PERFORMANCE AUDIT

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

SECURITY STAFFING ISSUES

Report to the Arizona Legislature
By the Auditor General
January 1986
86-1

DOUGLAS R. NORTON, CPA
AUDITOR GENERAL

STATE OF ARIZONA

OFFICE OF THE

AUDITOR GENERAL

January 29, 1986

Members of the Arizona Legislature
The Honorable Bruce Babbitt, Governor
Samuel A. Lewis, Director
Department of Corrections

Transmitted herewith is a report of the Auditor General, A Performance Audit of the Department of Corrections, Security Staffing Issues. This report is in response to the January 30, 1985 resolution of the Joint Legislative Oversight Committee.

The report addresses deficiencies in the Department's ability to accurately determine security staff needs. The report also addresses DOC's inability to hire enough correctional service officers due to high turnover and a lengthy hiring process. Further, we found DOC's background check process for correctional service officer applicants was inefficient, and DOC lacked guidelines to evaluate results of the check. Finally, we found that correctional service officers lacked sufficient pre-service and in-service training.

My staff and I will be pleased to discuss or clarify items in the report.

Respectfully submitted,

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Enclosure

SUMMARY

The Office of the Auditor General has conducted a performance audit of the Arizona Department of Corrections (DOC) staffing function. This audit was conducted in response to a January 30, 1985, resolution of the Joint Legislative Oversight Committee, which requires a performance audit of DOC. This report is one in a series of audit reports on the Department.

For fiscal year 1985-86, DOC has an estimated 4,659 authorized full-time positions (FTE), including 2,419 security positions (correctional service officers [CSO] and supervisors), 472 correctional program positions, and 217 medical positions. This report addresses staffing issues only as they relate directly to security staff.

DOC's Security Staffing Levels
Are Not Properly Determined (see page 7)

DOC cannot accurately determine its security staff needs. Security staff needs in a correctional institution depend on two factors: 1) the number of posts required to maintain adequate security, and 2) the number of people required to cover each post. However, the formula DOC uses to calculate the number of staff needed to fill security posts (shift relief factor) appears to understate the staffing levels needed. DOC uses 5.0 full-time positions to staff a seven-day, 24-hour post, compared with the 5.3 FTE positions that a review of actual records indicates are needed. In addition, DOC has not clearly defined the number and type of posts necessary for the proper and efficient operation of its institutions. Although several studies have been undertaken, DOC has not completed a comprehensive analysis of post needs. Further, DOC does not have an accurate list of the Department's posts on which to base post needs.

Due to the lack of information on posts needed to provide adequate security and the variations between institutions in the shift relief factor, DOC and Auditor General staff could not determine the number of

CSO positions DOC should have. DOC has completed a staffing study. However, it appears that the study does not include all information necessary to determine the number of security posts needed. Therefore, DOC needs to complete additional studies and analyses to improve its decision-making ability regarding staffing levels.

DOC's Hiring Process Is Inadequate
To Meet CSO Staffing Needs (see page 21)

DOC is unable to hire enough CSOs to meet its security staffing needs. DOC has constant vacancies due to high turnover and a lengthy hiring process. Once a position becomes vacant, it takes DOC approximately three months to fill the institutional vacancy - more than four and one-half weeks to hire a new CSO, plus six weeks to train the new hire. Because of the approximately 11-week delay, the number of staff required to adequately fill a seven-day, 24-hour post is 5.3 FTEs. However, reducing the delay to two weeks, for example, would reduce the number of staff needed to 5.0 FTEs. The Department is currently implementing a program to reduce the delay. This reduction would significantly reduce staff needs throughout the Department. For example, the ASPC-Tucson Santa Rita Unit requires 127 CSOs to fill its existing posts using the 5.3 shift relief factor, but would require only 116 CSOs if the factor were reduced to 5.0.

Although DOC plans to significantly revise its hiring process, problems may continue. DOC will assume all responsibility for CSO recruitment, selection and hiring from the Department of Administration in January 1986. DOC plans to hire, train and have CSOs ready to place in vacancies as they occur. However, DOC currently has problems beginning the hiring process in a timely manner. Since this process will not change when DOC takes over CSO hiring, timeliness may continue to be a problem. Further, the paperwork to begin the process may continue to be duplicated.

Finally, DOC may lack adequate funding for Correctional Officer Training Academy trainee positions, because it plans to rely on vacancy savings. If the Department succeeds in reducing its vacancies, institutions will

not have vacancy savings to fund the trainee positions. DOC should request funding for the trainee positions in order to eliminate hiring delays.

DOC's Inspections And Investigations Section
Could Improve Its Background Investigation Process (see page 31)

DOC's background check process for CSO applicants could be improved. Although the actual computer background check takes only minutes, the background check process takes an average of 34 days. The delay is caused because background forms are sent to institutions for processing. Centralizing the process and allowing applicants to be interviewed by hiring authorities while backgrounds are checked could significantly reduce the delay.

DOC also needs to develop guidelines for evaluating the results of background checks. DOC has no clear policies indicating what disqualifies an applicant. As a result, investigators who review the results of background checks at each institution must use considerable judgment in determining who should be rejected, creating the potential for inconsistent decisions.

Training For CSOs
Is Inadequate (see page 39)

DOC has not provided CSOs with adequate training. The amount and type of in-service training provided has been inconsistent. Although a recently enacted DOC policy requires 20 hours of in-service training a year, DOC CSOs receive far less. Auditor General staff reviewed 150 CSO in-service training records. CSOs employed by DOC for more than two years received an average of less than 13 hours of in-service training in fiscal years 1984 and 1985. In addition, the training received is not uniform. Inadequate in-service training is also signficant because some CSOs received no pre-service training when they were initially employed. Because of DOC's inconsistent in-service training, CSOs may not be adequately trained in critical skill areas. Lack of in-service training is due to staffing shortages and poor record keeping.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The Office of the Auditor General has conducted a performance audit of the Arizona Department of Corrections (DOC) staffing function. This audit was conducted in response to a January 30, 1985, resolution of the Joint Legislative Oversight Committee, which requires a performance audit of DOC. This report is one in a series of audit reports on the Department.

DOC is statutorily charged with protecting the public from offenders under its jurisdiction. In doing so, the Department must also ensure that a safe and just environment exists within its facilities. DOC staff comprise a critical element for accomplishing the Departmental mission.

Departmental Staffing

Among staff who have direct inmate contact, the large majority are located in the Adult Institutions, Juvenile/Community Services and Human Resource/Development Divisions. They include correctional security staff, correctional program staff and medical staff. For fiscal year 1985-86, DOC has an estimated 4,659 authorized full-time positions, including 2,419 security positions, 472 correctional program positions and 217 medical positions. Because of time limitations, however, this report addresses staffing issues only as they relate directly to security staffing.

Security Staffing

Staff primarily concerned with security are largely involved in the direct supervision and control of inmates, or in supervising staff with such responsibilities. Within DOC, security staff occupy positions that fall under the Correctional Service series, which includes correctional service officers (CSOs), sergeants, lieutenants, captains and majors. Security staff perform duties assigned to specific security posts. Examples of posts include:

* A tower guard watching the perimeter of an institution or observing inmate activity in the vicinity of the tower,

1

- A gate officer controlling access to the institution, and

- A housing unit officer monitoring inmate activity in a dormitory.

Because of the nature of their work, more than 99 percent of DOC's security staff are located at the institutions, with the remainder involved in functions to support institutional security staff, such as training, and inspections and investigations.

Hiring Process

The recruitment process for CSOs currently involves several entities. The Personnel Division of the Department of Administration (DOA), DOC's Central Office, DOC's Inspections and Investigations Section, and DOC institutions all share responsibilities in the CSO hiring process. DOA's Personnel Division receives and scores applications and maintains an active register of applicants.* The Inspections and Investigations Section completes background checks and notifies DOA of results. DOC's Personnel Office generates hiring lists for institutional use after a request to fill a position has been submitted by the institution and approved by DOC's Central Office. The institutions contact and interview prospective employees. Finally, DOC's Personnel Office updates the lists when it is notified of appointments. However, in January 1986 DOA will relinquish control of the CSO hiring process to DOC. An intergovernmental agreement to this effect has already been approved by both agencies.

Training

Correctional service officers participate in both pre-service and in-service training. Pre-service training involves a six-week curriculum to prepare CSOs for institutional duties. The training is held at regional academies in Tucson, Perryville, Florence and Fort Grant. In July 1984 the Legislature moved to centralize and standardize CSO pre-service training, with an appropriation to establish the Correctional

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* ASPC-Florence has been excluded from divided DOA-DOC authority, and currently oversees all phases of CSO recruitment for the institution.

Officer Training Academy (COTA) in Tucson. COTA is expected to begin operation in January 1986. CSOs who satisfactorily complete Academy training will receive a certificate from the Arizona Law Enforcement Officer Advisory Council.

Also, DOC has required in-service training for CSOs. In-service training is important to improve CSOs' critical skills and keep them current on operational procedures. A policy rescinded in October 1984 required CSOs to have 80 hours of in-service training per year. DOC enacted a policy in November 1985 that requires 20 hours of in-service training per year for CSOs.

Staffing Allocations and Budget

For fiscal year 1985-86, DOC has an estimated 2,395 authorized full-time institutional security staff allocated to the Divisions of Adult Institutions and Juvenile/Community Services. In addition, 23 correctional service security staff are also employed in the Bureau of Inspections and Investigations (Division of Administration), and the Training Section (Division of Human Resources and Development). Table 1 shows personal services and employee related expenditures for fiscal years 1983-84, and estimated expenditures in these categories for fiscal years 1984-85 and 1985-86, in the two divisions in which most correctional service security staff are employed.

TABLE 1

DOC EXPENDITURES FOR PERSONAL SERVICES AND EMPLOYEE RELATED EXPENSES
DIVISION OF ADULT INSTITUTIONS AND DIVISION OF JUVENILE/COMMUNITY SERVICE
(UNAUDITED)

	Actual 1983-84	Actual 1984-85	Estimated 1985-86
Adult Institutions			
FTE Positions	2,591	2,789	3,372[1]
FTE Security Positions	1,594	2,054	2,205
Expenditures (all FTEs)			
Personal Services	41,818,800	48,485,735	62,425,000
Employee Related	10,612,200	12,925,052	16,512,000
Total	52,431,000	61,410,787	78,937,000
Juvenile/Community Services			
FTE Positions	499	677	700[1]
FTE Security Positions	186	193	190
Expenditures (all FTEs)			
Personal Services	8,133,600	13,241,051	14,681,600
Employee Related	1,892,300	3,181,454	3,564,200
Total	10,025,900	16,422,505	18,245,800

[1] On June 20, 1985, DOC underwent a reorganization, at which time the Division of Adult Institutions (formerly Adult Services) and the Division of Juvenile/Community Services (formerly Juvenile Services) were created.

Source: Arizona Department of Corrections budget requests for fiscal years 1985-86 and 1986-87

Audit Scope and Objectives

This audit focuses on the Department's ability to perform its security staffing function efficiently and effectively. The audit report presents its findings and recommendations in four major areas.

● The ability of DOC to evaluate security staffing needs at the institutional level,

● The ability of DOC's hiring process to meet Departmental needs for security staff,

● The effectiveness of DOC's background investigations of prospective CSOs, and

● The adequacy of DOC's training for correctional service officers.

4

Due to time constraints, we were unable to address all potential issues identified during our audit work. The section Areas for Further Audit Work describes these issues.

The Auditor General and staff express appreciation to the Director of the Department of Corrections and his staff for their cooperation and assistance during the audit.

