadline from October 5 to October 15. Mi Familia Vota v. Hobbs, 977 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2020).

Source: Auditor General staff transcription of SOS-provided English and Spanish audio files and Auditor General contractor's assessment of SOSprovided Diné audio files all created by its contracted advertising agency.

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Transcript of general election television advertising examples

English	Spanish
The general election is November 3rd. Still have your ballot by mail. Return ballots to any election drop box or voting location in your county. You don't have to stand in line to do it. Learn more at <u>Arizona.Vote</u> . (<u>https://vimeo.com/652194532/c3c4376b5f</u>)	La elección general es el 3 de noviembre. ¿Todavía tiene su boleta por correo? Devuelva la boleta a cualquier buzón electoral o lugar de votación en su condado. No tiene que hacer fila para dejarla. Aprenda más en <u>Arizona.Vote</u> . (https://vimeo.com/652194653/ c12ea51c8f)

Source: Auditor General staff transcription of SOS-provided video file created by its contracted advertising agency.

Transcript of general election outdoor (electronic-gas station TV) advertising

English
The general election is November 3rd. You can vote
in person. Voting locations are open from 6 am to 7
pm on election day. Remember to bring appropriate
ID. Still have your ballot by mail? Return ballots to any
election drop box or voting location in your county.
Recommended last day to mail back is October
27th. Learn more at <u>Arizona.Vote</u> (<u>https://vimeo.</u>
com/652195299/763d6d8d3d)

Source: Auditor General staff transcription of SOS-provided video file created by its contracted advertising agency.



SOS methods and related information for combating misinformation and disinformation—post-election

The following table presents the post-election advertising methods and locations the SOS purchased with private, nongovernmental grant monies. Digital advertising was available anywhere the user had internet access. Various examples of the different advertisements follow the table.

Post election		
<i>Digital advertising</i> —The following includes digital ad campaigns, the target audience, and amount. This advertising was available anywhere a user had internet access.		
Method	Target audience	Amount

Facebook, Instagram, and website advertising	Everyone in AZ age 18 and older	\$215,728
Total post-election digital advertising		\$215,728

Traditional advertising—The following includes outdoor and radio ad campaigns, locations, and amounts.

Method	Location	Amount
Outdoor (electronic)	Maricopa, Mohave, and Yuma Counties (<i>includes freeway bulletins and street digital posters</i>)	\$ 85,804
Radio (English)	Apache, Cochise, Coconino, Gila, Greenlee, Graham, La Paz, Mohave, Navajo, Yavapai, and Yuma Counties (39 radio stations)	36,521
	Phoenix (7 radio stations)	28,795
	Tucson (8 radio stations)	14,744
Radio (Spanish)	Maricopa, Yavapai, and Yuma Counties (3 radio stations)	19,135
Total post-election traditional advertising		184,999
Total post-election advertising		\$400,727

Source: Auditor General staff analysis of SOS 2020 elections media plan summary.

Post-election digital advertising examples



Source: SOS-provided document created by its contracted advertising agency.

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ACCURATE ELECTION RESULTS TAKE TIME. Updates at Arizona.Vote



MORE THAN 3.4 MILLION ARIZONANS VOTED IN THE GENERAL ELECTION. THANK YOU. Visit Arizona.Vote



Source: SOS-provided document created by its contracted advertising agency.

Transcript of post-election radio advertising examples

English	Spanish	Diné
What happens after the voting locations close? This is Secretary of State Katie Hobbs. In Arizona you'll start to see election results around 8 pm on election day. However, these early results will change as county election officials continue to verify and count ballots. This takes time, so please be patient as election officials work to ensure every eligible vote is counted. Throughout the process you can track your ballot and find updated results at <u>Arizona.</u> <u>Vote</u> your trusted source for election information	¿Qué sucede después de que los lugares de votación cierran? Este es un mensaje de la Secretaria de Estado. En Arizona comenzaran a ver los resultados de las elecciones; alrededor de las 8 pm el día de la elección. Estos resultados cambiarán a medida que los funcionarios electorales de cada condado, continúen verificando y contando las boletas. Esto toma tiempo. Así que por favor tenga paciencia mientras trabajan para garantizar que cada voto elegible sea contado. Encuentra resultados actualizados y verifique el estado de su boleta en <u>Arizona.Vote</u> . Su fuente confiable de información electora.	A Diné language version of this ad was not used.
This is Arizona Secretary of State Katie Hobbs with an election update. The State will certify the 2020 general election results on November 30th. You can check results anytime at <u>Arizona.Vote</u> and thank you Arizona for another safe and secure election. More than 3.4 million Arizonans voted in the general election. To learn more about voting visit <u>Arizona.Vote</u> . It's your trusted source for election information. Look for the certified election results on November 30th	Esta es una actualización de las elecciones de parte de la Secretaria de Estado de Arizona. El estado certificará los resultados de la elección general del 2020 el 30 de noviembre. Puede verificar los resultados en cualquier momento en <u>Arizona.Vote</u> . Y gracias Arizona por otra elección segura y protegida. Más de 3.4 millones de personas votaron en la elección general. Para más información sobre la votación; visite <u>Arizona.Vote</u> . Es su fuente confiable de información electoral. Busque los resultados de las elecciones certificadas el 30 de noviembre.	A Diné language version of this ad was not used.

Source: Auditor General staff transcription of SOS-provided English and Spanish audio files created by its contracted advertising agency.

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APPENDIX F



PEVL mailer

The following is an example of the mailer that the SOS sent in 2020 to educate voters about how to sign up for PEVL or how to request an early ballot.





YOU HAVE A SAY IN HOW TO PARTICIPATE IN THE 2020 GENERAL ELECTION.

Registered voters in Arizona have many options for making their voices heard in the 2020 General Election. Any voter can choose to vote in person, early or on Election Day or they can request a ballot-by-mail. Our state has a secure and reliable voting by mail process, and most Arizonans already vote by mail from the comfort of their homes.

This year, because of the ongoing concerns about the pandemic, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommends voting by mail to help keep voters and poll workers safe.

You can either request a one-time ballot by mail for this election, or you can join the Permanent Early Voting List (PEVL) and receive a ballot in the mail automatically for elections you qualify to participate in from now on. Here is some more information about your ballot-bymail options.

1. Permanent Early Voting List (PEVL)

Voters on the PEVL are automatically sent a ballot-by-mail for all elections in which they are eligible to vote. There is no deadline to join the PEVL. However, to get a ballot-by-mail for an upcoming election, you must sign up at least 11 days before Election Day. That means your request must be made by October 23 if you want to join PEVL in time for the General Election.

