

STATE OF ARIZONA OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL

A PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF THE

ARIZONA CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM AGENCY

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A REPORT TO THE ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE



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AUDITOR GENERAL

September 23, 1983

Members of the Arizona Legislature The Honorable Bruce Babbitt, Governor Mr. Frank F. Navarrete, Director Arizona Criminal Intelligence System Agency

Transmitted herewith is a report of the Auditor General, A Performance Audit of the Arizona Criminal Intelligence System Agency. This report is in response to a January 18, 1982, resolution of the Joint Legislative Oversight Committee. The performance audit was conducted as a part of the Sunset Review set forth in A.R.S. §§41-2351 through 41-2379.

The blue pages present a summary of the report; a response from the Arizona Criminal Intelligence System Agency is found on the yellow pages preceding the appendices.

My staff and I will be pleased to discuss or clarify items in the report.

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OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL

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SUMMARY

The Office of the Auditor General has conducted a performance audit of the Arizona Criminal Intelligence System Agency in response to a January 18, 1982, resolution of the Joint Legislative Oversight Committee. This performance audit was conducted as part of the Sunset Review set forth in Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §§41-2351 through 41-2379.

The Arizona Criminal Intelligence System Agency (ACISA) was created for the purpose of collection, control, analysis and dissemination of criminal intelligence information to governmental authorities which investigate violations of criminal laws. ACISA replaced the Arizona Drug Control District (ADCD) on July 25, 1981. While the ADCD operated as a continuing drug strike force with enforcement authority, ACISA has been limited to criminal intelligence functions only but for all areas of criminal activity. ACISA maintains a computer file of information on approximately 24,000 persons known or suspected to be involved in criminal activity. The Legislature has approved 70 full-time employee positions and a budget of \$3.3 million to operate ACISA in fiscal year 1983-84.

Ineffective Statewide Intelligence Functions (see page 11)

The Arizona Criminal Intelligence System Agency (ACISA) has not developed an effective statewide intelligence system. Lacking definite goals and objectives, limited "strategic intelligence" functions have been performed and ACISA's "tactical intelligence"* support has been impaired. ACISA reports it is now changing its operational philosophy to address these problems.

^{*} There are two types of intelligence support provided by intelligence systems: strategic and tactical. Strategic intelligence is used for long-range planning and to identify major cases of criminal activity which are not already in the hands of enforcement investigators. Tactical intelligence is assistance given to enforcement investigators on current cases.

ACISA lacks definite goals and objectives. Clearly stated goals and objectives are needed to provide an intelligence unit with direction and focus. Arizona Revised Statutes establish ACISA as an intelligence unit but provide no further direction. The ACISA policy board has not provided any operating guidelines. Although ACISA has established goals and objectives, they are not explicit enough to be useful. The lack of goals and objectives has affected ACISA's provision of basic intelligence support.

Lacking direction and focus, ACISA has performed only a limited strategic intelligence function. Strategic intelligence functions analyzing major crime types to determine the extent and nature of probable criminal activity, 2) identifying persons suspected of being involved in these activities, 3) gathering additional information to confirm or disprove suspected criminal involvement, and 4) assisting law enforcement agencies in building prosecutable cases if suspected criminal involvement Strategic intelligence functions are necessary to provide is confirmed. information that can be used for law enforcement planning purposes. the strategic intelligence process is continued, the intelligence unit is able to identify major criminal cases for law enforcement agencies to However, ACISA's support to law enforcement agencies has been pursue. largely limited to consulting with and supporting requests for tactical intelligence assistance on a case-by-case basis.

Lack of direction and focus also impairs ACISA's ability to perform its First, tactical intelligence functions. ACISA has not intelligence collection plans for gathering of. the Collection plans are necessary to give clear direction for information. information gathering and to assure enough quality data collected. Second, ACISA has lacked a sufficient flow of criminal information. Law enforcement agencies in Arizona have not supported the statewide intelligence system by submitting information to it. situation is especially critical for ACISA because, as an independent agency, it has no routine sources of information such as crime reports and investigative reports. The foregoing problems have reduced the usefulness of the ACISA intelligence information data base. The data base has declined in its ability to provide information to law enforcement agencies. ACISA only had information on 11 percent of the inquiries made to it during the recent three-month period ended June 30, 1983. In contrast, it had information on 27 percent of the inquiries made during a three-month period almost two years earlier. In addition, most of the data in the files has been used only by the agency submitting the data.

ACISA Should Be Combined with DPS (see page 29)

The statewide criminal intelligence functions of ACISA and the Department of Public Safety (DPS) should be consolidated within DPS. Several factors favor such a transfer. First, ACISA and DPS duplicate each other by having similar intelligence systems which provide support to statewide law enforcement agencies. ACISA's proposed intelligence gathering emphasis will duplicate areas already being pursued by DPS. Second, ACISA relies heavily on information systems housed by DPS to provide information to answer its inquiries. In fiscal year 1982-83 ACISA queried other sources 20,173 times to gain information for inquiries made to it. More than half (59%) of these queries were to sources accessible through the Arizona Criminal Justice Information System (ACJIS) maintained by DPS. Most law enforcement agencies have direct access to the ACJIS system without going through ACISA. Third, while ACISA lacks sufficient data flow for analysis, DPS has an adequate information flow from both internal and external sources. Finally, the statewide intelligence function should be located in DPS because it complements other DPS services provided to local law enforcement agencies. No other state has established a statewide intelligence unit as an independent agency.

Transportation Costs Can Be Reduced (see page 43)

Changes can be made in agency operations to reduce transportation costs. ACISA can reduce the cost and size of its vehicle fleet. Approximately \$177,600 can be saved over a five-year period if vehicles are purchased rather than leased.* Additional savings can be realized by eliminating unneeded vehicles permanently assigned to management level staff.

^{*} Currently ACISA owns 17 vehicles and leases 17 vehicles.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The Office of the Auditor General has conducted a performance audit of the Arizona Criminal Intelligence System Agency in response to a January 18, 1982, resolution of the Joint Legislative Oversight Committee. This performance audit was conducted as part of the Sunset Review set forth in Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §§41-2351 through 41-2379.

The Arizona Criminal Intelligence System Agency (ACISA) was created effective July 25, 1981. Its statutory purpose is the "... collection, control, analysis and dissemination of criminal intelligence information to governmental authorities involved in the investigation of violations of the criminal laws." ACISA replaced the Arizona Drug Control District (ADCD) which was created on June 18, 1975, and took over its facilities, equipment, personnel and appropriated budget funds. The ADCD originally created to continue a narcotic strike force.* During its existence, ADCD developed a computerized narcotic intelligence information Since the creation of ACISA this system has been expanded to include information on all areas of criminal activity. Currently, the computer system includes data on approximately 24,000 persons or organizations who are known to be or suspected of engaging in criminal activity.

^{*} Pima County created the Pima County Attorney's Narcotics Strike Force in 1973. The creation of ADCD continued the strike force and expanded it to the four border counties. Later all Arizona counties were included in ADCD.

The creation of ACISA was recommended by the Select Law Enforcement Review Commission (SLERC). The SLERC was a 15-member committee (the President of the Senate, Speaker of the House and Governor each appointed five members) charged with reviewing the control of narcotics and organized criminal activity within Arizona. The Commission found that Arizona had need for a computerized statewide criminal intelligence information system and that there was duplication in maintaining two competing statewide intelligence information organizations (ADCD and the Department of Public Safety). However, it recommended that the ADCD intelligence information system be maintained as an independent function separate from DPS. This was partly due to local law enforcement agencies' concerns that DPS would use intelligence information provided by them to further DPS enforcement activities. The Commission strongly urged that the independent statewide intelligence system be limited to the intelligence function and that all law enforcement agencies cooperate fully by providing intelligence information to the system. Thus, ACISA was created. A 15-member Arizona Criminal Intelligence System Board made up of law enforcement officials was also created to establish policies, procedures, rules and regulations for the functioning of the agency.

ACISA was intended to operate differently than its predecessor, ADCD, and is in a period of transition. There has been a 50 percent staff turnover since ACISA's creation and the Director has extensively reorganized the agency. While the ADCD was engaged in enforcement activities, ACISA is limited to intelligence functions only. The services of ACISA are available to law enforcement agencies within the State. In addition, ACISA will respond to informational requests from law enforcement agencies in other states. In its intelligence role ACISA responds to requests for assistance and performs very few independent intelligence activities. ACISA performs the following major functions:

- Maintains a computerized criminal intelligence data base on all types of major crime;
- Assists local, State and Federal law enforcement agencies with information, research and analysis of criminal intelligence including giving technical advice; and
- Provides physical resources including computer services, surveillance and investigation equipment, personnel and financial support.