DOC'S SECURITY STAFFING LEVELS ARE NOT PROPERLY DETERMINED

The Department of Corrections (DOC) cannot accurately determine its security staffing needs. The formula for determining the staffing level needed to cover a given post seems to underestimate the staff needed. In addition, the Department has not clearly defined its security post needs. As a result, it cannot be determined whether institutional security staffing is adequate. A comprehensive staffing study would resolve these problems.

Security staff needs in a correctional institution depend on two factors: 1) the number of posts required to maintain adequate security, and 2) the number of people required to cover each post. Specific posts generally are established based on the need to monitor and control inmate movement and activity. Thus, the number and types of posts vary throughout the day and also from day to day, reflecting changes in the level and type of inmate activity. Coverage for a particular post ranges from 24 hours per day, seven days a week, to eight hours per day, five days a week or less. Once necessary posts are determined, the number of people needed to cover those posts is computed from a staffing formula. A staffing formula determines the number of people required to cover a post, taking into account time employees are expected to be away from the post due to vacations, illness, etc.

DOC's Staffing Formula Appears To Understate The Number Of Staff Needed

DOC's formula for calculating the number of staff to fill a security post appears to result in lower staffing levels than are actually needed. DOC's figures for available work days, used to calculate the formula, overestimate the actual figure by 20 days. DOC figures are inaccurate because DOC did not follow standard criteria in developing its formula. The accuracy of the formula is highly important, since even small differences in figures can affect the adequacy of institutional staffing.

7

DOC's estimate of available work days is 20 days more than the actual number of days correctional service officers (CSOs) are likely to be at their posts. The Department estimates 226 available days. Actual figures show only 206 days. Auditor General staff tested DOC's formula by reviewing the leave records of a randomly selected sample of 174 CSOs and correctional security sergeants employed by DOC from August 17, 1984, to August 16, 1985. Because DOC uses a single formula for the entire Department, Auditor General staff tested the formula by computing a Department-wide figure. As Table 2 shows, DOC's figures deviate considerably from those of our records review.

TABLE 2

COMPARISON OF DOC STAFFING FORMULA WITH AUDITOR GENERAL RECORDS REVIEW
AUGUST 17, 1984, THROUGH AUGUST 16, 1985

Category	DOC Formula	Auditor General Review
Regular days off	104 days	104 days
Annual leave	12	14.61
Sick leave	12	6.66
Holiday leave	11	5.68
Comp time taken	N/A[1]	2.75
Military leave	N/A	.39
Absence without approval	N/A	.15
Administrative leave with pay	N/A	.04
Administrative leave without pay	N/A	.26
Bereavement leave	N/A	.16
Civic duty	N/A	-0-
Industrial leave	N/A	1.05
Jury duty	N/A	.01
In-service training	N/A	5.0[2]
Pre-service training	N/A	9.3[3]
Time required to fill vacancies	N/A	8.94[4]
Special assignments requiring employee to be away from post	N/A	not available
Total number of days employee expected to be away from post	139	159.00

Calculation of Staffing Formula

a) 365 days per year	365	365
b) Minus number of days employee away from post	-139	-159
c) Equals number of days employee available to cover post	226	206

Employees required to cover:		
Seven-day, eight-hour shift (365 divided by available days per employee per year	1.6	1.8[6]
Seven-day, 16-hour shift (two times number needed to cover seven-day, eight-hour shift)	3.2	3.5[6]
Seven-day, 24-hour shift (three times number needed to cover seven-day, eight-hour shift)	5.0[5]	5.3[6]

[1] N/A indicates that DOC does not consider this factor in its staffing formula calculations.

[2] Auditor General review showed that the number of in-service training hours CSOs receive is far below American Correction Association (ACA) standards. Because using historical data would have incorporated substandard criteria into the formula, ACA standards were used. DOC had no official training policy at the time of this study.

[3] DOC currently requires all newly hired CSOs to receive 240 hours (30 days) of pre-service training. Because the period covered by the review did not reflect current practice, this figure was based on current practice. To calculate the pre-service training factor, it was necessary to use a turnover estimate. We used 31 percent, as reported for fiscal year 1984-85 by DOA's Personnel Division.

[4] In computing a staffing formula, the turnover rate is used to calculate time required to fill vacancies. Again, 31 percent was used [see note (3)].

[5] Actual result is 4.8, but DOC rounds this figure up to 5.0

[6] Figures reflect rounding.

Source: DOC payroll records, DOC staff interviews, ACA standards, DOA Personnel Division reports, and interview with N.R. Cox and Associates

DOC's figures are inaccurate because DOC did not follow standard criteria in developing its formula. DOC's staffing formula:

- Does not account for all factors causing employees to be away from their posts. DOC's formula accounts for the impact of only four factors: regular days off, annual leave, sick leave and holiday leave, and omits numerous other factors such as military leave, training time, comp time taken, time required to fill vacancies and industrial leave.

- Is not based on historical data. DOC calculates its formula using figures for annual, holiday and sick leave accrued by employees rather than time actually taken. As a result, the annual leave figure is two and one-half days too low, while holiday and sick leave are more than five days too high.

- Is not computed by institution. DOC uses the same formula for the entire Department, even though marked variations among institutions may exist.

- Is not reviewed annually. Evidence indicates that DOC's formula has not been updated for at least nine years.

Thus, DOC's 5.0 staffing figure for seven-day, 24-hour posts is deficient, compared with the 5.3 figure resulting from our review. The same is true for 16-hour and eight-hour posts. However, even 5.3 may underestimate the true staffing requirements, since information on time spent for special assignments was not readily available. In addition, Auditor General staff used Department of Administration (DOA) turnover figures, which may have been low because the figures did not include vacancies arising from promotions and transfers within DOC. Thus, DOC's staffing formula may be less accurate than shown in Table 2.*

The accuracy of the formula is critical, because even small differences in figures computed can have potentially serious consequences for institutional staffing. For example, DOC used its own 5.0 figure to compute tentative staffing levels for Florence's new Administrative Segregation Unit, despite consultant recommendations advising the use of

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*   However, DOC can decrease the staffing requirements by eliminating inefficiencies. For example, the time for filling vacancies may be unnecessarily lengthy. The Department may also be able to decrease turnover among security staff. Since both factors influence staffing requirements, decreasing them would also decrease the requirements.

a 5.2 figure for a seven-day, 24-hour post. This apparently minor change, according to an institutional official, reduced staff by 30 positions for this 768 bed unit.* Differences among institutions can also affect the accuracy of the formula at the institutional level, because using a Department-wide formula may provide some institutions with more staff than they really need, while leaving others with less than they require. For example, because Arizona State Prison Complex (ASPC)-Perryville has a 68 percent turnover rate, preliminary calculations show that this facility would be allocated approximately 34 fewer CSOs under a system-wide formula than it would under a formula based on institution-specific data.

The Need For Posts Is Not Clearly Defined

DOC has not clearly defined posts necessary for the proper and efficient operation of its institutions. DOC has insufficiently analyzed staffing requirements to identify needed security posts. Moreover, the Department lacks the necessary information to evaluate security post needs. Thorough evaluation of post requirements is particularly important because Arizona's growing prison population has increased institutional staffing requirements.

<u>No Evidence Of Analysis</u> - DOC has not completed a comprehensive analysis of Departmental post needs. Although staffing requirements for an institution are normally determined through post analysis, which ascertains the number and types of posts necessary for effective and efficient institutional operation, Auditor General staff could find no evidence that DOC had done such an analysis. We identified two staffing studies, completed in 1983 and 1984, that examined Adult Institutions' personnel. However, information in both studies was based almost exclusively on staff interviews or written input from institutional personnel. The few studies that may have incorporated broader substantive

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*   We were unable to calculate the staffing formula's effect on the entire Department because of incomplete information regarding posts at all DOC institutions.

criteria were older studies limited to only one institution and thus, do not adequately reflect changes that have occurred since the studies were completed.

A comprehensive post analysis is necessary because institutional post requirements are affected by several factors, including inmate custody level, the size of the institution, the design of the facility, institutional programs and the mission of the institution. A post analysis assesses the effects of these factors on institutional staffing using elements of time and motion studies, task analyses, work load measures and evaluations of staff utilization.

DOC Lacks Essential Staffing Information - DOC does not have an accurate list of the Department's posts on which to evaluate post needs.

Post documents that show duty assignments for CSOs on each shift conflicted with staff interviews and Auditor General observations of post coverage. For example, post documents showed some posts being covered (as much as 24 hours per day) that in reality were rarely covered because of CSO vacancies or other unexpected leave. In at least two cases, posts existed that were not recorded in written documents. In both instances, a portion of the CSOs' responsibilities were in areas entirely unrelated to security, such as typing or time keeping. Officials at one facility, in which CSO vacancies jumped from two to 24 in less than five months in 1984, declared that the post document was only "paperwork" that did not reflect the true situation.

Effect Of Inmate Population Growth - Completion of a post analysis is particularly vital because unprecedented inmate population growth has changed institutional work loads. For example, in late 1984 DOC increased institutional capacity by nearly 30 percent at the San Juan and Santa Cruz Units at ASPC-Perryville by adding 112 beds to each unit. Yet, the beds were added with no increase in security staff. Similarly, when the Minimum Custody Unit was created at ASPC-Tucson, security staff were provided from existing Rincon Unit allocations, leaving both units with fewer staff than institutional officials thought adequate.

Some institutions have actually lost positions at the very time that correctional facilities experienced significant inmate population increases. For example, the ASPC-Florence Central Unit has lost 30 CSOs since 1981. According to an institutional official, this unit had 265 allocated CSO positions in 1981 but only 235 such positions for 1985-86. Even though bed capacity remains unchanged from 1981, the average daily population at Central Unit has increased slightly. The ASPC-Florence South Unit has lost security staff while at the same time taking on additional beds. As of June 1985 the South Unit had 123 CSOs compared to 145 in 1980. Yet, since 1980 inmate population has increased by 152, to the current population of 600.

Appropriate Staffing Levels
Cannot Be Determined

Without an accurate staffing formula and analysis of post requirements, the number of staff needed to provide adequate security cannot be identified. As a result, it is difficult to determine why apparent staffing shortages exist, or if they exist at all. Possible explanations include underallocation, inefficient placement of staff and improper use of staff.

During the review of adult institutions' security, (Auditor General report number 85-12) consultants N.R. Cox and Associates identified many instances of apparent staff shortages in DCC facilities. Yet, without a comprehensive analysis, they could not determine whether "shortages were due to insufficient numbers of personnel, inefficient deployment of personnel, or inadequate evaluation of personnel needs. . . ." The lack of reliable information also prevented Auditor General staff from determining adequate staffing levels. Several possibilities may explain apparent shortages.

Underallocation - In some instances, institutions may be inadequately staffed. Many instances of inadequate staffing appear to exist. Inadequate security staffing creates hardships not only for security staff but also for other staff as well as inmates.

13

Institutional officials cited numerous examples of need for additional security posts. In addition, preliminary calculations by Auditor General staff indicated that some institutions appear less adequately staffed than others. Based on existing posts, adequacy of staffing varied from less than 70 percent to almost 95 percent. However, some institutions that appear more adequately staffed may have less staff than needed because many facilities have eliminated or omitted posts due to staffing constraints. For example:

- North Unit Outside Trustee does not provide staff for one post, thereby leaving a dorm unguarded. With existing staff, this unit cannot have a CSO in the dorm without sacrificing security elsewhere. Incidents of theft and assault have occurred.