2. One-Time Ballot-by-Mail

Voters can request a one-time ballot-by-mail just for the General Election. Make this request on or before October 23 for the November 3 General Election.

If you'd like to vote by mail, complete and return the enclosed form or visit Arizona.Vote today. It's your source for trusted 2020 election information.

Sincerely,

Katie Hobbs Secretary of State

Arizona.Vote

Arizona Auditor General

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			STOLTONA
STHE STATE	BALLOT-BY-MAIL & PERM		
1912 +	VOTING LIST REQUEST FO		
KATIE HOBBS SECRETARY OF STATE	FORMULARIO DE SOLICITUD PARA LA BOLETA-P PERMANENTE DE VOTACIÓN TEMPRANA	OR-C	CORREO Y LA LISTA
	Use this form: (1) to request a ballot-by-mail for the General Election; or (2) to be added to the Permanent Early Voting List (PEVL) and automatically receive a ballot-by-mail for every election. Complete, sign, and return this form by mail, fax, or email to your County Recorder (contact information: azsos.gov/county-election-info). Your request must be received by <u>5:00 p.m. on the 11th</u> day before the election to receive a ballot-by-mail for that election.		
	Use este formulario: (1) para solicitar una boleta-por-correo; o (2) para ser incluido en la Lista Permanente de Votación Temprana y recibir automáticamente una boleta-por-correo para cada elección. Llene, firme, y devuelva por correo, email, o fax este formulario al Registrador de su Condado (datos de contacto: azsos.gov/county-election-info). Para recibir una boleta-por-correo para una election, el Registrador de su Condado debe recibir su solicitud <u>antes de las 5:00 p.m., 11 dias antes del dia de la elección</u> .		
	* Starred boxes are required. / Cajas con un asterisco son	obligo	torios.
*1	I am requesting a ballot for: / Estoy solicitando una boleta par		
	Every Election. I authorize the County Recorder to include my name on the PEVL and automatically send me a ballot-by-mail for each election I am eligible for. Todas las Elecciones. Autorizo al Registrador del Condado a incluir mi nombre en la Lista Permanente de Votación Temprana y a enviarme automáticamente una boleta- por-correo para cada elección para la cual yo sea elegible. General Election Only Sólamente para la Elección General		
2	Date / Fecha	3	Phone Number / Número de Teléfono
*4	First and Last Name / Nombre y Apellido		
5	Voter ID / Identificación de votante		
*6	Residence Address / Domicilio Residencial		
7	County of Residence / Condado de Domicilio		
8	Mailing Address (if different from residence address) / Direc	ción P	stal (si es diferente a su domicilio)
*9	Date of Birth / Fecha de Nacimiento	10	Email Address / Correo Electrónico
*11	Provide your place of birth, driver's license #, or last 4 digits of SSN# Proporcione su lugar de nacimiento, # de licencia, o los cuatros dígitos pasados de su # de seguridad social		
12	Check this box if you request the County Recorder <u>change your residence and mailing address</u> on your registration record to the ones listed above. / Marque esta casilla si solicita al Registrador del Condado que <u>cambie su domicilio y</u> <u>dirección</u> postal en su registro electoral a los que están enumerados arriba.		
	Former address / Dirección anterior		
To update your registration Para actualizar	Check this box if you request the County Recorder change your name on your registration record to the one listed above. / Marque esta casilla si usted solicita que el Registrador de su Condado cambie su nombre en su registro electoral por el que aparece arriba.		
su registro	Former name / Nombre anterior		
*13	By signing below, I swear or affirm that I am a registered voter in my county of residence and that the above information is true and correct. / AI firmar abajo, yo juro o afirmo que soy un votante registrado en mi condado de residencia y que la información anterior es verdadera y corecta.		
	Х		
	Questions? / ¿Preguntas? 1-8	77-T	HE-VOTE or elections@azsos.gov

Source: SOS-provided document created by its contracted advertising agency.





Poll worker recruitment advertisements

The following are examples of poll worker recruitment advertisements the SOS purchased with private, nongovernmental grant monies.



Secretary Katie Hobbs 🥥 September 14 at 6:41 PM · 🕲

Sign up to be a poll worker and help get ready for the General Election and run voting centers. Receive training and pay.



Election Day Poll Workers Hiring election poll workers.

Learn More



Secretary Katie Hobbs 🥥 September 14 at 6:41 PM · 3

Democracy needs you. We're hiring poll workers to help Arizona during the 2020 Election season. Pay varies by county.



AZSOS.GOV General Election Workers Hiring election poll workers.

Learn More

Source: SOS-provided document created by its contracted advertising agency.

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
APPENDIX H

EBU voter postcard

The following is an example of a postcard sent to EBU voters to inform them that they may be eligible to vote and to provide information on how to register. The postcards also included a website address that provided information on how to request a ballot-by-mail. According to SOS data, the postcards were sent to a total of 1,430,503 EBU voters across all 15 Arizona counties.



Back¹



¹ The reverse side of the postcard was specific to the county in which the EBU voter resided.

Source: SOS-provided document created by its contracted advertising agency.





Maricopa County voting system evaluation criteria and scores

The following are the RFP evaluation criteria and selection committee scores for Maricopa County's procurement of the voting system it used in the 2020 elections.

Maricopa County voting system selection committee scores for bidders on voting system RFP

May 13, 2019 (Unaudited)

	Proposals received from bidders and their committee scores:			
	Dominion Voting Systems	Election Systems & Software	Clear Ballot Group	
Criteria	Score	Score	Score	
Respondent's written proposed solution/ compliance with specifications	806	675	656	
Proposer meets County contractor requirements Open source software features Supports County open data initiative Warranty Adjudication programs or applications Supports cryptographic hashing of system and election-related data and reports				
Support services offered	563	542	454	
Installation plan Training and instruction Election-specific support Maintenance plan				
Pilot program offered	580	480	280	
Pilot cost (shipping, installation, setup, and testing) Pilot installation plan Pilot training and instruction Pilot election support				
Price	450	415	430	
Total score	2,399	2,112	1,820	

Source: Auditor General staff analysis of Maricopa County's voting system procurement records.


Table 8

APPENDIX J



EAC Certification

The following is the EAC's certificate of conformance for Dominion's Democracy Suite 5.5-B voting system.



Manufacturer: Dominion Voting Systems (DVS) System Name: Democracy Suite 5.5-B Certificate: DVS-DemSuite5.5-B Laboratory: Pro V&V Standard: VVSG 1.0 (2005) Date: September 11, 2019



Scope of Certification

This document describes the scope of the validation and certification of the system defined above. Any use, configuration changes, revision changes, additions or subtractions from the described system are not included in this evaluation.