The ACISA organization includes 1) regional field agents who establish liaison for information collecting and providing resources to other agencies, 2) central analysts who review/analyze intelligence information and assist other agencies in case building, and 3) an intelligence center which houses the computerized subject information and answers inquiries for information. ACISA headquarters are located in Tucson with district offices in all counties except Greenlee.

Until May 1, 1983, ACISA hosted the federally funded Rocky Mountain Intelligence Network (RMIN) which provides criminal intelligence information services to law enforcement agencies in eight Rocky Mountain states. This program, which supported 24 employee positions and received approximately \$1 million per year in Federal funds, has been moved to Albuquerque, New Mexico.

The ACISA budget for fiscal years 1981-82 through 1983-84 is shown in Table 1. Revenues are appropriated from the State General Fund.

TABLE 1

ACISA EXPENDITURES (ACTUAL OR APPROVED)
FISCAL YEARS 1981-82 THROUGH 1983-84

	Actual	Actual	Approved
	1981-82	1982-83	1983-84
Number of full-time employees	70*	67*	70
Expenditures:			
Personal services	\$1,502,100	\$1,498,700	\$1,622,800
Employee-related	310,600	289,800	352,100
Professional services	2,100	1,700	20,500
Travel -	•	·	•
In-State	200,000	23,200	49,200
Out-of-State	19,100	7,400	11,500
Other operating	1,093,000	949,600	1,101,600
Equipment	53,900	16,700	-0-
Total operating expenditures	3,180,800	2,787,100	3,157,700
Investigative fund***	50,000	34,000	50,000
Flash fund****	150,000	50,000	50,000
Total	\$3,380,800	\$2,871,100	\$3,257,7 00

Source: Appropriations reports

^{*} This does not include approximately 24 employee positions which were federally funded.

^{**} Expendable monies used for general investigative purposes such as providing cover stories and equipment rental.

^{***} Nonexpendable monies to be used by local law enforcement agencies to establish a "good faith" relationship between undercover officers and criminals.

Scope of Audit

The scope of our audit was limited to three broad audit objectives. These objectives were to determine:

- Whether ACISA is performing a proper and adequate statewide intelligence function and if it houses a quality criminal intelligence information system,
- Whether ACISA should operate as an independent State agency or be combined with another State agency to increase effectiveness or efficiency, and
- 3. Whether improvements can be made in selected operational areas to reduce costs or increase efficiency and performance.

Our scope of review was limited to the extent that we did not have access to any criminal intelligence information maintained in manual and computer files or written reports.

The Auditor General and staff express appreciation to the ACISA director and his staff for their cooperation and assistance during the course of our audit.

SUNSET FACTORS

In accordance with A.R.S. §41-2354, the Legislature should consider 11 factors in determining whether the Arizona Criminal Intelligence System Agency (ACISA) should be continued or terminated.

1. Objective and purpose in establishing the Agency

The objective and purpose of the Agency is stated in A.R.S. §41-2152:

"There is established the Arizona criminal intelligence system agency which shall be a law enforcement agency with peace officer authority for the limited purposes of collection, control, analysis and dissemination of criminal intelligence information to governmental authorities involved in the investigation of violations of the criminal laws. Agency personnel shall not otherwise engage in law enforcement activities." (emphasis added)

2. The effectiveness with which the Agency has met its objective and purpose and the efficiency with which the Agency has operated

ACISA needs direction and focus in order to develop an effective statewide intelligence system. ACISA has performed only a limited "strategic intelligence" function to assess the threat of criminal activity and to identify targets for investigation (see page 11). Further, the lack of focus has impaired ACISA's "tactical intelligence" role of providing support to law enforcement agencies. Specifically, AICSA has not developed intelligence collection plans and has lacked an adequate flow of information for analysis. As a result of these problems ACISA has been unable to provide law enforcement agencies with much information from the statewide intelligence data base (see page 24).

If the Agency is not allowed to terminate on July 1, 1984, the Agency's efficiency can be improved by 1) purchasing vehicles rather than leasing them and 2) disposing of unneeded vehicles.

3. The extent to which the Agency has operated within the public interest

The Agency has operated within the public interest to the extent that it has assisted various law enforcement agencies. However, because it has not performed all functions of the intelligence process in a systematic and proactive manner, its effect has been minimized (see page 11).

4. The extent to which rules and regulations promulgated by the Agency are consistent with the legislative mandate

This factor is not applicable because ACISA has no authority to promulgate rules and regulations.

5. The extent to which the Agency has encouraged input from the public before promulgating its rules and regulations and the extent to which it has informed the public as to its actions and their expected impact on the public

This factor is not applicable to ACISA.

6. The extent to which the Agency has been able to investigate and resolve complaints which are within its jurisdiction

This factor is not applicable to ACISA.

7. The extent to which the Attorney General or any other applicable agency of State government has the authority to prosecute actions under enabling legislation

This factor is not applicable to ACISA.

8. The extent to which the Agency has addressed deficiencies in the enabling statutes which prevent it from fulfilling its statutory mandate

The Agency has addressed one deficiency in its enabling statutes. When the Agency was established in 1981, it was not declared a law enforcement agency or given peace officer authority. Other law enforcement agencies' charters prohibited them from cooperating with ACISA because of this deficiency. The problem was brought to the attention of the Legislature, resulting in ACISA receiving law enforcement status with limited peace officer authority.

9. The extent to which changes are necessary in the laws of the Agency to adequately comply with the factors listed in the Sunset Law

We recommend the Legislature consider combining ACISA with the Arizona Department of Public Safety (see page 29).

10. The extent to which the termination of the Agency would significantly harm the public health, safety or welfare

Because both ACISA and the Department of Public Safety (DPS) have competing statewide intelligence operations with similar capabilities, termination of ACISA would not significantly harm the public health, safety or welfare (see page 30). Statewide intelligence functions could be provided by DPS.

11. The extent to which the level of regulation exercised by the Agency is appropriate and whether less or more stringent levels of regulation would be appropriate

This factor is not applicable to ACISA.


FINDING I

ACISA NEEDS DIRECTION AND FOCUS IN ORDER TO DEVELOP AN EFFECTIVE STATEWIDE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM.

The Arizona Criminal Intelligence System Agency (ACISA) has not developed an effective statewide intelligence system. Lacking direction and focus, ACISA has performed only a limited "strategic intelligence" function. Further, the lack of focus has impaired ACISA's tactical intelligence role. ACISA reports it is now changing its operational philosophy to address these problems.

There are two types of intelligence support provided by intelligence systems. Simply stated, strategic intelligence is used for long-range planning and to identify and develop major criminal cases that are not already in the hands of enforcement investigators. An example of strategic intelligence would be an analysis of how organized crime's encroachment into legitimate business enterprises may affect future illegal activities associated with the businesses. Strategic intelligence is considered to be the most important activity of an intelligence unit because it allows law enforcement to counteract developments by organized crime as they occur, rather than reacting after the fact.

Tactical intelligence is assistance given to enforcement investigators on current cases. An example of tactical intelligence would be a response to an enforcement investigator's request for the names of all persons known to commit burglary in a particular manner so the investigator can identify possible suspects in a reported crime. Figure 1 depicts the effect that lack of direction and focus has had on the ACISA intelligence system.



^{*} Strategic intelligence products are defined on page 17.

No Direction and Focus

The Arizona Criminal Intelligence System Agency lacks definite goals and objectives. Specific goals and objectives are needed to provide an intelligence unit with direction and focus. Arizona Revised Statutes establish ACISA as an intelligence unit but provide no further direction. The ACISA policy board has not provided any operating guidelines. Although ACISA has established goals and objectives they are not explicit enough to be useful.

Specific Intelligence Goals Needed - Intelligence goals and objectives are needed to assure that the function fulfills its purpose. This is supported by an article appearing in the <u>Criminal Justice Journal</u>, October 1982, which states:

"Simply stated, the goals and objectives of the intelligence unit must be explicitly stated and systems implemented must support these goals and objectives."

The <u>Handbook of Self Evaluation Guidelines For: Organized Crime Intelligence Units</u> prepared by the California Department of Justice also supports the need for clearly stated policies and operating procedures in order to standardize and bring consistency to an intelligence unit's operations.