- San Pedro does not staff the post at one of two dining halls in the unit. As a result, 216 inmates and the unit's CSOs have 90 minutes to eat in a single dining hall with a maximum capacity of 56.

- Because there are only enough CSOs to supervise eight outside work crews, Florence Complex security has apparently been able to handle its work load only by taking out fewer crews than are available, despite statutes that require all able-bodied inmates to work 40 hours per week.

When staffing problems occur, institutions address these problems through a variety of strategies: (1) prioritize posts, (2) balance the number of staff working each shift, (3) use security supervisors to cover routine posts, (4) use CSOs as security supervisors, (5) deny requests to attend training, and (6) in extreme cases, call in security staff on their days off and leave vital posts vacant temporarily. The strategies are not altogether desirable. For example, prioritizing posts may leave certain security posts vacant. According to institutional staff, the Tucson and Perryville Complexes each leave one control room post largely unfilled due to staff shortages. Auditor General staff observed that staff in both control rooms were barely able to keep up with work demands. Yet, N.R. Cox and Associates state that control room posts are of such vital significance that a post analysis begins with assessing the adequacy of control room posts. Using security supervisors in posts routinely filled by CSOs can result in less supervision of correctional security staff. Denying leave requests and calling in employees while they are on leave can result in increased work loads, additional stress and decreased morale for employees.

14

The end result is that institutional security may suffer. N.R. Cox and Associates observed many instances in which security is less than adequate.

- The Rincon yard control officer had to leave the station unattended to perform another task.

- ASP-Fort Grant does not have sufficient officers to guard each dorm.

- Only one officer supervises more than 100 inmates during the midnight shift in the ASPC-Tucson Minimum Custody Unit.

Improper security staffing also affects other institutional personnel as well as inmates. In times of severe need, correctional program officers (CPOs) in some facilities perform security duties. In at least one facility, the Deputy Warden and even the secretary escort inmates during severe security staff shortages. Under some circumstances, nonsecurity staff cannot provide services to inmates until security escorts are available. One Health Services official stated that the dentist serving cellblock 6 may see clients only 15 minutes out of the hour due to a shortage of security escorts. Another staff member stated that a great portion of her days are spent waiting for security officers to escort inmates to her. As a result, not only are staff time and resources used inefficiently, but inmates receive limited services.

Inefficient Use Of Staff - On the other hand, institutions that appear to be short of staff may be using staff inefficiently. Some institutions, for example, appeared to have a much greater proportion of security supervisors performing administrative functions than others. According to N. R. Cox and Associates, some administrative posts may not have been created in response to a pressing need, but rather to reward senior employees. Varying use of security supervisors may exist in part because DOC has no guidelines as to the level and number of security supervisors appropriate for each institution, or how security supervisors should be used. In response to a question regarding how security supervisor staffing is determined, some institutional officials stated that they merely "work with what we have."

15

CSOs In Nonsecurity Positions - In other cases, staffing problems may have arisen because many institutions must use CSOs for functions that, though not security related, are vital to institutional operations. Some CSOs work in posts that would be more appropriately filled by building maintenance supervisors, clerks, typists, mechanics, storekeepers and food service supervisors. In one unit, the Deputy Warden stated that ten CSOs perform work that should be done by food service supervisors, CPOs and recreation aides; and five more work in areas that do not necessarily require CSOs. Yet, having CSOs working in functions unrelated to security may cause an institution to leave a security post unstaffed or result in inadequate relief for some posts. Some institutions have requested nonsecurity positions for these functions but the requests have not been funded.

Staffing Analysis Would
Improve Staffing Decisions

A comprehensive staffing analysis would improve DOC's ability to make decisions regarding staffing levels. DOC has completed a staffing study intended to help the Department identify staffing needs. Although the study provides DOC with some information, the study does not furnish DOC with information needed to identify staffing needs because of incomplete information, deficiencies in the staffing formula, and limited critical review of data submitted by the institutions.

DOC has recently completed a study of staffing needs. This study, completed in December 1985, was intended to assess staffing for the entire Department, and will be used to determine needs for existing and new positions. Previous DOC studies completed for the purpose of developing staffing patterns for new institutions used consultants chosen specifically for the task. DOC officials stated they they might have used an outside consultant for the current study, but resource constraints prevented them from considering this alternative. The staffing study has enabled DOC to obtain information it previously lacked, and has helped the Department update existing information. For example, the study provided DOC with current lists of positions,

organizational charts, and schematic diagrams showing posts for various institutions. It also projected institutional staffing needs for fiscal year 1986-87.

Incomplete Information - The DOC staffing study does not provide DOC with complete information needed to accurately determine staffing needs. Schematic diagrams, intended to depict security post locations, were incompletely developed for some institutions and missing for others. Schematic diagrams were missing for all but one unit at ASPC-Perryville. Information showing the specific location of each post and specific areas covered by each post was missing or incomplete for most units at ASPC-Florence.

Morever, the Department did not analyze the tasks and duties necessary to carry out each institution's mission. A task analysis forms a critical part of a staffing study, because the objective of such an analysis is to identify specific tasks, duties, and interrelationships among tasks and duties, to determine the numbers and types of posts needed for the most efficient and effective operation of an institution. This information must be reviewed and analyzed before accurate conclusions regarding staffing needs can be reached. Because DOC did not conduct a task analysis as part of its staffing study, the extent of inefficiencies in staff utilization remains unknown, and conclusions about the number and location of security posts may not be accurate.

Staffing Formula - The staffing formula developed as a result of the DOC study may be inaccurate. As noted previously, the staffing formula should include all factors that cause employees to be away from a post. However, DOC officials stated that at least one factor, the time required to fill vacancies, was not included.* As a result, DOC came up with formulas of 4.64 to 4.87 for seven-day, 24-hour posts for most institutions, which was rounded to 5.0 to provide some "cushion." Yet, the basis for rounding specifically to 5.0 (as opposed to 4.9, 5.1, 5.2,

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*   Other factors related to training may have also been excluded. However, we were unable to determine from DOC records how in-service and pre-service training factors were calculated.

17

etc.) is unclear. It is also unclear how DOC plans to modify the staffing formula for one institution that apparently required the use of a 5.12 formula. An accurate staffing formula is highly important; even small differences in the formula used can have potentially serious consequences for institutional staffing.

Limited Review - Information gathered for the study was compiled and conclusions were drawn with only limited Central Office review. For example, one institution actually stated that the duties performed by one CSO could be performed equally well by a secretary, yet the statement was apparently not considered in the final compilation of staffing needs.

One DOC official did state that the respective institutional heads were contacted, especially when institutional data appeared unrealistic. However, differing opinions among institutional officials regarding the types of posts needed and the kinds of positions necessary to fill particular posts led to inconsistencies in determining how similar posts would be staffed among different institutions. For example, some units use a storekeeper in the "inmate store" (commissary) post, whereas others use a CSO in the same post. Another example is the WIPP payroll post, in which units may use CPOs, CSOs and clerks, based on differing institutional rationales.

CONCLUSIONS

DOC is unable to accurately determine security staffing requirements. DOC uses an inaccurate formula that apparently underestimates staffing needs. Furthermore, post needs are not clearly defined. Consequently, DOC does not know whether current staffing is adequate. A comprehensive staffing analysis could alleviate staffing problems.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. DOC should complete additional studies and analyses to determine the following:

    a. the number of security posts needed based on work load measures, detailed task analyses, staff utilization and facility design;

    b. other areas affecting security staffing, including staffing needs for areas in which CSOs are currently inappropriately assigned; and

    c. an accurate staffing formula for each institution, along with a plan to gradually eliminate Departmental inefficiencies that tend to inflate the staffing formula.

    DOC should report to the Legislature the results of the staffing study, as well as the Department's progress in implementing study results.

    If DOC lacks sufficient resources to perform a comprehensive staffing analysis, DOC should request monies from the Legislature to hire a consultant to perform the study.

2. DOC should review the staffing formula annually and post needs periodically to assess changes in conditions affecting staffing needs. DOC should report the results of these reviews to the Legislature.

FINDING II

DOC'S HIRING PROCESS IS INADEQUATE TO MEET CSO HIRING NEEDS

The Department of Corrections (DOC) is unable to hire enough correctional service officers (CSOs) to meet its security staffing needs. DOC has difficulty filling CSO positions and must constantly operate with high vacancy levels. The Department plans to centralize the hiring process, but several major problems will still exist. In addition, reducing the time that positions are vacant may also eliminate the vacancy savings counted on to fund training positions.

Currently, the Department of Administration (DOA)-State Personnel Division is ultimately responsible for developing procedures governing CSO recruitment, selection and hiring. State Personnel has an office at DOC's Central Office that employs both DOA and DOC staff. State Personnel receives applications and maintains a register of CSO candidates. DOC's Personnel Office generates hiring lists for institutions and updates the register. DOC institutions receive hiring lists, interview candidates and make final hiring decisions.* However, under a new intergovernmental agreement between State Personnel and DOC, DOC will assume all CSO recruitment responsibilities. DOC has established a special Recruitment Unit for Selection and Hiring (RUSH) to centralize CSO hiring. RUSH is scheduled to begin recruitment in January 1986.

DOC Has Difficulty
Filling CSO Positions

DOC has difficulty filling CSO vacancies. DOC records indicate that its institutions operate with a high number of CSO vacancies. CSO vacancies are due to high turnover and a lengthy hiring process. The constant vacancies increase the number of staff needed to operate institutions.

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*   Arizona State Prison Complex-Florence has been excluded from divided DOA-DOC authority. It is the only institution presently to oversee all phases of CSO recruitment.

<u>CSO Vacancy Levels Are High</u> - DOC institutions constantly operate with a high number of CSO vacancies. DOC vacancies result from newly authorized CSO positions and CSO terminations. The termination vacancies result from high turnover, which may have several causes.

DOC has a large number of vacancies caused by newly authorized CSO positions. DOC has been authorized 413.5 new CSO positions for fiscal year 1985-86. Most of the new positions (252.5) are for the emergency facilities. One hundred sixty-one new positions are being added for existing institutions.

In addition to vacancies caused by newly authorized positions, DOC has a high number of vacancies caused by CSO terminations. Since DOC has not maintained Department-wide historical records on vacancy levels, we were unable to calculate a Department-wide average monthly vacancy level. However, CSO monthly terminations for the 1984-85 fiscal year were obtained from Arizona State Prison Complex (ASPC)-Florence, ASPC-Perryville and ASPC-Tucson. A summary of the terminations for these institutions is presented in Table 3. The three institutions had a total of 616 vacant positions of 1,340.5 authorized CSO positions, resulting in an overall termination level of 46 percent. ASPC-Perryville had the highest termination level at 69 percent, ASPC-Florence had 46 percent, and ASPC-Tucson had a 21 percent termination rate for 10 months.

TABLE 3

MONTHLY CORRECTIONAL SERVICE OFFICER TERMINATIONS[1]
FOR FISCAL YEAR 1984-85

| | Facility | | |
Month and Year	ASPC-Florence	ASPC-Perryville	ASPC-Tucson
July 1984	102	25	no data
August	0	21	no data
September	37	23	6
October	38	25	6
November	42	20	3
December	35	2	4
January 1985	30	17	4
February	0	24	5
March	27	22	10
April	25	12	8
May	0	18	8
June	0	11	6
Total	336	220	60
Authorized CSO Positions for 1984-85	737.5	317	286
1984-85 Termination Percentage	45.6%	69.4%	21.0%[2]

[1] Terminations based on promotions, transfers, demotions, dismissals and resignations at the end of each month.
[2] Ten months only.