Significance of EAC Certification

An EAC certification is an official recognition that a voting system (in a specific configuration or configurations) has been tested to and has met an identified set of Federal voting system standards. An EAC certification is **not**:

- An endorsement of a Manufacturer, voting system, or any of the system's components.
- A Federal warranty of the voting system or any of its components.
- A determination that a voting system, when fielded, will be operated in a manner that meets all HAVA requirements.
- A substitute for State or local certification and testing.
- A determination that the system is ready for use in an election.
- A determination that any particular component of a certified system is itself certified for use outside the certified configuration.

Representation of EAC Certification

Manufacturers may not represent or imply that a voting system is certified unless it has received a Certificate of Conformance for that system. Statements regarding EAC certification in brochures, on Web sites, on displays, and in advertising/sales literature must be made solely in reference to specific systems. Any action by a Manufacturer to suggest EAC endorsement of its product or organization is strictly prohibited and may result in a Manufacturer's suspension or other action pursuant to Federal civil and criminal law.


System Overview:

The D-Suite 5.5-B Voting System is a paper-based optical scan voting system with a hybrid paper/DRE option consisting of the following major components: The Election Management System (EMS), the ImageCast Central (ICC), the ImageCast Precinct (ICP and ICP2), the ImageCast Evolution (ICE), the ImageCast X (ICX) DRE w/ Reports Printer, ImageCast X (ICX) DRE w/ voter-verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT), and the ImageCast X ballot marking device (BMD). The D-Suite 5.5-B Voting System configuration is a modification from the EAC approved D-Suite 5.5 system configuration.

Language capability:

System supports Alaska Native, Apache, Bengali, Chinese, English, Eskimo, Filipino, French, Hindi, Japanese, Jicarilla, Keres, Khmer, Korean, Navajo, Seminole, Spanish, Thai, Towa, Ute, Vietnamese, and Yuman.

Democracy Suite 5.5-B System Diagram



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Components Included:

This section provides information describing the components and revision level of the primary components included in this Certification.

System Component	Software or Firmware Version	Operating System or COTS	Comments
EMS Election Event Designer (EED)	5.5.32.4	Windows 10 Pro	EMS
EMS Results Tally and Reporting (RTR)	5.5.32.4	Windows 10 Pro	EMS
EMS Application Server	5.5.32.4	Windows Server 2012 R2	EMS
		Windows 10 Pro	
EMS File System Service (FSS)	5.5.32.4	Window 10 Pro	EMS
EMS Audio Studio (AS)	5.5.32.4	Windows 10 Pro	EMS
EMS Data Center Manager (DCM)	5.5.32.4	Windows Server 2012 R2	EMS
		Windows 10 Pro	
EMS Election Data Translator (EDT)	5.5.32.4	Windows 10 Pro	EMS
ImageCast Voter Activation (ICVA)	5.5.32.4	Windows 10 Pro	EMS
EMS Adjudication (ADJ)	5.5.32.4	Windows 10 Pro	EMS
EMS Adjudication Services	5.5.32.4	Windows 10 Pro	EMS
Smart Card Helper Service (SCHS)	5.5.32.4	Windows 10 Pro	EMS
Election Firmware	5.5.31.1	uClinux	ICP
Firmware Updater	5.5.31.1	uClinux	ICP
Firmware Extractor	5.5.31.1	uClinux	ICP
Kernel (uClinux)	5.5.31.1	Modified COTS	ICP
Boot Loader (COLILO)	20040221	Modified COTS	ICP
Asymmetric Key Generator	5.5.31.1	uClinux	ICP
Asymmetric Key Exchange Utility	5.5.31.1	uClinux	ICP
Firmware Extractor (Technician Key)	5.5.31.1	uClinux	ICP
ICP2 Application	5.5.1.8	uClinux	ICP2
ICP2 Update Card	5.5.1.8	uClinux	ICP2
Voting Machine	5.5.6.5	Ubuntu Linux	ICE
Election Application	5.5.6.5	Ubuntu Linux	ICE
ImageCast Central Application	5.5.32.5	Windows 10 Pro	ICC
ICX Application	5.5.13.2	Android 5.1.1 (ICX Prime) Android 4.4.4 (ICX Classic)	ICX

Voting System Software Components:

Voting System Platform:

System Component	Version	Operating System or COTS	Comments
Microsoft Windows Server	2012 R2 Standard	Unmodified COTS	EMS Server SW
			Component
Microsoft Windows	10 Professional	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server
			SW Component
.NET Framework	3.5	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server
			SW Component
Microsoft Visual J#	2.0	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server
			SW Component
Microsoft Visual C++ 2013	2013	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server
Redistributable			SW Component
Microsoft Visual C++ 2015	2015	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server
Redistributable			SW Component

System Component	Version	Operating System or COTS	Comments
Java Runtime Environment	7u80	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Java Runtime Environment	8u144	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Microsoft SQL Server 2016Standard	2016 Standard	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Microsoft SQL Server 2016 Service Pack 1	2016 SP1	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Microsoft SQL Server 2016 SP1 Express	2016 SP1	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Cepstral Voices	6.2.3.801	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Arial Narrow Fonts	2.37a	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Maxim iButton Driver	4.05	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Adobe Reader DC	AcrobatDC	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Microsoft Access Database Engine	2010	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Open XML SDK 2.0 for Microsoft Office	2.0	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Infragistics NetAdvantage Win Forms 2011.1	2011 Vol. 1	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Infragistics NetAdvantage WPF 2012.1	2012 Vol. 1	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
TX Text Control Library for .NET	16.0	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
SOX	14.3.1	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
NLog	1.0.0.505	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
iTextSharp	5.0.5	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
OpenSSL	1.0.2K	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
OpenSSL FIPS Object Module	2.0.14 (Cert 1747)	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
SQLite	1.0.103.0	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Lame	3.99.4	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Speex	1.0.4	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Ghostscript	9.04	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
One Wire API for .NET	4.0.2.0	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Avalon-framework-cvs-20020806	20020806	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Batik	0.20-5	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Fop	0.20-5	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Microsoft Visual J# 2.0 Redistributable Package – Second Edition (x64)	2.0	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Entity framework	6.1.3	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Spreadsheetlight	3.4.3	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Open XML SDK 2.0 for Microsoft Office	2.0.5022.0	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Open SSL	1.0.2K	Unmodified COTS	ICP
OpenSSL FIPS Object Module	2.0.10 (Cert 1747)	Unmodified COTS	ICP
Zlib	1.2.3	Unmodified COTS	ICP
uClinux	20070130	Modified COTS	ICP
Kernel (Linux)	2.6.30.9-dvs-36	Modified COTS	ICE