An example of specific goals and objectives which identify crime areas for emphasis are those prepared by New Jersey. The New Jersey State Police Intelligence Bureau has developed an intelligence manual whose contents have been adopted by the U.S. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, New Scotland Yard, the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (association) and several Canadian law enforcement agencies. In this manual the goal of the New Jersey Intelligence Bureau is stated:

"The primary goal of the New Jersey State Police Intelligence Bureau will be the development of strategic and tactical intelligence assessments designed to:

- 1. Provide a descriptive analysis of organized crime systems operating in the State of New Jersey.
- 2. Depict the capabilities of these organized crime systems and provide alternatives to reduce the effectiveness of these systems.
- Identify the major crime problems affecting the State of New Jersey and provide recommendations for remedial action.
- Assess the efforts of law enforcement in the control of organized crime in the State of New Jersey.
- 5. Provide the operational units within the Division of State Police with the necessary data to investigate organized criminal activity.
- 6. Identify those person(s) engaged in organized criminal activity in the State of New Jersey."

These goal statements set forth in rather precise terms what the intelligence unit plans to provide for the law enforcement effort.

The New Jersey unit also identifies specific crime areas for focusing their collection, evaluation, analyzation and dissemination activities. These are stated as follows:

- 1. Gambling
- 2. Loansharking
- 3. Narcotics
- 4. Prostitution
- 5. Bribery
- 6. Extortion
- Conversion of illegitimate funds into legitimate investment
- 8. Trafficking in stolen property
- 9. Counterfeiting
- 10. Arson
- 11. Homicide/Kidnapping
- 12. Crimes designed to subvert the economic interests of the State, black market activity, etc.
- 13. Labor racketeering

Not only do these specific goals and crime areas provide focus and direction, but they also become the basis for evaluating the activities and functions of the intelligence unit. However, neither the statutes, the ACISA Board nor ACISA have set forth these kinds of goals and objectives for ACISA's intelligence efforts.

Enabling Statutes Vague - ACISA's enabling statutes do not provide sufficient direction for the agency. The statutes provide that ACISA operate as an intelligence unit but gives no further guidance. A.R.S. §41-2152 provides only that

"There is established the Arizona criminal intelligence system agency which shall be a law enforcement agency with peace officer authority for the limited purposes of collection, control, analysis and dissemination of criminal intelligence information to governmental authorities involved in the investigation of violations of the criminal laws. Agency personnel shall not otherwise engage in law enforcement activities." (emphasis added)

The Director of ACISA is further required in A.R.S. §41-2155.B(1) to respond to requests from local, county, State and Federal authorities for criminal intelligence information. No other direction is provided by statutory mandate.

Policy Board Has Not Provided Direction - The Arizona Criminal Intelligence System Board was established by A.R.S. §41-2153. The Board's duty is to ". . . establish policies, procedures, rules and regulations for the functioning of the agency and for the collection, preservation, access to and security of criminal intelligence information." A review of Board minutes indicates that the Board has not provided ACISA with specific focus and direction, such as crime areas for emphasis or types of intelligence support to give to law enforcement agencies.

Agency Goals and Objectives Not Specific - ACISA's goals and objectives are not specific enough to provide adequate direction and focus. The agency has established three goals.* These are:

- "1. The collection of criminal information.
- The control of criminal intelligence information, including the management, collation, and analysis necessary to increase the quality and timeliness of the intelligence product.
- The dissemination of criminal information and intelligence."

The agency has developed objectives for each goal, however, these objectives are likewise vague. For example, ACISA has developed four objectives in support of its first goal. These are:

- "1. Establish a comprehensive liaison program for collecting criminal information, disseminating criminal intelligence and providing resources in support of other agencies. . . .
 - 2. Establish overt intelligence projects. . . .
 - 3. Establish covert intelligence projects. . . .
 - 4. The training of ACISA and other agency's personnel..."

As illustrated above, these goals and objectives provide little direction concerning the actual emphasis and focus of ACISA's resources.

Not Providing Strategic Intelligence Products

The Arizona Criminal Intelligence System Agency has not developed an essential intelligence role. Although it has performed a tactical intelligence function, ACISA has performed only a limited strategic intelligence function.

^{*} Appendix I contains the full text of ACISA's mission statement, goals and objectives.

Nature of Strategic Intelligence - An intelligence unit's primary focus is developing cases not already under investigation. This is accomplished by strategic intelligence functions. First, strategic intelligence provides information that may be used for planning purposes. The strategic intelligence assessment estimates the extent and nature of a type of criminal activity, assesses the current situation and estimates future developments. This enables the intelligence unit and law enforcement agencies to establish priorities. Second, as the strategic intelligence process continues, the intelligence unit can identify major cases for law enforcement agencies to pursue. This differs from tactical intelligence which is support given to enforcement investigators on existing cases. Tactical intelligence consists of responding to inquiries on the subject (person) under investigation and is reactive in nature while strategic intelligence is proactive.

Strategic intelligence provides four types of intelligence products which can be used as the basis for measuring the impact of criminal intelligence units. These four products, in order of their development, are 1) threat assessment, 2) target selection, 3) target tracking, and 4) case building. The natures of these products are defined by the <u>Handbook of Self Evaluation Guidelines For: Organized Crime Intelligence Units</u>, 1976, California Department of Justice, as follows:

"Threat Assessment - The systematic collection and analysis of information to identify the nature and types of existing and/or potential threats posed to the community by organized criminal activities."

"Target Selection - The systematic evaluation of threat information, the formulation of hypothesis of probable criminal activity, and the selection of targets (individuals and organizations) for further investigation."

"Target Tracking - The systematic completion of the intelligence collection plan for each selected target through the utilization of overt and covert sources." (This confirms or disproves suspected criminal activity)

"Case Building - (1) The systematic accumulation of legally admissible evidence necessary to support the eventual arrest, or indictment and prosecution of the targeted subjects; and/or (2) the systematic accumulation and dissemination of information necessary to influence regulatory, legislative and administrative agencies to take corrective actions and the general public to support such action."

An example illustrates how the process works. Suppose the intelligence unit elects to perform an analysis of car thefts with focus on possible connections with parts distributors or dealers. First, it performs a "threat assessment" to determine the extent of probable criminal activity and to estimate future developments. If the threat is significant enough, the intelligence unit continues its investigation. Second, by evaluating the threat information the unit selects targets (individuals businesses) it believes may be involved in criminal activity. products of this "target selection" are a prioritized set of specific targets and corresponding intelligence collection plans for each target. Third, the intelligence unit completes the collection plan to acquire sufficient information to confirm or disprove the suspected criminal activity of each target. This is called "target tracking." If criminal activity is disproven, the target is cleared and it is removed from the intelligence unit files. If criminal involvement is confirmed, target tracking is continued and the intelligence unit moves to the last phase called "case building." Case building is the process of collecting sufficient evidence to support direct arrests and prosecution. activity must be performed in conjunction with external enforcement and prosecuting agencies. Thus, the process of strategic intelligence enables the intelligence unit to identify cases not already in the hands of enforcement investigators.

No Strategic Products - ACISA has performed only a limited strategic intelligence function. ACISA's support to law enforcement agencies has been generally limited to consulting with and supporting requests for tactical assistance and information on a case-by-case or reactive basis. Through its analytical resources, ACISA has been able to expand some cases beyond their initial impacts or scopes. However, only limited strategic intelligence functions have been performed in this reactive mode. The agency has not performed any statewide analysis of crime problems to establish either its own internal priorities or to guide State and local law enforcement activities. It has not systematically performed the primary intelligence functions necessary to develop strategic intelligence products.

ACISA's ability to assist State law enforcement activities is not as great as could be expected were it proactively performing the strategic intelligence process. By not developing more strategic intelligence, ACISA is unable to 1) identify unreported criminal activity and 2) foresee developing crime networks. Lacking threat assessments, law enforcement agencies may not have sufficient information to effectively plan and coordinate their efforts. Moreover, the proactive nature of strategic intelligence facilitates crime prevention.

The ACISA director recognizes the need to operate in a proactive manner and reports he is preparing the agency to begin threat analysis, target identification, target tracking and case building on a statewide basis. He also reports that ACISA was restructured on May 15, 1983, to prepare for this future emphasis.

Tactical Intelligence Support Impaired

Lack of direction and focus also impairs ACISA's ability to perform its tactical intelligence functions. First, it has precluded the development of intelligence collection plans. This in turn has reduced information flow, because not knowing what is wanted, law enforcement agencies do not

submit information to the statewide intelligence data base. The combined effect of these factors is to limit the usefulness of the ACISA intelligence information base for tactical support.

No Collection Plans - ACISA has not developed statewide intelligence collection plans which contain such elements as crime area for information gathering, collection methods and participants, benefits expected by undertaking the collection effort and time frames for completion. It has not provided guidance to State and local law enforcement agencies regarding the specific kinds of information to submit for the statewide intelligence data base.