Source: Recruitment Unit for Selection and Hiring, Department of Corrections

CSO vacancies are the result of high turnover. DOA reports indicate that for fiscal years 1983-84 and 1984-85 the CSO turnover rate was approximately 32 and 31 percent, respectively.* During the same period, the turnover rate for all positions within DOC was 26 percent. The overall turnover rate for all State service positions was 20 percent in 1983-84, and 18 percent in 1984-85. Therefore, the turnover rate for the CSO position has been much higher than the average rate for all State

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*   Turnover, as defined by DOA, includes only those employees leaving State service. The rate does not include CSO vacancies due to promotions, transfers or demotions. Thus, the DOA turnover rate is usually lower than the termination percentage shown in Table 3.

service positions, and has been higher than the average for all positions within DOC. CSO turnover rates also vary widely among institutions and from year to year. For example, in 1983-84 ASPC-Tucson's turnover rate, as defined by DOA, was 33 percent; but in 1984-85 its turnover rate had dropped to 21 percent. DOA reported ASPC-Perryville's turnover rate as 36 percent in 1983-84, and 43 percent in 1984-85. Such annual turnover rate variation impacts DOC's ability to anticipate institutional CSO replacement needs due to turnover.

Although the CSO turnover rate is high, the causes for turnover are not clear. Two studies were completed to investigate CSO turnover. Although the studies provide insight into potential causes of CSO turnover, each has limitations. DOA's study was limited to 50 CSOs and one institution. DOA reviewed exit interviews of 50 CSOs resigning from ASPC-Florence between October 1, 1983, and September 30, 1984.* Results of DOA's review indicated that the most common reasons for CSOs leaving were: 1) personal reasons not related to the job, 2) work environment, and 3) supervisors. DOC completed a follow-up study in April 1985 due to its concern that CSOs were leaving because of their supervisors. However, DOC's study was limited to CSO supervisors and did not reflect CSO opinions on the causes of turnover.

This DOC study found that from the supervisors' perspective, the primary factor affecting retention of CSOs is the pay scale. The other major factor identified impacting CSO dissatisfaction was understaffing. Understaffing, according to the report, increased tension and stress on individual officers who were expected to cover two, and sometimes three posts. In addition, the task force concluded that one of the causes of CSO dissatisfaction with sergeants and lieutenants is the "dismal level" of supervisory/management training provided by DOC.

In addition to conducting these studies, DOC has implemented an exit interview program to monitor reasons for CSO turnover. Since January

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*   Exit surveys were sent to 202 CSOs who resigned from ASPC-Florence. Of the 202 sent, 50 were returned. DOA's conclusions were based on the 50 returned surveys.

1985 DOC has sent questionnaires to CSOs who resign from the Department to determine their reasons for leaving. According to DOC officials, the results of the questionnaires will be used to develop strategies to reduce turnover.

Lengthy Hiring Process Compounds Vacancy Problem - In addition to the high CSO turnover rate, the hiring process forces the institutions to wait almost three months until CSO positions are filled. Auditor General staff reviewed CSO hiring lists* prepared between October 1984 and June 1985 to determine the delay in filling positions. However, of the 487 position numbers reviewed, information on the date the positions were filled was only available on 133. Based on the 133 positions for which information was available, results of the review indicate that the average length of time taken to fill a CSO position is more than four and one-half weeks. Once hired, a CSO must attend a six-week training program. Therefore, an institution must wait approximately 11 weeks to fill a vacant CSO position. According to our analysis, ASPC-Florence hires within three weeks, since its hiring lists are prepared without Central Office involvement. With the required training, the time to fill a position at ASPC-Florence is nine weeks. Thus, ASPC-Florence is able to fill positions more quickly, but the delay is still more than two months.

Two major areas impact the delay in the hiring process: DOC's hiring approach and the inadequacy of hiring lists.

- Current Hiring Approach - DOC does not begin recruitment until it receives notice that a position will become vacant. As the process is structured, even if DOC were able to hire a CSO the day a position became vacant, the institution would still be without a CSO for six weeks while the new hire completed training.

- Hiring Lists Do Not Provide Enough Interested Applicants - Hiring lists do not provide enough interested, qualified applicants. Two of the institutions' personnel officers stated that they assume that at least half of the applicants on a hiring list will not respond to an interview contact. ASPC-Perryville, for example,

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* Hiring lists were reviewed from ASPC-Perryville, ASPC-Tucson, ASP-Fort Grant, ASPC-Douglas, Catalina Mountain Juvenile Institution, Adobe Mountain Juvenile Institution and New Dawn Juvenile Institution.

25

sent 93 interview contact letters from a hiring list to fill 26 vacancies. Only 28 applicants responded. The Associate Warden stated that from the 28 respondents, they would be lucky to hire 15; thus, 11 positions would remain vacant and would need to be filled from a subsequent hiring list. One potential cause for the low response rate may be the timeliness of candidate interviews. Due to the background check requirement for CSOs, applicants may not appear on a register for several weeks (see Finding III). By the time the applicants are contacted they may no longer be interested in the position. Another cause may be discrepancies between DOA and DOC in removing applicants from the register. DOC authorities often note reasons on hiring lists for not hiring an individual. However, DOA, which is ultimately responsible for removing applicant names from the register, may not find the explanation provided sufficient to remove an applicant from the register. Thus, these applicants may continue to appear on other hiring lists.

Lack of coordination within DOC also affects the initiation of the hiring process.

● Duplication Of Paperwork - DOC institutions begin the hiring process with the completion of an internal 303 form. The form is used to inform Personnel that a person is leaving a position. Once the position becomes vacant, a form 303 is again completed to request that the vacant position be filled. The form contains two sections for these two personnel transactions, and both could be completed simultaneously.*

● Authorization Signatures - According to our analysis, the number of signatures required on the 303 form has nearly doubled its processing time from 4.4 work days to 8.2 work days. During the period analyzed, two versions of the form 303 were used. The old form required three different DOC signatures for proper completion, whereas the revised form added an additional signature requirement. Since the Personnel Office cannot send hiring lists to institutions until receiving the form, the processing time impacts the timeliness of hiring CSOs.

The delay in filling vacancies at institutions increases staff needs. The length of time a position is vacant after a termination impacts the staffing formula. As indicated in Finding I, the staffing formula determines the number of CSOs needed to staff a post. DOC currently uses a staffing formula of 5.0 for a 24-hour, seven-day post. Based on our review of the formula, we found that with the current 11-week delay to

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* At the time of our review, ASPC-Florence did not complete the "request to fill" portion of the 303 form, but used the "change of status" section to begin the hiring process.

26

fill positions at institutions, the staffing formula should be 5.3. However, if the delay in filling vacancies could be reduced to two weeks, for example, the staffing formula could be reduced to 5.0. DOC is currently implementing a procedure to reduce the delay (see page 28). This would reduce staff needs significantly. For example, based on existing posts, the Santa Rita Unit at ASPC-Tucson requires 127 CSOs under the 5.3 figure. Based on the 5.0 figure, needs would be reduced to 116 CSOs. Department-wide, the reduction could have a significant impact on overall staffing needs. However, since we were unable to obtain the total number of posts Department-wide, we were not able to calculate a Department-wide reduction in total number of CSOs needed.

DOC's New Hiring Unit Plans To Hire
And Train In Advance Of Vacancies,
But Problems May Still Exist

Although DOC plans to change its hiring process, some of the existing problems may still exist. DOC will assume primary responsibility for recruitment, selection and hiring of CSOs. The change will centralize the process, and eliminate some of the duplication and coordination problems. However, some problems such as difficulty in providing each institution with the number of needed CSOs, untimeliness in Intelligence & Investigation (I&I) background checks, and DOC's lengthy and duplicative process to initiate hiring are likely to continue.

Change Will Eliminate Some Problems - Under an intergovernmental agreement between DOA and DOC, DOC will assume all responsibility for CSO recruitment, selection, and hiring. DOC has created a Recruitment Unit for Selection and Hiring to perform these functions.* According to the RUSH Administrator, RUSH plans to begin recruitment in January 1986. Since all new CSOs must receive pre-service training prior to being placed at an institution, RUSH will work closely with the Correctional Officer Training Academy (COTA). RUSH will hire new CSOs into limited

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* RUSH was developed through a joint DOA-DOC task force. DOA has also conducted studies to identify ways to improve CSO selection and retention. In addition, DOA will continue to be involved with RUSH as it will perform audits to ensure DOC remains in compliance with DOA personnel rules and regulations.

training positions while they attend the Academy. Upon completion of the training, each CSO will be assigned to a permanent authorized CSO position at an institution.

The new centralized hiring process will emphasize filling vacancies as they occur. Through RUSH, DOC plans to anticipate CSO vacancies, and thus have CSOs hired, trained and ready to place in vacancies when they occur. By hiring and training CSOs in advance of vacancies DOC intends to reduce the length of time a vacancy exists.

Centralization of the process combined with prescreening of applicants should eliminate the problems associated with deficient hiring lists. An objective of RUSH is to remove undesirable applicants from the selection process before they are placed on the CSO register. Screening will be performed at several points throughout the process. For example, the application packet will contain a questionnaire that asks the applicants about their ability or willingness to perform certain duties such as the willingness to use force or the willingness to work varied shifts. If an applicant chooses not to perform these functions, that applicant will be removed from the process during the initial stages. In addition, the new process differs from the current process in that applicants will not be placed on the active register until after they have taken a written exam and had an oral interview. Those found undesirable will be removed from the selection process. Thus, all applicants listed on the register should be hireable, and the hiring lists generated from the register should contain a greater proportion of qualified applicants than at present.

DOC Will Continue To Encounter Some Hiring Difficulties - A problem that may continue under the new hiring process is the timeliness in obtaining CSO applicant background checks. As discussed in Finding III (see page 31), the background check has been untimely and has delayed applicants' availability for hiring. According to the RUSH coordinator, I&I will continue to process background checks after RUSH assumes hiring responsibility. However, background checks will be limited to only those

28

who RUSH intends to interview, rather than all applicants as is done currently. RUSH will need results of the background checks within two weeks, therefore, it will be important for RUSH to coordinate with I&I to ensure that results are returned in a timely manner.

RUSH may also encounter problems with the procedure used to begin the hiring process. DOC's Personnel Division currently has problems in obtaining the "request to fill" form 303 in a timely manner. According to DOC's Personnel Manager, under RUSH DOC will continue to process the "requests to fill" form 303 through the same channels at DOC. The major difference is that the form will go to RUSH instead of to DOC Personnel. Since RUSH cannot transfer a COTA graduate into a permanent position until it receives form 303, delays in RUSH's receipt of the "request to fill" form 303 could still impact institutions operating with vacancies. Thus, timeliness in obtaining the form may continue to be a problem. In addition, duplication of paperwork will continue. The new process will require the institutions to continue to send a "change of status" form 303 when a person vacates a position, and a "request to fill" form 303 to initiate hiring. Added to the process is another change of status form transferring the COTA graduate into the vacant position number.

Eliminating Extended Vacancies May Reduce
Resources For Training Positions

Because DOC does not have separate funding for COTA training positions, it may be unable to reduce the time CSO positions are vacant. One of DOC's objectives in creating RUSH is to hire and train CSOs in advance of vacancies, in order to decrease or eliminate the time a CSO position is vacant. To meet this objective, DOC has established limited training positions and funded the positions with vacancy savings from the 1985-86 budget. However, each institution will have to fund the training positions from its own personnel funds in the future. When a COTA graduate is assigned to an institution, the institution will be charged for the six-week period the trainee attended the Academy. Institutions, therefore, will need to have personnel funds available to fund both authorized positions and training positions in order to request a CSO in advance of a vacancy.