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System Component	Version	Operating System or COTS	Comments
U-Boot	1.3.4	Modified COTS	ICE
Google Text-to-Speech Engine	3.11.12	Unmodified COTS	ICX SW
Kernel	4.9.11	Modified COTS	ICP2
U-Boot	2017.03	Modified COTS	ICP2
Zxing Barcode Scanner	4.7.5	Modified COTS	ICX SW
SoundTouch	1.9.2	Modified COTS	ICX SW
ICX Prime Android 5.1.1 Image	0405	Modified COTS	ICX SW
ICX Classic Android 4.4.4 Image	0.0.98	Modified COTS	ICX SW
OpenSSL FIPS Object Module	2.0.10 (Cert 2473)	Unmodified COTS	ICX SW Build Library
OpenSSL	1.0.2K	Unmodified COTS	ICC SW Build Library
OpenSSL FIPS Object Module	2.0.10 (Cert 1747)	Unmodified COTS	ICC SW Build Library
1-Wire Driver (x86)	4.05	Unmodified COTS	ICC Runtime SW
1-Wire Driver (x64)	4.05	Unmodified COTS	ICC Runtime SW
Canon DR-G1130 TWAIN Driver	1.2 SP6	Unmodified COTS	ICC Runtime SW
Canon DR-G160II TWAIN Driver	1.2 SP6	Unmodified COTS	ICC Runtime SW
Canon DR-M260 TWAIN Driver,	1.1 SP2	Unmodified COTS	ICC Runtime SW
InoTec HiPro 821 TWAIN Driver	1.2.3.17	Unmodified COTS	ICC Runtime SW
Visual C++ 2013 Redistributable (x86)	12.0.30501	Unmodified COTS	ICC Runtime SW
Machine Configuration File (MCF)	5.5.12.1_20190510	Proprietary	ICX Configuration File
Device Configuration File (DCF)	5.5.31_20190423	Proprietary	ICP and ICC
			Configuration File
ICE Machine Behavior Settings	5.5.6.3 20190512	Proprietary	ICE Configuration
ICP2 Machine Behavior Settings	5.5.1.4 20190510	Proprietary	ICP2 Configuration

Hardware Components:

System Component	Hardware Version	Proprietary or COTS	Comments
ImageCast Precinct (ICP)	PCOS-320C	Proprietary	Precinct Scanner
ImageCast Precinct (ICP)	PCOS-320A	Proprietary	Precinct Scanner
ImageCast 2 Precinct (ICP2)	PCOS-330A	Proprietary	Precinct Scanner
ImageCast Evolution (ICE)	PCOS-410A	Proprietary	Precinct Scanner
ICP Ballot Box	BOX-330A	Proprietary	Ballot Box
ICP Ballot Box	BOX-340C	Proprietary	Ballot Box
ICP Ballot Box	BOX-341C	Proprietary	Ballot Box
ICP Ballot Box	ElectionSource IM-COLLAPSIBLE	Proprietary	Ballot Box
ICE Ballot Box	BOX-410A	Proprietary	Ballot Box
ICE Ballot Box	BOX-420A	Proprietary	Ballot Box
ICP2 Ballot Box	BOX-350A	Proprietary	Ballot Box
ICP2 Ballot Box	BOX-340C	Proprietary	Ballot Box
ICP2 Ballot Box	BOX-341C	Proprietary	Ballot Box
ICP2 Ballot Box	ElectionSource IM-COLLAPSIBLE	Proprietary	Ballot Box
ICX UPS Inline EMI Filter	1.0	Proprietary	EMI Filter
ICX Tablet (Classic)	aValue 15" Tablet (SID-15V)	COTS	Ballot Marking Device
ICX Tablet (Classic)	aValue 21" Tablet (SID-21V) (Steel or Aluminum chassis)	COTS	Ballot Marking Device
ICX Tablet (Prime)	aValue 21" Tablet (HID-21V) (Steel or	COTS	Ballot Marking Device or
	Aluminum chassis)		Direct Recording
			Electronic
Thermal Printer	SII RP-D10	COTS	Report Printer

System Component	Hardware Version	Proprietary or COTS	Comments
Thermal Printer	KFI VRP3	COTS	Voter-verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT)
Server	Dell PowerEdge R620	COTS	Standard Server
Server	Dell PowerEdge R630	COTS	Standard Server
Server	Dell PowerEdge R640	COTS	Standard Server
ICC Workstation HW	Dell OptiPlex 7440 All in One	COTS	Standard Server
ICC Workstation HW	Dell OptiPlex 3050 All In One	COTS	
ICC Workstation HW	Dell OptiPlex 9030 All In One	COTS	
ICC Workstation HW	Dell OptiPlex 9020 All In One	COTS	
ICC Workstation HW	Dell OptiPlex 9010 All In One	COTS	
ICC Scanner	Canon imageFormula DR-G1130	COTS	Central Count Scanner
ICC Scanner	Canon imageFormula DR-M160II	COTS	Central Count Scanner
ICC Scanner	Canon imageFormula DR-M260	COTS	Central Count Scanner
ICC Scanner	InoTec HiPro 821	COTS	Central Count Scanner
ICC Scanner	Dell Optiplex 7050	COTS	
ICC Scanner	Dell 2418HT Monitor	COTS	
Client Workstation HW and	Dell Precision 3430	COTS	
Express Server			
Client Workstation HW and Express Server	Dell Precision 3431	COTS	
Client Workstation HW and	Dell Precision T3420	COTS	
Express Server			
Client Workstation HW	Dell Precision T1700	COTS	
Client Workstation HW	Dell Latitude 3400	COTS	
Client Workstation HW	Dell Latitude 3490	COTS	
Client Workstation HW	Dell Latitude E3480	COTS	
Client Workstation HW	Dell Latitude E3470	COTS	
Client Workstation HW	Dell Latitude E7450	COTS	
ICX Printer	HP LaserJet Pro Printer M402dn	COTS	
ICX Printer	HP LaserJet Pro Printer M402dne	COTS	
Monitor	Dell Monitor KM632	COTS	
Monitor	Dell Monitor P2414Hb	COTS	
Monitor	P2419H	COTS	
Monitor	P2417H	COTS	
Monitor	Dell Ultrasharp 24" Monitor U2414H	COTS	
CD/DVD Reader	Dell DVD Multi Recorder GP60NB60	COTS	
iButton Programmer	Maxim iButton Programmer DS9490R# with DS1402-RP8+	COTS	
UPS	Tripp Lite SMART1500RMXL2U	COTS	
UPS	APC SMT1500C Smart-UPS	COTS	
UPS	APC SMT1500 Smart-UPS	COTS	
UPS	APC BE600M1	COTS	
UPS	APC BR1000G	COTS	
Network Switch	Dell X1008	COTS	
Network Switch	Dell X1018	COTS	
Network Switch	Dell X1026	COTS	
Network Switch	Dell PowerConnect 2808	COTS	
Sip and Puff	Enabling Devices #972	COTS	
Headphones	Cyber Acoustics ACM-70 and ACM- 70B	COTS	
4-way Joystick Controller	S26	Modified COTS	