Intelligence collection planning is essential for an effective intelligence operation. Collection plans integrate the functions of collection and analysis. They assure that enough quality data will be collected for an effective and thorough analysis. The importance of collection plans was stressed during an Organized Crime Intelligence Analysis seminar conducted by the New Jersey State Police. It was stated that

"In order to manage the daily activities of intelligence officers/analysts, collection plans represent a vital part of the communicative process. The collection plan, usually generated by the analytical element, provides the mid-managers and intelligence officers with a specific objective and direction. In essence, the collection plan is a vehicle for communicating to intelligence officers the direction their collection efforts should take."

Collection plans set forth such parameters as 1) crime area for information gathering, 2) justification for undertaking the collection effort, 3) expected benefits of completing the plan, 4) the extent of inquiry to be made, 5) the period of inquiry and completion dates, 6) type of information to be collected, and 7) collection methods and participants.

In the absence of collection plans, past direction from ACISA has been very broad. In one case ACISA made a statewide request for its agents to "collect information on organized crime." However, law enforcement agencies provided little information to assist the collection effort. The ACISA Director says this taught them two lessons:

". . . the need to focus the area of analysis and for ACISA headquarters to communicate directly with law enforcement agencies as well as through our agents."

The ACISA Director has acknowledged the need to develop statewide data collection plans and states that he has taken steps to prepare for such an effort. The agency now has several collection plans currently in draft form.

Reduced Information Flow - The absence of data collection plans results in reduced information flow. Law enforcement agencies in Arizona submit limited amounts of information for inclusion in the ACISA statewide intelligence data base. Data flow problems are further compounded because ACISA lacks routine data sources associated with enforcement agencies.

Enforcement agencies can submit information to the statewide intelligence file on ACISA intelligence transmittal forms called subject cards. However, records kept by ACISA show that law enforcement agencies have submitted very little information to the statewide data base. Only 954 subject cards were submitted by law enforcement agencies during fiscal year 1982-83. ACISA agents submitted 2,208 subject cards into the system. Table 2 shows the number of subject cards submitted by various sources.

TABLE 2
SUBJECT CARDS SUBMITTED TO THE ACISA DATA FILE DURING FISCAL YEAR 1982-1983

Agency	No. Subject Number	Cards Submitted Percent
ACISA Employees	2,208	70%
Arizona Law Enforcement Agencies Total	$\frac{954}{3,162}$	30% 100%
Source of subject cards submitted by Arizona law enforcement agencies:		
AZ Department of Public Safety	299	31%
AZ Attorney General's Office	86	9%
Tucson Police Department	77	8%
Maricopa County Sheriff	68	7%
U.S. Customs	54	6%
Kingman Police Department	51	5%
Phoenix Police Department	47	5%
U.S. Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms	41	4%
Scottsdale Police Department	35	4%
Mohave County Sheriff	20	2%
Coconino County Sheriff	19	2%
Chandler Police	17	2%
Maricopa County Attorney	16	2%
Pima County Sheriff	15	2%
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration	12	1%
Goodyear Police Department	12	1%
Glendale Police Department	10	1%
National Park Service	10	1%
Other (21 agencies)	65	7%
Total	954	100%

Although DPS has provided ACISA with more information than any other agency, DPS officials state that more available information is not provided because ACISA requests have not been specific and ACISA has no collection or dissemination plans. Another agency responded that little information is sent to ACISA because it is too time consuming to send information on each and every case. Sixteen other agencies responded in a like manner. If these agencies were provided specific direction regarding information needs, they may submit more information to ACISA.

The problems with obtaining information from other agencies are especially critical because ACISA lacks a continuous, routine flow of information to be analyzed, other than what is obtained by its own agents. Department of Justice in its publication Basic Elements of Intelligence states that an intelligence unit cannot, with its own resources, develop an information flow sufficient for effective analysis. However, those intelligence units associated with an enforcement agency have several sources of routine information. These sources include crime reports and enforcement investigators' case reports. An intelligence unit must have access to this general flow of reporting on criminal activity in order to gain a picture of crime in its jurisdiction. This forms the context within which the unit can request specific information and focus on specific criminal activities. As an independent agency ACISA does not have these routine sources of information and must depend even more heavily on other agencies for information flow.


<u>Value of Intelligence Data Base Is Questionable</u> - The foregoing problems have reduced the usefulness of the ACISA intelligence information data base. First, the data base has declined in its ability to provide information to law enforcement. Second, most of the data in the files has been used only by the agency submitting the data.

Law enforcement agencies may request intelligence information from ACISA. To obtain this information ACISA checks its own data base and contacts other agencies. During fiscal year 1982-83, ACISA processed 9,212 inquiries. Approximately half of these inquiries were made by ACISA agents and half by law enforcement agencies.

Decline of Information Available from ACISA Files - ACISA has been unable to provide Arizona law enforcement agencies with much information from the statewide intelligence data base. ability of the data base to provide information for inquiries has declined significantly during the period July 1, 1981, to June 30, 1983. For the first three months of its operation, ACISA had some information in its data base for 26.7 percent of the inquiries made to it. However, it only had information for 10.8 percent of inquiries made during the three-month period ended June 30, 1983. The decline may be attributed to a loss of focus and direction. Before ACISA created the was statewide intelligence system was limited to narcotic and related information. When ACISA was created the system's scope was broadened. However, ACISA has not developed specific guidelines regarding the type of criminal intelligence to be included on the This affects raw data flow. ACISA also statewide system. attributes the decline to purging criminal history information from the system. We were not allowed access to the intelligence files and were unable to determine the extent of criminal history information on the system. ACISA believes the ability to provide information from its files will improve over time. depicts the percentage of inquiries for which ACISA had information on the data base during its first two years.

FIGURE 2
PERCENTAGE OF INQUIRIES FOR WHICH ACISA HAD

INFORMATION ON THE STATEWIDE DATA BASE



^{*} Pre-ACISA rates

As shown by Figure 2, the ACISA statewide system has had information to answer few of the inquiries made to it. However, ACISA does request information from other agencies to help satisfy inquiries regardless of whether it has information in its own data base. By this means, ACISA was able to provide some information on approximately 53 percent of inquiries received during fiscal year 1982-83. We were unable to determine if the information provided by ACISA to the requestor from either the ACISA or other agencies' data bases was useful to the requesting agency because ACISA would not allow us access to the intelligence files.

Information in ACISA Data Base Rarely Used - Information stored on the ACISA data base is rarely used by law enforcement agencies. ACISA has information stored on approximately 24,000 subjects or individuals. A review of the file* as of March 1, 1983, showed that 11,518 subjects or 49 percent have not received any inquiries for more than 2 years. In addition, 86 percent of the subjects on file showed only the original inquiry or subject card; no other agency had since requested information on the individual. Even when ACISA received more than one inquiry on a person, it was by the same agency in 76 percent of the cases.**

Thus the concept of information sharing has not fared well. According to ACISA, one major purpose for its data base is to facilitate information sharing among law enforcement agencies.

^{*} ACISA would not allow us to review its intelligence files because of statutory exclusions but provided us with statistical information to make these determinations.

^{**} We considered only inquiries since July 1, 1981.

Changes in ACISA Operational Philosophy

ACISA reports it is now changing its operational philosophy to operate in a more proactive mode and to emphasize more strategic intelligence functions. Specifically, the ACISA director stated in a May 23, 1983, letter that

"ACISA is a new organization with a new, state-wide intelligence function. Thus far, most of its work has involved consulting with and supporting user requests for information or assistance on a case by case basis. . . ACISA has made considerable progress in performing and providing basic intelligence support and is prepared now to progress to advanced intelligence work. Specifically, ACISA is preparing to begin threat analysis, target identification, target tracking and case building on a state-wide basis."

As indicated in the director's letter, ACISA is a new organization evolved from a forerunner agency with different objectives. This factor appears to have impacted its ability to develop an effective intelligence system during the two years of its existence.

CONCLUSION

The Arizona Criminal Intelligence System Agency (ACISA) has not developed an effective statewide intelligence system. Lacking direction and focus, ACISA has performed only limited "strategic intelligence" functions. ACISA's "tactical intelligence" assistance to law enforcement has been impaired by the lack of collection planning and inadequate data flow. As a result of the foregoing problems, the ACISA computer intelligence files are of questionable value.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. ACISA in conjunction with the ACISA Board should develop specific goals and objectives and crime category priorities in order to establish agency direction and focus.