29

Due to the current high turnover and the lengthy period required to fill positions, institutions should have vacancy savings to use for advance hiring. However, if RUSH is able to eliminate or decrease the time CSO positions are vacant, institutional vacancy savings will be reduced. If these vacancy savings are depleted, the institutions' ability to fund training positions is eliminated. An institution would be forced to wait until a position becomes vacant to request that the position be filled. Without separate funding for training positions, DOC is not likely to succeed in reducing the length of time its CSO positions are vacant.

CONCLUSION

DOC's hiring process is inadequate to meet CSO needs. DOC constantly operates with a high level of CSO vacancies. These vacancies are due to both a high turnover rate and a lengthy hiring process. Although DOC's move to centralize its hiring process will eliminate some problems, DOC will continue to have difficulty in filling CSO vacancies. In addition, the Department may lack adequate funding for training positions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. DOC should continue to monitor reasons for CSO turnover and establish procedures to reduce identified turnover causes.

2. DOC should require institutions to complete the "change of status" and the "request to fill" portions of form 303 at the same time to eliminate duplication.

3. DOC should request funding for the COTA training positions in order to allow DOC to hire CSOs in advance of needs.

FINDING III

DOC'S INSPECTIONS AND INVESTIGATIONS SECTION COULD IMPROVE ITS BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION PROCESS

The Department of Corrections' (DOC) background check process for correctional service officer (CSO) applicants could be improved. Delays caused by background investigations of CSO applicants could be reduced. In addition, DOC needs to develop clear guidelines for applicant disqualification. The current problems with background check delays and lack of guidelines may have an even greater impact as the background investigation process is modified.

DOC began performing background investigations for CSO applicants in November 1984.* Applicants for CSO positions are required to complete a background investigation form, and indicate any prior convictions. This form is sent to the Department of Administration (DOA) along with the application. DOA forwards the background investigation form to DOC. DOC's Inspections and Investigations (I&I) Section distributes the forms to one of four institutions to run National Criminal Information Center, Arizona Criminal Information Center, Arizona Computerized Criminal History, and Interstate Information Index background checks.** The checks identify any outstanding warrants and previous convictions for an applicant. The institutional I&I Sections then determine whether a person is eligible for hiring, and send a list of the results to Central Office. Once Central Office receives the lists, the results are forwarded to DOA. The check serves as a preliminary screen for DOC. If an applicant is hired by DOC, a fingerprint check is performed by the Department of Public Safety and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

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*   Before November 1984, background checks were only performed <u>after</u> a CSO was hired by DOC.
**   However, there appear to be inconsistencies among institutions in the use of the computerized background checks.

Background Check
Delays Availability

The background investigations performed for CSO applicants delays their availability. Background checks have not been conducted in a timely manner. Although the cause of the delay is unclear, decentralization of the process contributes to the untimeliness. Since the delay impacts applicant availability, DOC should continue processing applicants while awaiting results of background checks.

CSO Background Checks Are Untimely - The background checks for CSO applicants are not performed in a timely manner. Although the actual computer inquiry requires only minutes, the checks take an average of more than 30 days. These delays may eliminate some job candidates.

When DOA receives applications it codes preliminary information into the CSO register and lists the applicants as pending. Applicants are left in a pending status until the results of the background checks are received. We reviewed the timeliness of the background check process. Although data was lacking for a number of applications, for those applications for which data was available we found that it takes an average of 34 days from the time DOA receives an application for the Department to complete the background check. The 34 days does not include the time it takes for the results of the check to be returned to DOA and updated on the register. In addition, DOC had no record of completing a background check for 30 percent of the applicants we reviewed.

The delay in background checks may unnecessarily eliminate some CSO candidates. If DOA does not receive the results of a background check within three months, the application is purged from the computer's pending register.* Between February 25 and August 8, 1985, DOA forwarded three lists to DOC indicating a total of 282 applicant names for which it

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* Because the purge is performed at a given time each month, some applicants remain on the register more than 90 days. For example, an applicant on the list for 88 days at the time of the monthly deletions would remain on the list for the following month.

had not received a response. According to a DOA personnel analyst, DOC did respond with the results of the background checks for most of the applicants on the lists; however, results were not received for about one-third of the applicants. Thus, due to DOC's failure to monitor the process, some applicants who may have no criminal history are not placed on the DOA register as eligible.

Decentralization Contributes To Delay - Although the exact cause of the delay is unclear, decentralization of background check responsibility clearly contributes to the delay. According to institutional officials, the background check can be performed quickly. However, the time needed to send names to institutions and receive results significantly delays the process. Arizona State Prison Complex (ASPC)-Florence has a centralized process and, thus, has CSOs available for hire much sooner.

According to institutional officials responsible for conducting the checks, the background checks are performed quickly. The actual process of keying information into the computer to obtain a record for a CSO applicant is very quick. The results of the check usually appear immediately. However, institutional I&I personnel have other duties, and usually run the background checks in batches as time permits. In addition, some background checks require follow-up to determine the outcome of pending dispositions. According to DOC officials, this can sometimes take several weeks.

Decentralization of the process has inherent delays. Although records indicate that background checks take an average of 34 days, no logs* or records existed for the period of our review to show exactly how much delay occurred at the various processing points. However, part of the delay can be explained by the sheer number of parties who must receive the form. Background check forms are sent from DOA to I&I Central Office, from I&I Central Office to the institutions, and then back

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*   I&I began logging applications in May 1985 to track the background forms' progress to and from the institutions. However, at the time of our analysis, there was insufficient documentation to trace a form through the entire process.

through the same parties.* Both timeliness and control could be improved if the background check process were centralized. Centralization is possible because terminals are available at institutions in the Phoenix area, and the Central Office is also planning to obtain a terminal.

ASPC-Florence has a centralized background check process and, thus, has CSOs available for hire much sooner. ASPC-Florence applications are received and processed at Florence, while all other institutions' applications are first sent to DOA. The background checks for ASPC-Florence CSO applicants are processed by Florence's I&I Section. According to the Personnel Administrator at Florence, results from background checks for CSO applicants are received within two weeks.

Few Applicants Have Criminal Records - Delaying applicant processing during background checks also appears to be unnecessary. The number of applicants who do not clear the process is relatively small and does not appear to warrant the delay. Therefore, DOC could continue processing applicants while the background checks are being conducted.

Delaying all CSO applicants to perform the background checks appears unwarranted. Processing of applicants stops while background checks are completed. During this pending period, applicants do not appear on a hiring list and cannot be interviewed by hiring authorities. The number of applicants screened out through the background checks is very small. We obtained information from DOC which indicates that approximately 4 percent of applicants fail the background check.** Therefore, DOC delays the process for all applicants when only a small number fail.

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*   DOA will be eliminated from the process when the hiring process is centralized. Beginning in January 1986, the applications and background check forms will be sent to the Recruitment Unit for Selection and Hiring in Tucson, which will forward the forms to I&I at Central Office in Phoenix for processing.

**   This figure contains primarily CSO applicants, but it also contains background check figures for other DOC employees.

DOC could allow applicants to appear on hiring lists and be interviewed by hiring authorities while the background checks are being processed. DOC has already taken this approach for Arizona State Prison-Douglas. Due to the number of CSOs that needed to be hired to staff ASP-Douglas, DOC's Personnel Manager informed DOA that he was waiving the requirement that background checks be performed prior to placing these CSOs on a hiring list. Specifically, the letter dated May 3, 1985 states:

> "The facility staff will conduct the background investigation while the personnel liaison office awaits receipt of a hiring list, sends out notices for interviews and conducts the interviews. Hiring decisions will not be made until background checks are completed. However, this special process is being instituted to avoid the 2-3 months delay in completing background checks before an applicant can be placed in the CSO register."

DOC Lacks Clear Guidelines
For Applicant Disqualification

DOC lacks clear guidelines as to what factors identified in a background check should cause an applicant to be ineligible. The lack of guidelines along with the decentralization of the process may cause inconsistency. In contrast, the Department of Public Safety (DPS) has specific criteria for eligibility.

Lack Of Clear Policies on Disqualification - DOC has no clear policies indicating what kind of background disqualifies an applicant. As a result, investigators at each institution who review the results of background checks must sometimes use considerable judgment in determining who should be rejected. As a result, their decisions may be inconsistent. For example, the investigators indicated that felony convictions are generally grounds for rejection. However, DOC has an ex-offender program which suggests that felony convictions should not automatically disqualify applicants. In addition, institutional I&I officials noted the lack of guidelines for misdemeanor offenses. Arrests or convictions for such offenses as shoplifting, DWI or narcotics use may or may not disqualify an applicant. However, no standard criteria is

used to make the decision. Thus, there is a potential for inconsistent treatment of applicants.

Some inconsistencies could be reduced if, as discussed earlier, the background check process were centralized, since fewer people would be involved in interpreting results of the check. However, guidelines would still be necessary to ensure consistent interpretation of results.

DPS Has Specific Criteria For Eligibility - The Department of Public Safety has clear guidelines for rejecting applicants from the selection process. DPS's selection guidelines define the conditions that could result in rejection. These conditions cover sexual misconduct, drug involvement, theft or misappropriation of property, acts constituting a felony, fraud or misrepresentation, and credit and driving record. In addition, DPS guidelines include time elements within which the conditions must exist for rejection. For example, marijuana use does not automatically cause an applicant to be rejected, as long as the use was not within the 12 months before the application was submitted. DPS considers any felony act cause for rejection of the applicant, regardless of the time element. DPS also uses a polygraph examination in exploring these conditions. DOC should develop its own standards for screening applicants.

New Background Investigation Requirements
Could Intensify Problems

The current problems with background check delays and lack of guidelines may have an even greater impact as the background investigation process is modified. The Arizona Law Enforcement Officer Advisory Council (ALEOAC) is required by statute to establish uniform standards for background investigations of CSO applicants. DOC is currently developing standards to meet ALEOAC requirements for background investigations. Since the standards will require a much more extensive investigation than is currently performed, delays and the lack of guidelines may create even greater problems.

ALEOAC is responsible for establishing uniform standards for CSO background investigations. The Legislature approved funding for fiscal year 1984-85 to establish the Correctional Officer Training Academy in Tucson. In connection with this appropriation, Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S) §41-1821 was modified to require ALEOAC to establish standards for background investigations to be conducted on CSO applicants before they enroll in the academy. Specifically, A.R.S. §41-1821 D states, in part:

> "D. The Council Shall:
>
> 4. Establish uniform standards for background investigations, including criminal histories under section 41-1750, subsection G, of all applicants before enrolling in the academy. The Council may adopt special procedures for extended screening and investigations in extraordinary cases to ensure suitability and adaptability to a career as a correctional officer."

DOC is currently developing standards to meet ALEOAC requirements. ALEOAC's rules and regulations define background investigation requirements for peace officers. R13-4-05 requires that background investigations for peace officers include a history statement and a written evaluation based on the results of the investigation, to be used for determining applicant suitability. The rule states that the sources of the investigation should include a polygraph exam, review of a driver's license record, contact of educational institutions, review of police files in jurisdictions the applicant has lived, a review of DPS criminal records, a review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation records, contact with at least three previous employers, check of references, and contact with the applicant's neighbors. DOC is developing standards based on ALEOAC guidelines; however, the standards proposed for CSOs will not be as extensive. DOC plans to present a proposal to ALEOAC for approval in November 1985.