Arizona Auditor General

System Component	Hardware Version	Proprietary or COTS	Comments
Rocker (Paddle) Switch	Enabling Device #971	COTS	
Rocker (Paddle) Switch	AbleNet 10033400 (2x)	COTS	
CF Card Reader	IOGEAR SDHC/microSDHC 0U51USC410	COTS	
CF Card Dual-Slot Reader	Lexar USB 3.0	COTS	
CF Card Reader	Hoodman Steel USB 3.0 102015	COTS	
CF Card Reader	Lexar Professional CFR1	COTS	
CF Card Reader	Kingston FCR-HS4	COTS	
ATI	ATI handset	Proprietary	
ATI	ATI-USB handset	Proprietary	
ACS PC-Linked Smart Card Reader	ACR38	COTS	
ACS PC-Linked Smart Card Reader	ACR39	COTS	

System Limitations

This table depicts the limits the system has been tested and certified to meet.

Characteristic	Limiting Component	Limit	Comment
Ballot positions	Ballot	292*/462**	Landscape Ballot: 240
			candidates + 24 write-ins + 28
			Yes/No choices.
Precincts in an election	EMS	1000; 250	Standard; Express
Contests in an election	EMS	1000; 250	Standard; Express
Candidates/Counters in an election	EMS	10000; 2500	Standard; Express
Candidates/Counters in a precinct	Ballot	240*/462**	Both
Candidates/Counters in a tabulator	Tabulator	10000; 2500	Standard; Express
Ballot Styles in an election	Tabulator	3000; 750	Standard; Express
Ballot IDs in a tabulator	Tabulator	200	Both
Contests in a ballot style	Ballot	38*/156**	Both
Candidates in a contest	Ballot	240*/231**	Both
Ballot styles in a precinct	Tabulator	5	Both
Number of political parties	Tabulator	30	Both
"vote for" in a contest	Ballot	24*/30**	Both
Supported languages in an election	Tabulator	5	Both
Number of write-ins	Ballot	24*/462**	Both

* Reflects the system limit for a ballot printed in landscape.

** Reflects the system limit for a ballot printed in portrait.

Functionality

2005 VVSG Supported Functionality Declaration

Feature/Characteristic	Yes/No	Comment
Voter Verified Paper Audit Trails		
VVPAT	YES	
Accessibility		
Forward Approach	YES	
Parallel (Side) Approach	YES	
Closed Primary		
Primary: Closed	YES	
Open Primary		
Primary: Open Standard (provide definition of how supported)	YES	
Primary: Open Blanket (provide definition of how supported)	YES	
Partisan & Non-Partisan:		
Partisan & Non-Partisan: Vote for 1 of N race	YES	
Partisan & Non-Partisan: Multi-member ("vote for N of M")	YES	
board races		
Partisan & Non-Partisan: "vote for 1" race with a single	YES	
candidate and write-in voting		
Partisan & Non-Partisan "vote for 1" race with no declared	YES	
candidates and write-in voting		
Write-In Voting:		
Write-in Voting: System default is a voting position identified for	YES	
write-ins.		
Write-in Voting: Without selecting a write in position.	NO	
Write-in: With No Declared Candidates	YES	
Write-in: Identification of write-ins for resolution at central	YES	
count		
Primary Presidential Delegation Nominations & Slates:		
Primary Presidential Delegation Nominations: Displayed	YES	
delegate slates for each presidential party		
Slate & Group Voting: one selection votes the slate.	YES	
Ballot Rotation:		
Rotation of Names within an Office; define all supported	YES	Equal time rotation
rotation methods for location on the ballot and vote		
tabulation/reporting		
Straight Party Voting:		
Straight Party: A single selection for partisan races in a general	YES	
election		
Straight Party: Vote for each candidate individually	YES	
Straight Party: Modify straight party selections with crossover	YES	
votes		
Straight Party: A race without a candidate for one party	YES	
Straight Party: "N of M race (where "N">1)	YES	
Straight Party: Excludes a partisan contest from the straight	YES	
party selection		

Feature/Characteristic	Yes/No	Comment
Cross-Party Endorsement:		
Cross party endorsements, multiple parties endorse one candidate.	YES	
Split Precincts:		
Split Precincts: Multiple ballot styles	YES	
Split Precincts: P & M system support splits with correct contests	YES	
and ballot identification of each split		
Split Precincts: DRE matches voter to all applicable races.	YES	
Split Precincts: Reporting of voter counts (# of voters) to the	YES	
precinct split level; Reporting of vote totals is to the precinct		
level		
Vote N of M:		
Vote for N of M: Counts each selected candidate, if the	YES	
maximum is not exceeded.		
Vote for N of M: Invalidates all candidates in an overvote (paper)	YES	
Recall Issues, with options:		
Recall Issues with Options: Simple Yes/No with separate	YES	
race/election. (Vote Yes or No Question)		
Recall Issues with Options: Retain is the first option,	NO	
Replacement candidate for the second or more options (Vote 1		
of M)		
Recall Issues with Options: Two contests with access to a second	NO	
contest conditional upon a specific vote in contest one. (Must		
vote Yes to vote in 2nd contest.)		
Recall Issues with Options: Two contests with access to a second	NO	
contest conditional upon any vote in contest one. (Must vote		
Yes to vote in 2nd contest.)		
Cumulative Voting		
Cumulative Voting: Voters are permitted to cast, as many votes	NO	
as there are seats to be filled for one or more candidates. Voters		
are not limited to giving only one vote to a candidate. Instead,		
they can put multiple votes on one or more candidate.		
Ranked Order Voting	NO	
Ranked Order Voting: Voters can write in a ranked vote.	NO	
Ranked Order Voting: A ballot stops being counting when all ranked choices have been eliminated	NO	
	NO	
Ranked Order Voting: A ballot with a skipped rank counts the vote for the next rank.	NO	
Ranked Order Voting: Voters rank candidates in a contest in	NO	
order of choice. A candidate receiving a majority of the first	NO	
choice votes wins. If no candidate receives a majority of first		
choice votes, the last place candidate is deleted, each ballot cast		
for the deleted candidate counts for the second choice		
candidate listed on the ballot. The process of eliminating the last		
place candidate and recounting the ballots continues until one		
candidate receives a majority of the vote		

Feature/Characteristic	Yes/No	Comment
Ranked Order Voting: A ballot with two choices ranked the	NO	
same, stops being counted at the point of two similarly ranked		
choices.		
Ranked Order Voting: The total number of votes for two or more	NO	
candidates with the least votes is less than the votes of the		
candidate with the next highest number of votes, the candidates		
with the least votes are eliminated simultaneously and their		
votes transferred to the next-ranked continuing candidate.		