- 2. ACISA should perform strategic intelligence functions to provide measurable products of threat assessment, target identification, target tracking and case building. Case building should be developed in conjunction with appropriate law enforcement agencies.
- 3. ACISA should develop statewide criminal intelligence collection plans to include the components of a) target identification, b) justification for undertaking the collection effort, c) expected benefits of completing the plan, d) the extent of inquiry to be made, e) the period of inquiry and completion dates, f) type of information to be collected, and g) collection methods and participants.

FINDING II

THE ARIZONA CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM AGENCY SHOULD BE COMBINED WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY.

The statewide criminal intelligence functions of the Arizona Criminal Intelligence System Agency (ACISA) and the Department of Public Safety (DPS) should be consolidated within DPS. Several factors favor such a First, ACISA and DPS duplicate each other by having similar intelligence systems which provide support to statewide law enforcement Second, ACISA relies heavily on information sources housed within DPS. Third, DPS can provide a better flow of criminal information for analysis. Finally, the statewide intelligence role is compatible with other DPS services provided to local law enforcement agencies. ACISA was established as an independent agency insulate intelligence function from enforcement activities and to facilitate support from local agencies, DPS can meet these needs.

Background

The development of 2 statewide criminal intelligence organizations has evolved over the past 15 years. The legislature recognized the need for a criminal intelligence system in 1968 when the Department of Public Safety (DPS) was created with a division of narcotics enforcement and criminal intelligence. However, DPS did not develop a fully operational computer intelligence system until 1980.

The Arizona Drug Control District (ADCD) was created in 1975 and developed a computerized intelligence system for narcotics information. In 1981, following the report of the Select Law Enforcement Review Commission, ACISA replaced ADCD and expanded the computerized intelligence system to include other areas of criminal activity.

DPS's computerized intelligence system now has approximately 50,000 subjects on file and ACISA's system has approximately 24,000 subjects. Both intelligence systems contain information on all areas of major criminal activities.

Duplicating Statewide Systems

Maintaining the ACISA intelligence function separate from DPS results in excessive duplication. Both agencies have established similar intelligence organizations based on statutory responsibility. Each agency provides intelligence information to answer inquiries from law enforcement agencies in the State. ACISA recently selected priorities which duplicate areas currently being pursued by DPS.

Development of Similar Intelligence Organizations and Capabilities - ACISA and DPS have developed intelligence organizations with similar capabilities and activities. These similar capabilities and activities include as follows:

- Computerized Subject File Each has computerized information on subjects suspected or known to be involved in criminal activity. The format for each system is basically the same. ACISA has approximately 24,000 subjects on its file while DPS has about 50,000.
- 2. <u>Same Analytical Capability</u> Each computer system can access data in the files by multiple categories of information. Both systems can establish associations or links between individuals in a case and can compare common characteristics for selected persons.

- 3. <u>Telephone Toll Analysis</u> ACISA and DPS both have developed sophisticated computer programs to analyze telephone toll information. These programs will:
 - give a frequency count of all numbers called by the subscriber,
 - sort numbers called in a number of ways,
 - establish links among persons calling the same number,
 - find any occurrence of one or more telephone number in the entire data base, and
 - prepare a matrix of frequency of telephone calls between subscribers and to other numbers.
- 4. Field Intelligence Agents Both agencies utilize field agents to provide liaison with local law enforcement. Each agency has 19 full-time intelligence agents. However, DPS also has another 52 agents in 22 cities which offer investigative and intelligence assistance to local law enforcement agencies.

Statutory Authority - Both ACISA and DPS are statutorily charged to develop intelligence organizations. In addition, DPS needs intelligence information to support its enforcement role. ACISA was established specifically to collect and control criminal intelligence information for dissemination to law enforcement agencies in the State. However, DPS was given this same authority in 1968 by A.R.S. §41-1711.A. and §41-1761.A. which state:

"There shall be established a department of public safety which is responsible for creating and coordinating services for use by local law enforcement agencies...

.

"There is established a division of narcotics enforcement and criminal intelligence within the department..." (emphasis added)

DPS has been given further authority in A.R.S. §41-1713 to

". . . cooperate with sheriffs, local police and peace officers within the state for the prevention and discovery of crimes. . . " (emphasis added)

As noted in Finding I (see page 17) the main purpose of an intelligence unit is to identify cases not already in the hands of enforcement investigators. Therefore, DPS must be engaged in intelligence functions in order to discover crimes.

Support to Other Agencies - ACISA and DPS's intelligence sections both receive and answer inquiries from law enforcement agencies within the state. However, DPS has been able to answer more inquiries than has ACISA. Each agency received approximately 8,900 requests for information during calendar year 1982. In both instances 22 percent of the inquiries were from city or county law enforcement agencies. Thus ACISA and DPS are providing approximately the same amount of intelligence support to local agencies. However, while ACISA was able to provide information for 59 percent of the total inquiries made to it, DPS provided information on 86 percent of inquiries received.*

ACISA Duplicates DPS Intelligence Gathering - ACISA's proposed intelligence gathering emphasis will duplicate areas already pursued by DPS. Past intelligence gathering efforts by ACISA had not been planned and focused (see page 20). ACISA recently announced a new emphasis. This new emphasis includes 1) making organized crime an ACISA priority and identifying organized crime figures in the state and 2) tracking members

^{*} To a large extent this may be attributed to the fact DPS has a larger system with more names on file and more computerized data bases (see page 36). It may, however, also be partially explained by an Auditor General survey which disclosed that 24 percent of the agencies requesting assistance from ACISA contact DPS for assistance before calling upon ACISA. (See Appendix II for the survey instrument and results.) In the case of these agencies ACISA may only receive requests for which DPS could not provide assistance.

of two "outlaw" motorcycle clubs. ACISA has also divided its analysis resources into four sections addressing 1) crimes against property, 2) crimes against persons, 3) narcotics and smuggling, and 4) organized crime. This new emphasis and organization duplicates areas already pursued by DPS. DPS has already gathered extensive information on the two motorcycle groups. It has also compiled and verified information on 9,600 members of organized crime families throughout the United States. Information in these two areas has been available to other law enforcement agencies through DPS. In addition, DPS has a Narcotics Enforcement Division and an Organized Crime Division. Thus, ACISA's new emphasis will duplicate efforts already pursued by DPS.

<u>Duplication Should Be Avoided</u> - As shown by the previous discussion, the establishment of ACISA as an independent agency has resulted in excessive duplication. The Select Law Enforcement Review Commission felt that duplication of intelligence functions should be avoided. It stated:

"There is a duplication of effort and facilities in maintaining two competing statewide intelligence information organizations. . . It is apparent that only one such statewide system needs to be maintained. . . . Care should be taken that the state not develop and fund capacity in more than one state agency for the same type of law enforcement support for local agencies. For example, a <u>single</u> criminal intelligence information system should be maintained."

The State has, however, established two competing intelligence information systems that provide similar services to the law enforcement community.

ACISA Reliance on DPS

ACISA relies on information systems housed by DPS to provide most of the information to answer its inquiries. Moreover, this information is directly available to most law enforcement agencies without going through ACISA.

During fiscal year 1982-83 ACISA received 9,212 inquiries for information. ACISA queried other sources 20,173 times to gain information for the inquiries. More than half (59%) of the queries made by ACISA were to data systems accessible through the Arizona Criminal Justice Information System (ACJIS) maintained by DPS. In addition, DPS has provided 31 percent of the subject cards* that ACISA received during fiscal year 1982-83 from law enforcement agencies in the State.

Most law enforcement agencies in Arizona have direct access to information available through the ACJIS system.** Therefore, they can obtain this information themselves without going through ACISA. Moreover the ACJIS system currently includes two intelligence files: 1) the U.S. Secret Service protection file which lists 200 to 300 names of persons potentially dangerous to the President or other political leaders and 2) the Maricopa County pawn shop file that lists all pawn shop transactions (guns, etc.). DPS reports that in the future its main intelligence system may be accessible through ACJIS if approved by the ACJIS policy board and if proposed changes in computer software and operating systems are completed.

DPS Has Better Information Flow

The flow of information is essential to the effective operation of an intelligence unit and provides another reason why ACISA should be made a part of DPS. ACISA lacks sufficient data flow to be effective (see page 21). On the other hand, DPS has an adequate information flow from both internal and external sources.

^{*} The subject card is used for transmitting intelligence information to the ACISA computer files.

^{**} All 15 county sheriffs and 54 of the 72 local police departments have a computer terminal which gives them direct access to ACJIS data bases (only the smaller cities/towns do not have direct access to ACJIS).