Since the standards will require a much more extensive investigation than is currently performed, the delays and lack of guidelines may have an even greater impact. DOC currently requires only computerized criminal

37

history checks for CSO applicants; however, these checks are delaying applicants' availability for hire by 34 days. As the investigations process becomes more extensive, the potential for even greater delays is increased. In addition, the new process will require additional sources which may create additional possibilities for inconsistent decisions in the absence of guidelines for disqualifying applicants.

CONCLUSION

DOC's background check process for CSO applicants could be improved. The background investigation performed for CSO applicants unnecessarily delays applicant availability. In addition, DOC lacks clear guidelines for applicant disqualification.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. DOC should centralize its background check function. Centralization would allow DOC to improve its timeliness in conducting background checks, and reduce the potential for inconsistent treatment of applicants based on the results of the background checks.

2. DOC should allow CSO applicants to appear on hiring lists while background checks are being conducted.

3. DOC should establish clear guidelines for rejecting CSO applicants.

TRAINING FOR CORRECTIONAL SERVICE OFFICERS IS INADEQUATE

The Department of Corrections (DOC) has not provided correctional service officers (CSOs) with adequate training. The amount and type of in-service training received by CSOs has varied, due largely to staff shortages and poor record keeping. Although the amount and type of pre-service training received by CSOs has also been inconsistent, a new academy has been established to correct this situation.

Amount And Type Of In-Service Training Provided Is Inconsistent

DOC has not designed a consistent in-service training program for CSOs. The number of hours of in-service training has not met minimum standards. Further, the type of in-service training given to CSOs has been varied. In addition, CSOs without pre-service training may not have received in-service training in critical areas to make up for the lack of pre-service training. As a result, CSOs may not be adequately trained in critical skill areas.

Amount Of Training Has Not Met Minimum Guidelines - The number of in-service training hours received by CSOs has not met minimum guidelines. Although DOC has been operating without a training policy since October 1984, a new training policy requiring CSOs to receive at least 20 hours of annual in-service training after their first year was approved in November 1985.* However, as shown in Table 4, CSOs have not received sufficient in-service training to meet the 20-hour standard. The Table summarizes training received by CSOs for the two year period of July 1, 1983, through June 30, 1985. CSOs employed by DOC for more than two years received an average of less than 13 hours of in-service training for fiscal years 1984 and 1985.

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*   This 20-hour requirement is less than the 80 hours of annual in-service training required by DOC's previous training policy and the 40 hours suggested by the American Correctional Association (ACA). According to a DOC memo, the 80-hour training policy was rescinded due to "a shortage of personnel resources." The 20-hour requirement is based on training resources currently available.

TABLE 4

HOURS OF IN-SERVICE TRAINING
RECEIVED BY CSOs
JULY 1, 1983, THROUGH JUNE 30, 1985

Length of Service	Number of CSOs(1)	Average Training Hours
0 - 6 months	6	0.67
7 - 12 months	19	5.16
13 - 18 months	9	7.89
19 - 24 months	17	15.00
over 24 months	46	12.52

(1)   The total is less than 150 because one CSO resigned before completing academy training and was excluded from the sample. Also, 51 CSOs did not have in-service training files and were eliminated from the sample.

Source: Random sample of 150 CSO in-service training files from five correctional facilities: Arizona State Prison-Fort Grant, and Arizona State Prison Complexes at Florence, Perryville, Phoenix and Tucson

Type Of In-Service Training Received Is Not Uniform - To the extent that training is conducted at all, the type of in-service training received by CSOs has been inconsistent. Although each institution's training needs may vary, certain topics should be taught at all facilities. According to ACA standards, annual refresher courses in first aid, weapons, security procedures and legal issues are essential.

Although DOC training policy in effect until October 2, 1984, required training in such areas as first aid, weapons and security procedures, a review of DOC training files revealed that CSOs were not receiving adequate instruction in these critical areas. In our sample, of the 47 CSOs hired before July 1, 1983, only six, 13 percent, received in-service first aid training and only 28, 60 percent, received in-service security procedures training during fiscal years 1984 and 1985.

Training inconsistency is further increased because CSOs are allowed to substitute on-the-job training hours for in-service training hours. For example, a CSO may record as in-service training time spent filling a different post for a day. While on-the-job training may be an effective

40

way to learn some routine job skills, it is oriented toward specific requirements of a given position. Moreover, reliance on on-the-job training provides no assurance that CSOs will be trained in critical skill areas. A spokesperson for ACA stated that on-the-job and in-service training are distinct programs and should not be substituted for one another. In addition, substituting on-the-job for in-service training could prevent CSOs from receiving formal instruction in critical skill areas because CSO in-service training hours would be inaccurately inflated.

Lack Of In-Service Training Is Critical For CSOs With No Pre-Service Training - Inadequate in-service training is also significant because some CSOs received no pre-service training when they were initially employed. Nineteen CSOs in our random sample did not receive any pre-service academy training. The number of hours of in-service training cannot be determined for five of the 19 CSOs because they do not have training records. None of the 14 with in-service training records have received adequate in-service training, as shown in Table 5.* Nine of the CSOs, whose years of service range from one to seven, attended less than 20 hours total in-service training. Only one CSO attended as much as 20 hours training per year. Since DOC has no plans to provide pre-service training for those who have not received it, in-service training is vital to ensure that these CSOs are trained in critical areas.

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* As noted previously ACA standards require a minimum of 40 hours annually of in-service training. DOC's recently approved training policy will require at least 20 hours annually of in-service training.

TABLE 5

HOURS OF IN-SERVICE TRAINING RECEIVED BY CSOs
LACKING PRE-SERVICE ACADEMY TRAINING
FROM HIRE DATE THROUGH JUNE 30, 1985

| CSO | Hire Date | TYPE OF TRAINING | | | Total |
		First Aid	Weapons	Procedures	
1	4/78	0	6	6	12
2	2/80	0	0	10	10
3	4/81	0	0	4	4
4	8/81	0	0	11	11
5	5/82	0	10	45	55
6	7/82	8	10	42	60
7	10/82	14	18	18	50
8	6/83	0	5	2	7
9	7/83	0	5	31	36
10	8/83	2	0	9	11
11	8/83	0	28	6	34
12	8/83	0	5	1	6
13	2/84	0	5	0	5
14	9/84	0	0	0	0

Source: Random sample of 150 CSO in-service training files from five correctional facilities: ASP-Fort Grant, ASPC-Florence, ASPC-Perryville, ASPC-Phoenix and ASPC-Tucson

Critical Skills May Not Be Developed - Because of DOC's inconsistent in-service training policy, CSOs may not be adequately trained in critical skill areas. As stated in the ACA Standards Manual, "Ongoing training . . . enables employees to sharpen skills and keep abreast of changes in operational procedure." Without such training, CSOs may be unable to respond to a particular situation in an appropriate manner. Lack of in-service training in critical areas could increase the State's potential liability. For example, some institutions do not have medical personnel on-site 24 hours a day. Therefore, should an emergency occur, it would be beneficial for CSOs to be trained in first aid procedures.

Staff Shortages And Poor Record Keeping
Limit In-Service Training

DOC has been unable to provide CSOs with sufficient in-service training. Staffing shortages have prevented CSOs from attending in-service training

42

classes. In addition, due to poor record keeping, DOC cannot effectively monitor training policy compliance.

Staffing Shortages Prevent CSOs From Attending Classes - Staffing shortages make it difficult to schedule CSOs for in-service training. According to several Deputy Wardens, CSOs cannot be trained during their regular shifts due to staff shortages. Scheduling a CSO for training could compromise a facility's security if the CSO's post remains unfilled while that person is in training. In addition, because of a lack of funds, compensatory time cannot be approved for a CSO to attend a training class during another shift. While several Deputy Wardens recognize the need for in-service training, because of staffing problems they are reluctant or unable to allow CSOs to attend classes.

To rectify this situation, DOC should incorporate a factor that accounts for in-service training hours into its staffing formula (see Finding I). DOC's current staffing formula does not include a factor for in-service training. A revised staffing formula could determine staff level changes necessary to allow for in-service training. This revision could give the Deputy Wardens the flexibility to schedule CSOs for various in-service classes. Once staffing levels are adjusted, the Deputy Wardens should be responsible for ensuring that CSOs receive adequate in-service training.

DOC Cannot Effectively Monitor Training Policy Compliance - Poor record keeping prevents DOC from monitoring CSO compliance with in-service training policies. DOC does not have an agency-wide record keeping procedure for in-service training. As a result, record keeping for in-service training varies among facilities. We requested in-service training records from Arizona State Prison-Fort Grant and the Arizona State Prison Complexes (ASPC) at Florence, Perryville, Phoenix and Tucson. The records obtained were not in a standardized format. It appears that each facility has designed its own form to document the amount of training received by its CSOs.

In addition, the records may not reflect all the in-service training CSOs have received. One institution had to request that its employees submit

43

copies of their training records to the institutional training officer. Further, in a sample of 79 CSO training records from ASPC-Florence, 35, more than 44 percent, were missing. Overall, of 150 CSO records requested 51, 34 percent, had no training files.

To improve the situation, DOC plans to convert to an automated and centralized record-keeping process. DOC's Bureau of Staff Development recently designed a Training Records Information Management System (TRIM). The system will store CSOs' in-service and pre-service training records. Information from the regional institutions will be mailed to the main office where an employee will input the data.

Amount And Type Of Pre-Service Training Provided Has Been Inconsistent

DOC has not provided newly hired CSOs with adequate pre-service training. The amount and type of pre-service training CSOs receive has not been consistent. However, DOC's recently established Correctional Officer Training Academy (COTA) should eliminate these deficiencies.

According to a DOC training officer, pre-service training for CSOs began in July 1973 as the result of the murder of two guards at ASPC-Florence. Over time, regional academies for pre-service training have been established at ASP-Fort Grant and Arizona State Prison Complexes at Florence, Perryville and Tucson. Also, DOC has contracted with Phoenix College to provide pre-service training.

Amount And Type Of Pre-Service Training Has Varied - The amount of pre-service training that CSOs have received at the regional academies has varied. For example, the pre-service training program offered in December 1984 at the Tucson academy lasted 160 hours, while the program offered at the Florence academy lasted 240 hours. A random sample of 150 CSO training files from the four academies shows that the amount of pre-service training received by CSOs has ranged from 0 to 280 hours. Table 6 highlights the results of the study.

TABLE 6

HOURS OF PRE-SERVICE TRAINING
RECEIVED BY CSOs

Hours of Training	Number of CSOs(1)	Percentage of Total
0	19	12.8
1 - 80	6	4.1
81 - 160	41	27.7
161 - 240	73	49.3
over 240	1	0.7
No record	8	5.4
	148	100.0%

(1) One CSO resigned before completing academy training and was excluded from the sample. One CSO was actually a correctional medical assistant and was eliminated from the sample.

Source: Random sample of 150 CSO training files from four regional academies: Arizona State Prison-Fort Grant and the Arizona State Prison Complexes at Florence, Perryville and Tucson

In addition to the variance in the amount of training received, some CSOs had a delay between their starting date and the date they began pre-service training. Sample results indicate that 9 percent of the CSOs received pre-service training well after their hire dates. The delays ranged from one month to more than three years.

Moreover, the type of pre-service training CSOs received has not been consistent. Before May 1985 each regional academy developed its own curriculum and used its own instructors. For example, the training academy at ASPC-Tucson emphasized communications and human relations, whereas the training academy at ASPC-Florence emphasized physical training and self-defense. However, since May 1985 a standardized pre-service training curriculum has been implemented at the regional academies.