Feature/Characteristic	Yes/No	Comment
Provisional or Challenged Ballots		
Provisional/Challenged Ballots: A voted provisional ballots is identified but not included in the tabulation, but can be added in the central count.	YES	
Provisional/Challenged Ballots: A voted provisional ballots is included in the tabulation, but is identified and can be subtracted in the central count	NO	
Provisional/Challenged Ballots: Provisional ballots maintain the secrecy of the ballot.	YES	
Overvotes (must support for specific type of voting system)		
Overvotes: P & M: Overvote invalidates the vote. Define how overvotes are counted.	YES	Overvotes cause a warning to the voter and can be configured to allow voter to override.
Overvotes: DRE: Prevented from or requires correction of overvoting.	YES	
Overvotes: If a system does not prevent overvotes, it must count them. Define how overvotes are counted.	YES	If allowed via voter override, overvotes are tallied separately.
Overvotes: DRE systems that provide a method to data enter absentee votes must account for overvotes.	N/A	
Undervotes		
Undervotes: System counts undervotes cast for accounting purposes	YES	
Blank Ballots		
Totally Blank Ballots: Any blank ballot alert is tested.	YES	Precinct voters receive a warning; both precinct and central scanners will warn on blank ballots.
Totally Blank Ballots: If blank ballots are not immediately processed, there must be a provision to recognize and accept them	YES	Blank ballots are flagged. These ballots can be manually examined and then be scanned and accepted as blank; or precinct voter can override and accept.
Totally Blank Ballots: If operators can access a blank ballot, there must be a provision for resolution.	YES	Operators can examine a blank ballot, re-mark if needed and allowed, and then re-scan it.
Networking		
Wide Area Network – Use of Modems Wide Area Network – Use of Wireless	NO NO	

Feature/Characteristic	Yes/No	Comment
Local Area Network – Use of TCP/IP	YES	Client/server only
Local Area Network – Use of Infrared	NO	
Local Area Network – Use of Wireless	NO	
FIPS 140-2 validated cryptographic module	YES	
Used as (if applicable):		
Precinct counting device	YES	ImageCast Precinct
Central counting device	YES	ImageCast Central

Baseline Certification Engineering Change Orders (ECO)

ECO #	Component	Description
100503	ICP PCOS-320C & ICP PCOS-320A	Adding a COTS collapsible ballot box to AVL for use with the ICP
100521	Servers and Workstations	Added DELL P2419H monitor as a display device.
100527	EMS Workstations.	Added DELL Latitude 3490 computer with updated i3-8130U processor (Dual Core, 4MB Cache, 2.2GHz) to DVS PN 190-000061 (a client workstation).
100543	ICC Scanner	Update to the DR-G1130 Scanner LCD Panel User Interface.
100588	ICX Workstation	Added new models of VVPAT printer for use with the D-Suite ICX workstation due to previous model becoming commercially unavailable
100596	EMS Workstation	Added DELL Latitude 3400 computer as a client workstation due to the DELL Latitude 3490 computer becoming commercially unavailable for purchase
100597	EMS Server	Added DELL PowerEdge R640 computer with new processor and RAM as an AVL to the existing R640 server computer configurations
100602	EMS Server and Workstations	Added DELL Precision 3431 computer in an EMS Express Server and EMS Client Workstation configuration due to the DELL Precision 3430 computer becoming commercially unavailable for purchase
100603	ICC Scanner	Added DELL P2418HT monitor as a display device for ICC HiPro scanner workstation configuration due to the Lenovo 10QXPAR1US monitor becoming commercially unavailable for purchase

Source: https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/voting_system/files/DVS_5.5B_Certificate_Scope_Conformance.pdf, retrieved February 17, 2022.

APPENDIX K



Dominion contract equipment, services, and costs

The following are the equipment, services, and costs included in the contract between Maricopa County and Dominion for the voting system used in the 2020 elections.

Table 9

Maricopa County Dominion contract equipment, services, and costs January 1, 2020 through December 31, 2022

(Unaudited)

Description of equipment or service	Quantity	Total cost
Precinct-based tabulators		
ImageCast Ballot Marking Device (BMD)	553	\$1,216,777
ImageCast Precinct	553	1,494,693
Central count tabulators		
G1130	5	86,625
High Speed Scanner (HSS)	4	507,276
Accessible marking -or- voting device		
ImageCast BMD Audio Tactile Interface	553	143,736
Election management hardware		
Standard Server	2	23,562
Client Workstation	4	4,713
Adjudication	20	23,566
Additional peripherals		
Privacy Screens	553	8,959
ImageCast BMD Transport Bag	553	47,978
ImageCast Precinct Adapter for use with Eagle Ballot Box	553	290,259
UPS	50	-
Consumable supplies		
Seals, etc.	1	6,930
Software		
Democracy Suite Light	1	121,275
Adjudication	1	103,950
Automated Test Deck	1	36,383
Remote Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)	1	34,650
Licenses		
ImageCast BMD	553	68,484
ImageCast Precinct	553	104,119
G1130	5	10,622
ImageCast HSS	4	33,990
Democracy Suite Light	1	28,875
Adjudication	1	24,750
Automated Test Deck	1	8,663
Remote UOCAVA	1	8,250

Arizona Auditor General

Table continued

Description of equipment or service	Quantity	Total cost		
Warranty, including maintenance (acceptance testing, preventive maintenance, etc.)				
G1130	5	6,188		
ImageCast BMD	553	70,673		
ImageCast Precinct	553	61,516		
ImageCast HSS	4	28,050		
Support services (e.g. election cycle, off cycle, etc.), including training				
Includes Implementation, Training, Election Support	1	1,333,200		
Total 3-year lease cost		\$5,938,712		

Source: Auditor General staff analysis of Maricopa County contract with Dominion, as amended February 10, 2020.



Scope and methodology

The Arizona Auditor General has conducted this special audit of (1) financial and related information of private, nongovernmental grant monies used for Arizona's 2020 elections by the SOS, Maricopa County, and Pima County and (2) Maricopa County's procurement of a voting system as well as security and technical analysis pursuant to Laws 2021, Ch. 408, §54.