<u>Internal Information Sources</u> - DPS has more internal information sources than ACISA. As an independent agency ACISA's internal information is limited to what can be provided by 19 intelligence field agents. DPS has internal information available from several sources including:

- 1. Nineteen full-time intelligence agents devoted to developing intelligence information.
- 2. Another 134 enforcement agents prepare reports on investigated crimes which provide useful information for intelligence analysis.
- 3. Highway Patrol officers assist intelligence gathering by preparing reports on field interviews that track motorcycle gang movement, check hitchhikers' identifications, etc.

Internal information data bases that assist DPS criminal intelligence efforts are:

- 1. Suspects Under Investigation (SUI) a system designed to provide names of subjects who are currently under investigation or have been under investigation by DPS within the past 12 months.
- 2. Automated Intelligence Report Systems (AIRS) a system designed to provide information on the suspected, but not confirmed, criminal activities of subjects.
- 3. Automated Name Index (ANI) a system designed to provide a list of subjects who are listed as suspects on Departmental Reports or subjects involved in traffic accidents. Information comes from arrest and accident reports.
- 4. Automated Field Interview Report System (AFIRS) a system consisting of information collected by DPS officers through field interviews.

External Information Sources - DPS has several external information its computer system. These sources provide valuable sources information for analysis and tactical response. While these systems are computerized at DPS, ACISA can obtain this information only by contacting the original source or DPS. ACISA would like to obtain this information for its own intelligence system. However, to provide this information to ACISA for computerization would increase the existing degree duplication between ACISA and DPS. External information sources which are computerized at DPS include:

- Arizona Driver's License Files DPS has developed a search method when only partial information is known;
- 2. Vehicle Registration Information DPS has developed a system to provide information when limited information is known about an owner, vehicle, or registration number (for example, a partial license plate number);
- 3. Arizona Watercraft Registration;
- 4. Uniform Crime Reports submitted to DPS by most law enforcement agencies in Arizona;
- 5. Unidentified Dead Body/Missing Persons Systems maintained by DPS, all agencies can contribute;
- 6. Arizona Property Ownerships and Tax Records;
- 7. Public Documents Computerized System, including
 - Arizona Registrar of Contractors,
 - Arizona Security Guard License,
 - Arizona Health Service,
 - Arizona Insurance Commission,
 - Corporation Commission,
 - Real Estate Commission, and
 - Federal Courts--Civil and Criminal Cases.

These computerized information sources which are computerized at DPS can provide an invaluable source of information for intelligence analysis.

Other Services Provided by DPS

The statewide intelligence function should be located in DPS because it complements other DPS services provided to local law enforcement agencies. DPS provides the following services to local law enforcement:

- 1. The State Crime Laboratory which provides scientific criminal analysis assistance to statewide law enforcement officers;
- 2. The Criminal Identification Section which procures and maintains positive identifications of persons arrested or convicted within the State and gathers information for the study of crime prevention concerning crimes committed and persons arrested;
- The Division of Training and Education which provides training and certification programs for law enforcement officers throughout the State;
- 4. The Arizona Criminal Justice Information System which provides access to outstanding warrants and criminal history information statewide and nationwide; and
- 5. Investigation and intelligence support which is provided upon request from local enforcement agencies.

These services demonstrate that DPS already works with local law enforcement agencies and could enhance this cooperative enforcement effort if the statewide intelligence function of ACISA were transferred to DPS.

Independence and Cooperation Needed for Effective Statewide Intelligence Can Be Maintained Under DPS Organization

Independence from enforcement activities can be preserved if ACISA functions are transferred to the Department of Public Safety. states have organizationally insulated intelligence enforcement activities. Most local law enforcement agencies will cooperate with the statewide intelligence system if it is combined with The consolidation of statewide intelligence resources within DPS should provide cost savings.

Need for Insulating Intelligence Functions from Enforcement Activities — Law enforcement officials generally agree that it is important to separate intelligence functions from enforcement activities. Two main reasons are given for the separation. First, intelligence is a staff function and if not insulated from enforcement its resources can be cannibalized or siphoned for enforcement activities or other functions whose results are more visible or easier to measure. Second, widespread cooperation from most local law enforcement agencies can be ensured if the risk of usurping their enforcement authority is reduced. The Select Law Enforcement Review Commission recognized the need to insulate intelligence functions from enforcement activites. Its report stated:

". . . It is imperative therefore that, wherever the intelligence system is located, the system must be insulated from any agency's investigatory and enforcement mission so that users will perceive no risk to their own interests in contributing information to the system."

However, the statewide intelligence system can be insulated from enforcement activities if it is established within DPS as a separate bureau reporting directly to the DPS Director. This has been done in other states.

Other States - No other state in the nation has established a statewide intelligence system as an independent agency. Most states' law enforcement agencies (such as Arizona's DPS) have a criminal intelligence system which supports their own enforcement operations. Only two states have established statewide intelligence systems whose main purposes are to provide intelligence information to all law enforcement agencies in their states. These two states, Florida and California, have established the intelligence function as a division of their state law enforcement agencies. Law Enforcement officials in both states feel that this organizational placement is effective. For example, a Florida official states:

"In Florida, the intelligence system is part of the state's primary investigative agency. The intelligence function, as I mentioned, is housed in a separate Division of the Department, with this Division being responsible for several basic types of support to local law enforcement agencies. In the past, various organizational placements of the intelligence function have been attempted, however, I feel separation of this function as it now is, is most effective. The regular contacts for many reasons with the state's law enforcement community foster the relationships which are also required in intelligence exchanges. . . " (emphasis added)

Therefore, ACISA's intelligence functions can be consolidated with DPS' intelligence functions and established as a separate bureau within DPS. Currently, the DPS intelligence function reports to the Criminal Investigation Bureau which has enforcement responsibility. To maintain independence and avoid redirection of intelligence resources, the intelligence function should be established as a separate bureau reporting directly to the DPS Director.

Local Law Enforcement Support - Participation by local law enforcement agencies would continue if the criminal intelligence function were in DPS. Support by most law enforcement agencies in the State is necessary to have a successful statewide intelligence function. We surveyed county and local law enforcement agencies to determine their attitude regarding combining ACISA with DPS.* Sixty-eight percent of the agencies responding to the question indicated that they would continue or increase their cooperation with the statewide criminal intelligence system if it were in DPS. Thirty-two percent responded they would not support such a move; however, these agencies currently do not significantly use or contribute to the statewide intelligence system.** Furthermore, the survey showed that 24 percent of law enforcement agencies which received support from ACISA first contacted DPS for intelligence information or resources.

Cost Savings and Benefits - If the ACISA function is combined with DPS, the State could enjoy potential cost savings while improving the development of intelligence products. As discussed earlier, ACISA and DPS duplicate each other. Reducing this duplication should provide cost savings. We did not estimate the potential savings of consolidating both operations because such a consolidation could both reduce duplication and allow more resources to be devoted to strategic intelligence. (Increasing strategic intelligence may be of greater benefit to the State than the potential cost savings.) Estimating the resources needed for strategic intelligence is difficult because neither agency presently performs a statewide strategic intelligence function. However, in response to a request from a legislative committee DPS previously estimated that if the ACISA function were merged with it, approximately \$1,482,000 could be saved in the first year and 28 employee positions could be eliminated.

^{*} All county sheriffs, city/town police and county attorneys were surveyed; 90 of 104 agencies surveyed responded to our questionnaire.

^{**} These agencies submitted only five percent of the total subject cards and inquiries submitted to ACISA by law enforcement agencies.

Combining ACISA and DPS intelligence resources would allow the State to provide a more complete intelligence operation. ACISA has not performed the strategic intelligence function (see page 16). DPS has performed strategic intelligence analysis for its own purposes disseminates this intelligence information throughout the State. Ιt could accelerate its present activities and broaden its scope to include more strategic intelligence functions with the additional resources of ACISA. The importance of strategic intelligence functions has been stressed by the U.S. Department of Justice in its publication Basic Elements of Intelligence as

> " . . . [strategic intelligence] is probably the single most important activity in the department since it assists investigators in making "quality" or major cases. Moreover, it enables investigators to get ahead of organized criminals. It allows the law enforcement agency to initiate counteractions rather than waiting and reacting after the fact. By being prepared and alert to potential organized criminal activity, the department can direct its investigators to look for information on expected developments. strategic intelligence is an input to . . . planning more effective action against crime jurisdiction." (emphasis added)

See page 17 of Finding I for additional information regarding strategic intelligence.

CONCLUSION

Currently, there is excessive duplication in maintaining two separate, competing intelligence operations. Study shows ACISA relies heavily on information sources within DPS, and DPS can provide a better flow of criminal information for analysis. Also, the statewide intelligence role is compatible with other DPS services provided to local law enforcement agencies. If the intelligence system is located within DPS, cost savings can be made and the statewide intelligence function improved.