New Correctional Officer Training Academy Should Reduce Problems - To ensure that CSOs are trained consistently, in 1984 the Legislature appropriated $1.9 million to the Department of Public Safety for the construction of a Correctional Officers Training Academy. COTA is intended to centralize and standardize DOC's pre-service training program.

COTA is located on the grounds of the Arizona Law Enforcement Officer Training Academy (ALETA) in Tucson. COTA was modeled after ALETA's facility and will accommodate 150 cadets: 100 in residence and 50 commuters.

At the time of the appropriation, the Legislature required that the Arizona Law Enforcement Officer Advisory Council (ALEOAC) approve COTA's curriculum. ALEOAC approved the curriculum on April 17, 1985. The new curriculum was based on a Department of Administration job analysis of the CSO position. The curriculum consists of 240 hours of classroom training in the following areas.

> Introduction to corrections
> Law and legal issues in corrections
> Inmate/ward supervision and management
> Security procedures
> Proficiency skills
> Administrative activities

CSOs who satisfactorily complete the training program will receive a certificate from ALEOAC.

According to DOC officials, the academy should be operational by January 1986. At that time, DOC plans to terminate pre-service training at the regional academies. The training at COTA will be given to groups of 50 CSO cadets, with new classes beginning every two weeks.

CONCLUSION

DOC's pre-service and in-service training programs have not provided CSOs with adequate training. Both the amount and type of training provided to CSOs have been inconsistent. Moreover, DOC is unable to ensure that CSOs receive adequate in-service training.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. DOC should adopt and enforce its draft training policy that requires at least 20 hours of annual in-service training after the first year of employment. In addition, DOC should ensure that training is

consistent and in critical skill areas. Once staffing levels make it practical, DOC should consider increasing the number of in-service training hours required per year.

2. DOC should incorporate a factor into the staffing formula that accurately states the required number of in-service training hours so staffing needs can be realistically estimated. This will enable CSOs to attend in-service training classes.

3. DOC should adopt agency-wide record-keeping procedures for in-service training. This will enable DOC to maintain CSOs' training files so they accurately reflect each employee's training hours.

AREAS FOR FURTHER AUDIT WORK

During the course of our audit we identified potential issues that we were unable to pursue due to time constraints.

- Can recruitment and retention of correctional medical staff be improved?

    Qualified correctional medical staff are difficult to recruit and retain in the Department of Corrections (DOC). For example, according to health staff, the infirmary at Arizona State Prison Complex (ASPC)-Florence Central Unit had to be closed temporarily due to a lack of nurses to staff the unit. Among the explanations that have been given for the difficulty in recruiting staff are noncompetitive salaries for some professions, fewer benefits than are available in the private sector (e.g., overtime pay and pay differentials for working less desirable shifts), and the lengthy amount of time required to hire medical personnel through the State personnel system. Even when qualified people are hired, the distant location of many DOC facilities from major population centers and inadequate facilities at some prisons discourage medical staff from staying long. Yet, the retention of qualified staff is vital if DOC is to provide a system of ready access to medical care, as required by a ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Liska v. DOC), in which the court ruled that a delay in providing health care may amount to a violation of constitutional rights. Further audit work needs to be done to determine whether changes can be made to improve the recruitment and retention of qualified correctional medical staff.

- Is correctional program staffing consistent and adequate within the Department of Corrections?

    Preliminary audit work indicates that correctional program staffing varies widely among institutions. For fiscal year 1985-86, DOC has an estimated 472 correctional program positions. Correctional

49

program staff perform various duties, including overseeing release programs and mandatory parole, monitoring inmate progress, counseling inmates, ensuring that inmates are involved in work and education programs, and handling inmate problems. Even though correctional program staffing needs are determined in part by institutional programs and the mission of the institution, these factors alone may not explain the wide variations in correctional program officer (CPO) case loads. Among the adult institutions we examined, the average case load of CPOs varied from 31 to 150 inmates per CPO. However, even when custody level is taken into account, CPO staffing varies widely. Further audit work is needed to determine the appropriate level of program staff.

- Must the Specialized Program Unit (SPU) at ASPC-Florence be licensed under current statutory requirements?

Preliminary audit work indicates that because of the nature of the programs and activities conducted at the Specialized Program Unit at ASPC-Florence, SPU may fall under the Department of Health Services (DHS) definition of a "behavioral health service agency." DHS defines "behavioral health service agency" as "a class of health care institutions other than a hospital which provides screening, evaluation, care or treatment to persons having mental disorders, personality disorders, emotional conditions, or substance abuse problems." If SPU does, indeed, meet this definition, then the continued operation of this unit without a license may be a violation of Arizona Revised Statutes §36-407.A.

If SPU is required to be licensed as a behavioral health service agency, DHS rules and regulations further require that there be a sufficient number of appropriately qualified staff and supporting personnel to provide the quantity and types of services set forth in the agency's written program statement. DOC currently has one facility that is a licensed psychiatric unit providing mental health services (B-Ward, ASPC-Phoenix-Alhambra). In addition, according to

a Flamenco official, DHS is requiring the Flamenco Unit (ASPC-Phoenix) to meet licensure requirements before the unit opens in 1986. Staff at this unit will be providing care for inmates with psychiatric problems. Further audit work needs to be done to determine whether SPU should be licensed and staffed as a behavioral health service agency.

Arizona Department of Corrections

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
BRUCE BABBITT
GOVERNOR

SAMUEL A. LEWIS
DIRECTOR

January 24, 1986

Mr. Douglas R. Norton
Auditor General
2700 North Central
Suite 700
Phoenix, Arizona   85004

Dear Mr. Norton:

The enclosed comments are provided in accordance with your letter dated January 6, 1986, for inclusion with the text of the published report of the Performance Audit of the Department of Corrections, Security Staffing Issues.

If you have any questions concerning the enclosed comments, please call me or Terry L. Stewart at 255-5820.

Sincerely,

Samuel A. Lewis
Director

SAL/TLS/lg

Enclosure

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

PERFORMANCE AUDIT

SECURITY STAFFING ISSUES

GENERAL COMMENTS

As indicated in the Security Staffing Issues report, staffing concepts for corrections institutions involve two major components. The first component relates to the number of security posts that are required to make a particular institution secure for the inmate population and staff. In the case of Arizona, this particular component is not easily identified due to the diversity of design and age of the various institutions that are in operation. The second component involves the application to those number of posts, a staffing formula to determine the total complement that is necessary to staff the number of posts that have been identified as required for adequate security. When the individual post is a 24-hour a day/seven-day a week post, the staffing formula that has traditionally been utilized by the Department of Corrections is 5.0. Of course, posts that require less than seven days a week, 24-hours a day have a reduced overall staffing formula requirement.

Additionally, security staffing is impacted by the additional requirements defined by institutional needs. A correctional institution is not simply an institution with security officers. The correctional institution must deliver a full range of services to the inmate population as well as that of staff. For example, medical care, food service, inmate programming and personnel support are additional requirements that must be met beyond that of security. If, for example, an institution's food service operation is understaffed by virtue of inadequate resource allocation, turnover, or other reasons, the need to feed the inmates does not stop. It must occur, and in many cases will occur, through the use of security staff or the reassignment or reclassification of security staff to meet that requirement. Traditionally, the legislature has funded security staff more liberally than support services staff. The focus of this comment is simply to emphasize that security staffing cannot be looked at in isolation. Total institutional requirements must be considered before judgments can be made from a security staff perspective.

In September of 1985, the Department undertook a comprehensive staffing study to more fully analyze the staffing requirements at the institutional level, as well as those on a Department-wide basis. This particular study involved a post-by-post analysis to determine appropriate staffing levels for each institution. In addition, the study reviews the National Institute of Corrections' (NIC) recommendation to estimate the staffing level if those particular standards were met. We believe the staffing study adequately identifies the staffing requirements and formulas and includes all the information necessary to determine the total number of security personnel needed.

Finally, the report is significantly affected by time. Much of the information is dated and as can be seen in this response, a great deal of progress has been made in the last 12 months.

FINDING I

RECOMMENDATIONS:

NO. 1 - DOC SHOULD COMPLETE ADDITIONAL STUDIES AND ANALYSES TO DETERMINE THE FOLLOWING:

   A. THE NUMBER OF SECURITY POSTS NEEDED BASED ON WORK LOAD MEASURES, DETAILED TASK ANALYSES, STAFF UTILIZATION AND FACILITY DESIGN.

RESPONSE:

The Department would agree that additional analysis is required as it relates to task analysis. Task analysis, as defined by the Department of Corrections, includes the "gathering, recording and evaluation of tasks related data used for productivity improvements as would be determined through a motion and time study." However, the Department's recently completed Staffing Study did cover workload measures and facility design noted in the recommendation.

   B. OTHER AREAS AFFECTING SECURITY STAFFING, INCLUDING STAFFING NEEDS FOR AREAS IN WHICH CSO'S ARE CURRENTLY INAPPROPRIATELY ASSIGNED.

RESPONSE:

While we would take issue with CSOs being inappropriately assigned in view of our comments contained in the introductory section regarding requirements in addition to security, the Department agrees that additional study and analysis in other areas are appropriate. Those studies will be undertaken as priorities and resources permit.

   C. AN ACCURATE STAFFING FORMULA FOR EACH INSTITUTION, ALONG WITH A PLAN TO GRADUALLY ELIMINATE DEPARTMENTAL INEFFICIENCIES THAT TEND TO INFLATE THE STAFFING FORMULA.

RESPONSE:

The Department's Staffing Study determined staffing formulas based on a sampling of 20% actuals for larger institutions and 100% for smaller institutions to determine staffing formulas for each special institution. Many of the responses to the recommendations contained in the remainder of this report are descriptions of actions that have been undertaken to eliminate those inefficiencies. In most cases, these corrective actions were initiated prior to these recommendations.

DOC SHOULD REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE THE RESULTS OF THE ENTIRE STAFFING STUDY, AS WELL AS THE DEPARTMENT'S PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING STUDY RESULTS.

RESPONSE:

The results of the December 1985 Staffing Study will be reported to the legislature.

IF DOC LACKS SUFFICIENT RESOURCES TO PERFORM A COMPREHENSIVE STAFFING ANALYSIS, DOC SHOULD REQUEST MONIES FROM THE LEGISLATURE TO HIRE A CONSULTANT TO PERFORM THE STUDY.

RESPONSE:

If additional study is required and external resources are needed, the Department will seek funding from the legislature.

NO. 2 - DOC SHOULD REVIEW THE STAFFING FORMULA ANNUALLY AND POST NEEDS PERIODICALLY TO ASSESS CHANGES IN CONDITIONS AFFECTING STAFFING NEEDS. DOC SHOULD REPORT THE RESULTS OF THESE REVIEWS TO THE LEGISLATURE

RESPONSE:

Each year, the Department of Corrections uses a staffing formula to justify positions requested through the appropriations process. We stand ready to provide that information to the Legislature on an annual basis.

FINDING II: DOC'S HIRING PROCESS IS INADEQUATE TO MEET CSO HIRING NEEDS

The report describes a bifurcated responsibility in the area of the hiring process. It describes that portion of the process which is handled by the Personnel Division of the Department of Administration and subsequently describes the personnel hiring responsibilities that are managed by DOC's central personnel office. It should be noted that the hiring practices are established by statute and under the Personnel Rules and Regulations. Therefore, the substantive process involved in hiring Correctional Service Officers is guided by those laws and regulations. The report only speaks to the logistical concerns involved in that process.