We used various methods to meet the report's objectives. These methods included reviewing statutes, rules, and applicable session laws; reviewing the SOS', Maricopa County's, and Pima County's websites; reviewing SOS-, Maricopa County-, and Pima County-provided documents, including policies and procedures, grant reports, and financial information; and interviewing SOS, Maricopa County, and Pima County elections management and staff. In addition, we used the following specific methods to meet the audit objectives:

- To determine what private, nongovernmental grant monies the SOS, Maricopa County, and Pima County received, we requested a list of such grants from each auditee and searched each auditee's general ledger for grants received for election purposes other than those received from the federal government or Arizona State government.
- To gain an understanding of the private, nongovernmental grantors and their grant programs, we reviewed CEIR's, ERIC's, CTCL's, and USC Schwarzenegger Institute's websites, interviewed CEIR and CTCL staff, and reviewed SOS, Maricopa County, and Pima County grant agreements and grant reports.
- To determine how the SOS spent private, nongovernmental grant monies, we examined AFIS; reviewed invoices and SOS-provided documents created by Lavidge, its contracted advertising agency. Additionally, we reviewed detailed payroll records for 8 of 41 individuals who received payments from private, nongovernmental grant monies.
- To determine how Maricopa County spent private, nongovernmental grant monies, we reviewed invoices for 11 of 49 nonpayroll transactions and detailed payroll records for 14 of 167 individuals who received payments from private, nongovernmental grant monies.
- To determine how Pima County spent private, nongovernmental grant monies, we reviewed invoices for 5 of 38 nonpayroll transactions and detailed payroll records for 44 of 354 individuals who received payments from private, nongovernmental grant monies.
- To determine whether Maricopa County complied with its procurement code when purchasing the voting system it used in the 2020 elections, we reviewed Maricopa County's procurement code; the RFP, vendor proposals, bid evaluation sheets, and other procurement documentation; and Board minutes.
- To determine the security and technical analysis performed on the voting system Maricopa County purchased for the 2020 elections, we reviewed:
 - The EAC's website, testing and certification program manuals, and Dominion voting system modification 5.5-B certification.
 - The SOS Equipment Certification Advisory Committee agenda and minutes, SOS list of State certified voting equipment, and SOS records of meeting notice.

- Maricopa County's records of stress test and pilot deployment results.
- To determine the contract terms for Maricopa County's purchase of the voting system it used in the 2020 elections, we examined the contract and the 2 contract amendments that occurred prior to the 2020 elections.
- To determine which other Arizona counties received private, nongovernmental grant monies from CTCL, we reviewed the CTCL website and confirmed the amounts with CTCL staff. To determine how other Arizona counties used CTCL grant monies, we obtained and reviewed the grant reports each county submitted to the CTCL.

We selected the previously indicated audit samples to provide sufficient evidence to support our conclusions. Unless otherwise noted, the results of our testing using these samples were not intended to be projected to the entire population.

We express our appreciation to the Secretary of State and her staff; Maricopa County Recorder and County staff; and Pima County Recorder, Elections Director, and County staff for their cooperation and assistance throughout the audit.

AUDITEE RESPONSES



March 25, 2022

Lindsey A. Perry, CPA, CFE Auditor General 2910 N 44th St., Ste 410 Phoenix, AZ 85018-7271

Dear Auditor General Perry:

We have reviewed the special audit report of my office's financial and related activities associated with private, nongovernmental grant monies used for the 2020 elections. Overall, we think your report captures well the work my office undertook in 2020 to ensure that the public had accurate and timely information about the upcoming primary and general elections, as well as information regarding post-election ballot tabulation, certification, and the electoral college.

The report highlights the resources that are needed to inform the public ahead of, during, and after an election. In 2020, mis- and dis-information shared by candidates, campaigns, and via social media was rampant and confusion about voting during the pandemic only compounded the need for investments in election education. Congress made emergency funding available for states and local jurisdictions, but the legislature did not appropriate the funds, which is required in Arizona¹. A partnership with the Governor's Office allowed us to create a limited public education campaign for \$1.5 million², but when other grant funds were made available for public education for state elections' offices, we applied for and were awarded³ what we thought was needed to reach as many voters as possible.

As this report shows, our messages were broadcast and shared statewide, in multiple languages, using multiple forms of media, targeting all voters. The historic turnout in 2020 amid rampant mis- and disinformation as well as a raging public health crisis was reached in large part due to the widespread public education our office was able to do.

¹ Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-129("To the extent permitted by federal law, monies in the fund, other than state general fund monies, deposited each subsequent fiscal year are subject to legislative appropriation...). Arizona returned \$7,874,848 unused dollars to the federal government due to lack of appropriation by the legislature. The total amount available to the state, with match, should have been \$9,449,768.

² AZVoteSafe Program available at <u>https://gn.ecivis.com/GO/gn_redir/T/u8gn9i2i88yd</u>. *See also* Governor Ducey, Secretary Hobbs Announce \$9 Million Investment For Safe Elections Plan. (2020, July 2). Retrieved from https://azsos.gov/about-office/media-center/press-releases/1201.

³ The Center for Election Innovation & Research 2020 Voter Education Grant Program. Available at https://electioninnovation.org/research/ceir-2020-voter-education-grant-program/

We hope that this report helps demonstrate, to the legislature, the level of investment the state needs to make in voter education going forward, because all Arizonans deserve consistent access to trusted, credible, and accurate elections information directly from their election officials.

I appreciate your thoroughness and objective review of my office's use of these private grants. As I have stated all along, it was about providing timely and accurate information to eligible voters about how and when to vote safely and securely in 2020. It is imperative that we have the same opportunity to provide this information in 2022.

Sincerely,

Secretary Katie Hobbs Arizona Secretary of State



Office of the Recorder

Maricopa County, Arizona

111 South Third Avenue Phoenix, Arizona 85003-2281 Phone: (602) 506-3535 Fax: (602) 506-3273

County Recorder Stephen Richer

March 28, 2022

Ms. Lindsey Perry Auditor General Arizona Office of the Auditor General 2910 North 44th Street, Suite 410 Phoenix, AZ 85018

Dear Auditor General Perry,

Thank you for your office's review of: (1) Maricopa County's procurement and use of private grant money, and (2) Maricopa County's procurement of the Dominion voting system in 2019. As your report states, the County complied with all applicable laws.

1. Maricopa County's procurement and use of private grant money.

Maricopa County won two private grants in 2020—the Center for Tech and Civic Life (CTCL) grant for \$2,995,921 and the University of Southern California, Schwarzenegger Institute (USC) grant for \$41,857.