RECOMMENDATION

The Legislature should consider transferring ACISA intelligence functions to the Department of Public Safety and creating a statewide intelligence bureau within DPS charged with serving all Arizona law enforcement agencies. Such a bureau should report directly to the DPS Director. Further study is needed to determine how much of ACISA's existing resources are required for the new intelligence bureau to function effectively—including the resources required to provide the State with a strong strategic intelligence function.

FINDING III

TRANSPORTATION COSTS CAN BE REDUCED.

Operating costs of ACISA's vehicle fleet can be reduced. Approximately \$177,600 can be saved over a five-year period if vehicles are purchased rather than leased. Although ACISA has reduced its vehicle fleet by 17 vehicles during the past 2 years, additional savings can be realized by eliminating unneeded vehicles.

ACISA currently operates a fleet of 34 vehicles. Thirty of the vehicles are assigned to employees on a take-home basis. ACISA owns 17 of the vehicles; the other 17 vehicles are leased commercially. Under lease contract terms, ACISA is required to pay all vehicle operating costs including repairs and maintenance. The agency is planning to purchase five vehicles this current fiscal year.

\$177,600 Savings Can Be Obtained

ACISA can save approximately \$177,600 over a five-year period if vehicles are purchased rather than leased. ACISA currently expends approximately \$63,000 per year to lease 17 vehicles. However, the purchase price of 17 comparable vehicles is only \$125,400. The purchase cost is equal to only two years of the lease cost, yet vehicle life is five years.* Table 3 shows the savings potential over a five-year period.

^{*} Lease contracts limit annual mileage to 20,000 miles.

TABLE 3

ESTIMATE OF 5-YEAR SAVINGS
BY PURCHASING RATHER THAN LEASING 17 VEHICLES

Year	Purchase	<u>Lease</u> **
1 2 3 4 5	\$125,400 -0- -0- -0- -0-	\$ 63,000 63,000 63,000 63,000
Five-year Cost Lost interest if purchased* Less purchase cost Five-year savings if purchased	<u>\$125,400</u>	\$ 315,000 (12,000) (125,400) \$ 177,600***

To obtain the \$177,600 savings only an additional appropriation of \$62,400 is needed because \$63,000 is already being appropriated to cover the lease cost. However, the 17 leases do not run concurrently and the vehicles may have to be replaced as leases expire.

Fleet Size Can Be Reduced

ACISA can further reduce the cost of its vehicle fleet by reducing the fleet size. The vehicle fleet is larger than necessary because of lenient full-time take-home assignments. At least two or three vehicles could be eliminated from the fleet if assignments were based on more justifiable criteria.

ACISA has a lenient vehicle assignment policy. Full-time vehicle assignments have been made to 30 employees. Assignments to eight

^{*} Leasing costs are reduced by the interest which can be earned on the difference between the purchase cost and the lease payments during the first two years.

^{**} Lease term is normally two years and our analysis assumes that the lease cost will not increase.

^{***} Potential savings would be slightly offset by increased maintenance cost of older purchased vehicles.

management-level employees are questionable. ACISA provides two reasons for these full-time vehicle assignments. First, that regular field inspections and meetings on 1aw enforcement matters require management-level employees to have full-time vehicles. justifies full-time vehicle assignments to management employees as "an incentive supplementing regular salaries." Other law enforcement agencies do not have such lenient policies. For example, DPS policy requires a need for immediate response or frequent off-duty assignments before take-home privileges are to be granted. ACISA's management employees do not meet these criteria.* A Federal law enforcement agency has even stricter policies than DPS and allows take-home privileges for only 20 percent of its fleet and excludes agents who are assigned to white collar crime areas. Although not strictly prohibited by statute, the assignment of vehicles as a supplemental salary incentive appears questionable. Other State law enforcement agencies such as the Attorney General's Office and DPS do not provide take-home vehicles to their management employees as an extra salary incentive.

If vehicle assignments are based on actual work-related use, then at least two or three vehicles can be eliminated. We analyzed the use of four vehicles assigned to Tucson-based management-level employees and found that 72 percent of the in-town mileage was due to commuting from home to office and back. Although the vehicles were sometimes used for out-of-town traveling, we found that at least three vehicles were in town on the same day 71 percent of the time and at least two vehicles were in town on the same day 97 percent of the time. Therefore at least two vehicles can be eliminated. If employees plan and coordinate out-of-town trips, another vehicle can be eliminated. The elimination of three vehicles could save ACISA approximately \$6,600 per year exclusive of any lease or depreciation costs.

^{*} A 1982 Federal audit of ACISA's Federal program found that three vehicle assignments to management-level employees were not sufficiently justified.

CONCLUSION

Changes are needed to increase agency efficiency. ACISA can save \$177,600 over a five-year period by purchasing rather than leasing 17 vehicles. Additional savings are possible by eliminating two or three unneeded vehicles.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1. The Legislature should consider appropriating funds to allow ACISA to purchase vehicles rather than lease them.
- 2. ACISA should discontinue unjustified full-time car assignments and reduce its fleet size as appropriate (at least two or three cars should be eliminated immediately).

OTHER PERTINENT INFORMATION

During the audit, other pertinent information was developed regarding intelligence information processing.

Information Processing

ACISA is currently developing a new automated system to improve its Presently, most inquiries to the statewide information processing. intelligence data base are received by telephone. ACISA clerks manually record initial information given by the inquirer on an "intelligence transmittal form." Any information obtained by ACISA through contacting outside sources is also added to the form. When all outside checks have been made, ACISA informs the inquirer of the results and places the form in a manual file. Later, the information is entered on the computer Quarterly, the clerks review the entire manual file to purge subjects with no information newer than two years.* These records must then also be removed from the computer file. At one point during the audit, ACISA reported that information submitted on 2,700 subjects was not yet added to the computer system. At the same time 6,200 subjects had been purged from the manual system but not yet removed from the computer files.

To improve information processing ACISA is developing a new automated system called the "screen driven format." Under this format the computer input screen will visualize the transmittal form and allow employees to input information directly onto the computer as if they were manually preparing the form. The system is designed to eliminate duplication of manual processing and files. It will allow the input of information directly from source documents of all enforcement agencies. In addition, the system can identify information to be purged from the system without requiring employees to review the entire intelligence file. ACISA hopes this system will allow them to eliminate the inputting and purging backlogs.

^{*} The ACISA purge cycle was recently changed to five years.

AUDITOR GENERAL NOTE

The Auditor General has carefully reviewed the written response submitted by the Arizona Criminal Intelligence System Agency (ACISA). We find no reason to alter or retract the findings of our report. Further, although the ACISA response contains several items of misinformation or inaccuracies, no purpose would be served in a lengthy "response to the response."

The Auditor General has reproduced the entire narrative portion of the ACISA response. Because of the extensive length of the total response (118 pages including appendices) 8 appendices totaling 59 pages are not presented here. These documents, which are available from ACISA, are as follows:

Appendix A - <u>Summary of Quality Control Standards</u>. General guidelines for input, dissemination and updating of information (3 pages). Relates to comments on page 6 of the response.

Appendix C - ACISA "Intelligence Bulletin" Publication Covers (contents restricted). A reproduction of the covers, not contents, of ACISA "Intelligence Bulletins" (5 pages). Supports comments on page 7 of the response.

Appendix D - ACISA Director's Congressional Testimony - U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control. Testimony before Congress regarding the increasing problem of marijuana cultivation within Arizona. Discusses the enforcement problems associated with the use of more sophisticated techniques to grow marijuana. Calls for additional resources to combat the problem and greater coordination between the various enforcement levels (14 pages). Relates to comments on page 7 of the response.

Appendix H - El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) Brochure - D.E.A. Excerpts of a brochure showing that Arizona agencies must access EPIC through ACISA (1 page). Supports comments on page 11 of the response.

Appendix I - <u>Intelligence Transmittal (subject-card) Form</u>. Shows the revised transmittal form currently used by ACISA (2 pages). Relates to comments on page 13 of the response.

Appendix J - <u>Intelligence Agent Specialized Training Curriculum</u>.

Outline for course of instruction for basic training for intelligence agents (4 pages). Relates to comments on page 24 of the response.


Appendix K - Final Report - Select Law Enforcement Review Commission. Reproduction of the study commission report which led to the establishment of ACISA (23 pages). Supports comments on page 26 of the response.

Appendix M - ACISA Budget Requests for Vehicles - FY 1983-84 and 1984-85 (7 pages). Supports comments on page 33 of the response.