It should also be noted that while the Department of Corrections has a central personnel office, that personnel office is managed by personnel who report to the Department of Administration Personnel Division and not to the Department of Corrections. While part of the DOC central personnel office staff are DOC employees, the personnel managers report to the Department of Administration.

FINDING II

RECOMMENDATIONS

NO. 1 - DOC SHOULD CONTINUE TO MONITOR REASONS FOR CSO TURNOVER AND ESTABLISH PROCEDURES TO REDUCE IDENTIFIED TURNOVER CAUSES.

RESPONSE

The Department agrees it should monitor the reasons for turnover. We are currently developing and/or implementing policies and/or programs that will reduce the turnover. Targeted recruitment that does a better job of informing the potential candidate of the nature of the position will result in recruits making more informed decisions. Thus, we feel the employed cadet will more likely remain with the Department.

Additionally, the Staff Development/Training Bureau is currently managing a statewide Basic Supervision Program for all first- and second-line supervisors. More than 400 supervisors have participated in this 24-hour, three-day training program. The major elements of the program curriculum are basic supervision principles and knowledge. A standardized agency-adopted Supervisor's Manual is given to each participant for his/her continued use. The manual consists of State Personnel guidelines, agency policies and other recommended supervisory materials that the participant may find helpful.

As a result of legislative authority and funding to increase the salary levels of CSOs two steps and the approval of and implementation of a "lead" CSO classification, CSO II, turnover for the first quarter of FY 1985 was 19%, down from approximately 28% the previous quarter.

Finally, the Department has implemented an exit interview process which seeks to solicit information from exiting employees to analyze why they are choosing to leave the Department. This information will then be utilized to develop strategies directed at reducing turnover and the attendant vacancy levels.

NO. 2 - DOC SHOULD REQUIRE INSTITUTIONS TO COMPLETE THE "CHANGE OF STATUS" AND THE "REQUEST TO FILL" PORTIONS OF FORM 303 AT THE SAME TIME TO ELIMINATE DUPLICATION.

RESPONSE

The Department is currently considering a number of alternatives to improve the "change of status" and the "request to fill" portions of the 303 to eliminate duplication and time delay. One of the alternatives being considered is to utilize the Automated Inmate Management System (AIMS) as the communications mechanism for communicating vacancies to the Central Office.

This automated system, if it could be adapted, would totally eliminate the problem in this area.

NO. 3 - DOC SHOULD REQUEST FUNDING FOR THE COTA TRAINING POSITIONS IN ORDER TO ALLOW DOC TO HIRE CSO'S IN ADVANCE OF NEEDS.

RESPONSE

The Department agrees. Funding will be requested to fund COTA training positions to ensure that training is not adversely impacted with the elimination of vacancy savings.

FINDING III: DOC'S INSPECTIONS AND INVESTIGATIONS SECTION CAN IMPROVE ITS BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION PROCESS

Pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes, Title 41-1663, D-4, the Department of Corrections is mandated to complete a background investigation, including criminal histories, under Title 41-1750, of all applicants before enrolling in the academy. This particular statutory requirement to conduct background investigations became effective on August 3, 1984. Unfortunately, resources have not been appropriated to assist in the accomplishment of that legislative mandate. As a result, the Department of Corrections has used its somewhat limited resource of Inspections and Investigations to accomplish this objective.

Additionally, a number of aspects of the background investigation process are not amenable to the control of the Department of Corrections. For example, the background investigation may reveal that an applicant has been charged with a criminal offense, but the record of that offense lacks a final disposition. In these situations, information with regard to that particular offense must be investigated to determine the status of the applicant.

Since criminal history information is subject to both state and federal privacy and security laws, the unrestricted dissemination of that information is not possible. In many cases, that information must be obtained personally by an investigator with law enforcement status. Such an investigation may require the investigator to visit the law enforcement agency that charged the individual, as well as one or more court jurisdictions to determine its final disposition.

The problem is exacerbated when the applicant is from out of state. There currently exists no national central repository for criminal history information. Due to court interpretations regarding criminal history information, each state is responsible for developing a repository to retain that information. Therefore, if the applicant is out of state, a teletype inquiry must be made to the particular repository and then the investigator must wait until a response is received.

Again, if the repository does not have a final disposition of that particular criminal history information, the investigator, via telephone or teletype, may have to search for the charging agency to determine the final disposition. Needless to say, this process is time consuming and not within the control of the Department of Corrections. Yet, the process must be completed to comply with good personnel practices and statutory mandates.

Another area that is not amenable to control by the Department of Corrections is the time necessary for the Federal Bureau of Investigation to respond to an applicant inquiry as the result of the submission of fingerprints on that particular applicant. It may take six weeks or longer.

In addition, the sheer lack of resources available to this function combined with a very high turnover rate and growth factor makes the timely processing of background investigations difficult. Four investigators for this function were requested in the 1986/87 budget. It is an irony of this entire report that the only resources available to enhance the background investigation process within this agency is security personnel.

Finally, the high demand for security staff over the near term places the agency in a true dilemma, as pointed out in the report. On the one hand, we need to quickly recruit and hire significant numbers of security personnel. On the other hand, in order to enhance organizational effectiveness and institutional integrity, there is a significant need to improve the quality of the background investigation. When the resources necessary to improve the quality of the investigation are available, that improved quality investigation possibly could reduce the number of acceptable candidates the Department could hire.

We believe this dilemma can only be solved in the long term through the recruitment and retention of the most qualified candidates. Those candidates must be attracted to this agency and be willing to stay here throughout his/her career. We believe that the Department's efforts to increase the salary level of Correctional Service Officer series personnel, our efforts at obtaining a 25-year retirement plan for personnel, and our efforts at improving supervisory training and career development of those individuals will all contribute to solving the dilemma we have alluded to.

FINDING III

RECOMMENDATIONS:

NO. 1 - DOC SHOULD CENTRALIZE ITS BACKGROUND CHECK FUNCTION. CENTRALIZATION WOULD ALLOW DOC TO IMPROVE ITS TIMELINESS IN CONDUCTING BACKGROUND CHECKS, AND REDUCE THE POTENTIAL FOR INCONSISTENT TREATMENT OF APPLICANTS BASED ON THE RESULTS OF THE BACKGROUND CHECKS.

RESPONSE:

The Department of Corrections agrees and, in fact, is in the process of centralizing the background check function. With additional resources requested in the 1986/87 budget, in conjunction with the establishment of an NCIC/ACIC terminal at the Central Office in Inspections and Investigations, a more timely processing of applicant backgrounds will occur.

NO. 2 - DOC SHOULD ALLOW CSO APPLICANTS TO APPEAR ON HIRING LISTS WHILE BACKGROUND CHECKS ARE BEING CONDUCTED.

RESPONSE:

The Department of Corrections does not totally agree with this recommendation. Due to the lengthy time in processing certain background investigation information, as indicated above, it is not feasible to simply keep someone on the applicant list for that length of time. Therefore, it is the intent of the Department of Corrections to hire CSOs when the preliminary information in the background information is positive but with the understanding between the applicant and the State that graduation from the academy and continued employment is contingent upon the completion of the background investigation, i.e., the receipt of any pending information before graduation from the academy. Proposed Arizona Law Enforcement Officer Advisory Committee rules that have been submitted to the Council indicate the Department will comply with this described procedure.

NO. 3 - DOC SHOULD ESTABLISH CLEAR GUIDELINES FOR REJECTING CSO APPLICANTS.

RESPONSE:

The Department agrees and is in the process of developing applicant disqualification guidelines.

FINDING IV

PRE-SERVICE TRAINING

Prior to May 1985, the above statement was true. Since May 1985, the Pre-Service Training Program (COTA) has been standardized statewide. The COTA program is a 240-hour, six-week competency-based curriculum that has been delivered through four Regional Academies located throughout the state. Beginning April 1, 1986, COTA at Tucson will be our primary Pre-Service Basic Training Program in the agency.

Pursuant to Article 6, Arizona Revised Statutes, Title 41, the Department of Corrections is mandated to offer a Correctional Service Officer training curriculum approved by the Arizona Law Enforcement Officer Advisory Council. Prior to May 1985, pre-service training programs for the CSO varied, depending upon the amount of time each institutional administrator felt he/she had. That time, of course, was the function of being able to operate safely with existing vacancies.

Since May of 1985, CSO pre-service training has been standardized and offered via five regional academies. The 240-hour competency-based curriculum approved by the Arizona Law Enforcement Officer Advisory Council, has been delivered under the centralized supervision of the Staff Development/Training Bureau.

Effective April 1, the pre-service CSO training program will be housed at the Correctional Officer Training Academy (COTA), Tucson. The 240-hour standardized curriculum will continue to be utilized. The Staff Development/Training Bureau will manage the program.

IN-SERVICE TRAINING

The In-Service Training program, although being a secondary priority this past year, has seen significant improvements over previous years' efforts. Statistics collected by the Department for in-service training between July 1984 and June 1985 indicate 62,902 hours of training was provided to 4,977 staff. The following list of course offerings have served as a foundation of our in-service training to date:

Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) training, EEOC workshops, Employee Relations Rights, First Aide, Inmate Games, Oral Board Presentation Skills, Report Writing, Restraint Techniques, Supervising the Problem Employees, Use of Force, Supervision and Discipline, Grievance.

In addition, courses have been offered in Team Building, Sex Offender, Job Bank Training, Search and Seizure, Report Writing, Classification of Offenders, Human Potential Seminars, Stress Management Treatment, Criminal Personality, Women and the Law, Reality Therapy, Violation Warrants.

FINDING IV:

RECOMMENDATIONS:

NO. 1 - DOC SHOULD ADOPT AND ENFORCE ITS DRAFT TRAINING POLICY THAT REQUIRES AT LEAST 20 HOURS OF ANNUAL IN-SERVICE TRAINING AFTER THE FIRST YEAR OF EMPLOYMENT. IN ADDITION, DOC SHOULD ENSURE THAT TRAINING IS CONSISTENT AND IN CRITICAL SKILL AREAS. ONCE STAFFING LEVELS MAKE IT PRACTICAL, DOC SHOULD CONSIDER INCREASING THE NUMBER OF IN-SERVICE TRAINING HOURS REQUIRED PER YEAR.

RESPONSE:

The Department agrees and is implementing the process.

NO.2 - DOC SHOULD INCORPORATE A FACTOR INTO THE STAFFING FORMULA THAT ACCURATELY STATES THE REQUIRED NUMBER OF IN-SERVICE TRAINING HOURS SO STAFFING NEEDS CAN BE REALISTICALLY ESTIMATED. THIS WILL ENABLE CSO'S TO ATTEND IN-SERVICE TRAINING CLASSES.

RESPONSE:

The Department agrees and will incorporate in-service training hours into the staffing formula.

<u>NO. 3 - DOC SHOULD ADOPT AGENCY WIDE RECORD KEEPING PROCEDURES FOR IN-SERVICE</u>
<u>TRAINING.   THIS WILL ENABLE DOC TO MAINTAIN CSO'S TRAINING FILES SO THEY</u>
<u>ACCURATELY REFLECT EACH EMPLOYEE'S TRAINING HOURS.</u>

RESPONSE:

The Department agrees and is responding to this requirement in the Training Records Information Management (TRIM) program.

The Department has felt the need for a system of maintaining training records and tracking the volume of training taking place agency wide. A system that would be efficient and easy to operate were necessary requirements if it were to be effective. "TRIM" was developed in conjunction with an outside computer specialist and was created by interfacing a variety of software programs with several programs specifically created for the Department. The decision was made to design the computerized record keeping system for use by COTA Academies and in-service training.