Maricopa County procured these grants openly, publicly, and lawfully. The County approved the CTCL grant in a public meeting on October 21, 2020 and the USC grant in a public meeting on November 18, 2020. No county resident protested or challenged the use of the lawfully acquired grants.

The County also used the grant funds lawfully. Of the \$1,892,971 spent, over half went to paying the thousands of temporary workers who staff various election functions. The second and third largest expenditures were election administration equipment and polling place rentals.

In August 2021, Maricopa County returned \$1,155,576 in unused funds to CTCL.

This information has already been shared through public records requests with multiple members of the media and multiple state legislators. Nonetheless, Maricopa County appreciates your thorough review of these grant funds and the detailed information included in your audit report.

The procurement of the grants, the use of the private grants, and the return of unused funds complied with all applicable laws.

2. Maricopa County's procurement of the Dominion Voting System

In 2019, Maricopa County began the public procurement process for new ballot-building and tabulation equipment. The county issued a request for proposals; the county received three competitive bids; the county enlisted a selection committee to review the bids, and the Board of Supervisors approved the chosen vendor in a public forum. At the time, no person contested the procurement process.

The procured equipment replaced tabulators that were over 20 years old. The procured equipment allowed for faster tabulation counts, as well as other enhancements.



Office of the Recorder Maricopa County, Arizona

County Recorder Stephen Richer

The county followed all applicable procurement laws.

The county used the exact same procured tabulators, without incident, in five elections prior to the 2020 General Election. Without incident, the County has continued to use Dominion tabulators in each of the four elections that have occurred since 2020.

Conclusion

I took office on January 4, 2020—after the procurement of both the private grants and the Dominion tabulation equipment. Accordingly, I have no personal interest in the reviewed items.

But facts are facts. The County followed all applicable laws both in the procurement of two private grants, the dispensation of the private grants, and the procurement of the Dominion tabulation equipment.

Your report concludes the same.

Thank you for the professionalism exhibited by your team throughout the process. We appreciated your use of recognized auditing methodologies, your insistence on sticking to verifiable facts, and the nature of your interactions with the County.

This is no surprise because your office is comprised of professional auditors with the applicable credentials and work experience.

I wish all reviews of the 2020 election could have been done in a similar manner, by similarly qualified professionals. Doing so would have saved Arizona taxpayers millions of dollars and would have increased confidence in local governance.

Thank you.

Stephen Richer Maricopa County Recorder



COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR'S OFFICE

PIMA COUNTY GOVERNMENTAL CENTER 115 N. CHURCH AVE., 2nd FLOOR, Suite 231, TUCSON, AZ 85701-1317 520-724-8661, FAX 520-724-8171

C.H. HUCKELBERRY County Administrator

March 25, 2022

Lindsey A. Perry, Auditor General Arizona Office of the Auditor General 2910 N. 44th St., Ste. 410 Phoenix, AZ 85018-7271

Re: Special Audit of Pima County Financial and Related Information of Private, Nongovernmental Grant Monies Used for Arizona's 2020 Elections

Dear Ms. Perry:

Pima County appreciates the opportunity to respond to the Special Audit of the Auditor General, referenced above. Additionally, the County wishes to thank your staff for its robust communication and professionalism throughout the audit, which was statutorily required by the Arizona State Legislature pursuant to Laws 2021, Ch. 408, §54. Regarding Pima County, this session law directs that:

On or before March 31, 2022, the auditor general shall submit a report to the governor, the president of the senate and the speaker of the house of representatives on . . . the following: . . . 3) Private, nongovernmental grant monies received and expended by Pima County on programs and processes for the 2020 elections, including the purpose of the expenditures, the amount spent for personnel and employee-related expenses and any balance remaining unexpended on June 30, 2021.

The only private, nongovernmental grant monies received by Pima County in relation to the 2020 elections was from the Center for Tech and Civic Life (CTCL). On October 20, 2020, CTCL notified Pima County of a \$950,446 grant award. The letter stated the overall purpose of the award as follows: "The grant funds must be used exclusively for the public purpose of planning and operationalizing safe and secure election administration in Pima County in 2020." The CTCL grant award was accepted and approved by the Pima County Board of Supervisors at its public meeting on November 10, 2020.

Ms. Perry
Re: Special Audit of Pima County Financial and Related Information of Private, Nongovernmental Grant Monies Used for Arizona's 2020 Elections
March 25, 2022
Page 2

Pima County is pleased to note that there are no findings in the Special Audit relating to the County's full expenditure of the CTCL grant award. Pima County also notes that it submitted all funding reports timely to CTCL and that CTCL considers all County expenditures of the grant were in full compliance with grant agreement terms and conditions.

Sincerely,

Jan Lesher Acting County Administrator Pima County

Gabriella Cázares-Kelly Recorder Pima County



MELANIE M. CHESNEY DEPUTY AUDITOR GENERAL

LINDSEY A. PERRY AUDITOR GENERAL

DATE: May 25, 2022

- TO: Representative Joanne Osborne, Chair Senator Nancy Barto, Vice Chair Members, JLAC
- **FROM:** Lindsey Perry, Auditor General
- SUBJECT: Next 2022 JLAC meeting

Background

Pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes §41-1279(C), JLAC is responsible for appointing an Auditor General and directing the Auditor General to perform audits. Consistent with this responsibility, at the next meeting in 2022, ideally in September or October, JLAC should consider and approve the 2024-2025 performance audit and sunset review schedule; consider and approve the 2024-2025 Committee of Reference (COR) sunset review assignments; review fiscal years 2022 and 2023 financial and compliance audit schedules; consider and approve entities to bill for audit work; and review the 2024-2025 school district performance audit schedule.

Additionally, given the current trend of decreasing the numbers of years to continue an agency from 8 years to a shorter time period, combined with other statutory mandates and approved legislative audits, our Office's ability to continue to conduct performance audits and sunset reviews of the same number of agencies we have typically reviewed in recent years is negatively impacted. Although our Office has never had the resources to perform the sunset reviews of every agency, with our current resources and the increased number of agencies requiring a sunset review each year, the proportion of agencies on each sunset cycle that we can review is decreasing.

Thus, given current Office resources, some agencies historically assigned to the Office for review will need to be assigned to CORs for their sunset review. A sunset review conducted by a COR is essentially a self-audit whereby the agency responds to statutorily prescribed questions and any questions developed by the COR. Therefore, when assigning audits to our Office as part of the next meeting agenda, JLAC may need to consider the impact of any agencies given a shorter continuation as well as any new legislation requiring the Office to conduct one-time and/or ongoing audits or reviews, including possibly removing, reducing, or delaying other required audits.

Action required

None. Presented for JLAC's information only.