BRUCE BABBITT Governor

ARIZONA CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM AGENCY



4370 South Fremont • Tucson, Arizona 85714 • (602) 628-5104

FRANK F. NAVARRETE Director

September 19, 1983

Mr. Douglas R. Norton Auditor General State of Arizona 111 W. Monroe, Suite 600 Phoenix, Arizona 85003

Dear Mr. Norton:

Enclosed is the Arizona Criminal Intelligence System Agency response to the Auditor General's Draft Sunset Audit Review of the Agency

I feel we have adequately, and candidly, responded to the issues identified in the audit.

Under current management, ACISA has made considerable progress in providing a professional criminal intelligence system for the State of Arizona.

Sincerely,

Frank F. Navarrete

Director

FFN/cb

Enclosure

ARIZONA CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM AGENCY

RESPONSE TO PERFORMANCE AUDIT

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SUMMARY

The overall reaction of the Arizona Criminal Intelligence System Agency to the Performance audit is, primarily, one of disappointment. A performance audit normally provides an excellent opportunity for an agency to obtain a useful view of its operations and procedures from a disinterested, objective viewpoint. Although some meaningful suggestions for improvement of ACISA's operations are offered, we believe the findings of the audit do not reflect reality.

In the subsequent pages of this response, we will convincingly demonstrate that ACISA has done a commendable job in its formative two years. We will show that our modest budget has been a bargain for the taxpayers, that we are carrying out the mandate of the legislature and that our customers, law enforcement agencies at every level throughout Arizona, overwhelmingly approve of ACISA and the services we provide.

The normal term a new state agency is given, prior to being subjected to a performance audit, is six years. There have been exceptions to this general rule. This audit started less than eighteen months after the agency was established, almost while the ink was still drying on the enabling legislation.

The auditors thus were examining an agency in the formative stage which was still (1) identifying policies and procedures, (2) identifying the criminal intelligence requirement of user agencies, (3) balancing user expectations against new agency mission requirements, and (4) retraining the employees it inherited to accomplish a newly definied mission. Under such circumstances, a fair way to audit the performance of an agency might be expressed by "how far had the agency come in the time available and what have they accomplished?", rather than observing the agency much like a photograph without reference to what led up to that moment.

As a result, the value of the agency to local law enforcement and the demonstrable progress the agency has made during the two years since its inception have gone largely unreported. We believe, by presenting our accomplishments during this period, we provide a more balanced view of the Arizona Criminal Intelligence System Agency. This, in turn, will provide a more accurate and complete picture to the legislature for its deliberations.

The following represents a summary of ACISA's findings concerning the performance review.

ACISA FINDING I

ACISA HAS DEVELOPED AN EFFECTIVE STATEWIDE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM WHICH ADDRESSES THE VARIED NEEDS OF ITS USERS THROUGHOUT THE LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNITY IN ARIZONA.

ACISA and its Policy Board have provided fully-developed, comprehensive goals and objectives which spring from, and facilitate attainment of, the Agency's overall mission statement and enabling statute.

Agency goals and objectives are supported by identified programs which were developed to help achieve those goals and objectives. These are spelled out in specific language in ACISA Operational Orders #A-2, A-3, and A-4 of July 26, 1981.

Our Agency Mission Statement, Goals, Objectives, and Programs provide sufficient direction in the employment of ACISA resources, and consequently provide direction and focus in explicit terms as to developing an effective statewide intelligence system currently acceptable to the majority of Arizona law enforcement. Furthermore, these policies elucidate the elements of A.R.S. 41-2151 and provide sufficient guidance for ACISA personnel to comply with and carry out the mandate of that legislation.

ACISA FINDING II

THE ARIZONA CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM AGENCY SHOULD REMAIN AN INDEPENDENT STATE AGENCY.

ACISA was established after long and careful deliberation by the legislature, appropriate legislative committees, and the Select Law Enforcement Review Commission (SLERC). The SLERC was established to deal with long standing problems regarding the utilization of criminal intelligence assets. None of the factors, which were identified by SLERC as the rationale for the establishment of ACISA as an independent entity, have been negated. The deliberations which resulted in the formation of the Agency are still fresh and germane. They are not musty documents of prior decades that have been overtaken by events. All deliberations and considerations took place in the 1980's.

An objective examination of ACISA and DPS reveals that each has an important role in Arizona law enforcement. These roles are markedly different in size and scope. As an agency focused on the criminal intelligence needs of the State, ACISA is able to perform a vital function not only for the State as an entity, but for each individual law enforcement agency. ACISA is the only organization with the flexibility and expertise needed to respond to widely varying intelligence requirements of small rural agencies as well as large urban departments.

The importance of impartiality, independence and flexibility cannot be overemphasized in providing criminal intelligence support to Arizona. We already have them with ACISA. It is particularly important that the State not take a critical step backward at this point by regressing to methods already discredited as inoperative and ineffective.

ACISA FINDING III

TRANSPORTATION COSTS HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED.

In the short history of the agency, transportation costs have been reduced significantly. An inherited fleet of five aircraft has been reduced to one single engine aircraft operated at minimum cost.

The vehicle fleet has been reduced by over thirty percent since 1981. Further savings in transporation costs can be achieved by substituting state owned vehicles for state leased vehicles and by replacing the older, high mileage vehicles with newer gasoline-efficient models. The average annual savings of approximately \$36,000 suggested by the auditors appears realistice once the legislature appropriates sufficient funds for vehicle purchase.

ACISA has recognized this potential saving for two years and submitted requests in the current and previous budget for this purpose.

Again, while we concur that recommended savings are possible, we have taken budgetary actions previously to effect savings and will continue to pursue them. Additionally, we feel encouraged that this agency has been particularly careful to ensure that the funds with which it has been entrusted have provided maximum value to the taxpayers of the state.

CONCLUSION

We believe that ACISA has done an excellent job in its formative stage. It has taken time to identify problems, opportunities and challenges, and to plan, create and implement an organization to address them. The most difficult part of the learning curve has been hurdled. It would be a disservice to the taxpayers and law enforcement agencies throughout the state to subject its criminal intelligence function to a debilitating reorganization and/or relocation. What is needed now, for the first time, is to afford the agency with a period of stability during which it can focus solely on the criminal intelligence needs of Arizona.

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ACISA and its Policy Board have provided fully-developed, comprehensive goals and objectives which spring from, and facilitate attainment of, the Agency's overall mission statement and enabling statute.

Agency goals and objectives are supported by identified programs which were developed to help achieve those goals and objectives. These are spelled out in specific language in ACISA Operational Orders #A-2, A-3, and A-4 of July 26, 1981. Interestingly, these orders span seven (7) pages of text -- quite unlike the five (5) truncated paragraphs depicted on Audit page 16.

DIRECTION AND FOCUS

Our Agency Mission Statement, Goals, Objectives, and Programs provide sufficient direction in the usage of ACISA resources, and consequently provide direction and focus in explicit terms as to developing an effective statewide intelligence system for Arizona law enforcement. Furthermore, these policies elucidate the elements of A.R.S. 41-2151 et. seq. and provide sufficient guidance for ACISA personnel to comply with and carry out the mandate of that legislation (See Auditor's Appendix I).

Unlike the New Jersey State Police goals statement, preferred by the auditors on audit page 14, ACISA's Mission Statement goes beyond merely providing "... intelligence assessments..." (which may or may not meet the needs of the New Jersey law enforcement community). Our Mission Statement identifies the desired "end product" not merely the "means" for accomplishing something. Our mission is to assist local law enforcement in reducing criminal activity in Arizona. Crime statistics throughout the State for the past 2-3 years would suggest that we have participated in such a reduction (violent crimes down 9%; index crimes down 5%; property crimes down 5%; 1981 vs. 1982. Source: "Crime in Arizona", DPS, 1982).

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

The audit statement, "ACISA has performed only a limited strategic intelligence function." is misleading. It is true that certain strategic intelligence activities and

services become more valuable as a data base builds over time. With the task and technical complexities of creating a newly defined data base, and the implementation of detailed qualility control standards (See Tab A), it would be expecting too much for the data base to have achieved its optimum strategic value in the short 18 months between the inception of the agency and the commencement of the audit. Nevertheless, there were still over 100 projects completed during this period, many of which were of a strategic nature. Examples include:

- Analysis of organized crime efforts to penetrate the fast food industry;
- Evaluation of an occult group with potential for serious criminal acts, penetrating a geographical area of Arizona;
- c. Long term compilation of information on smuggling aircraft to assist agencies in deployment of resources and case development;
- d. Analysis of major fraud activity in the livestock industry; and
- e. A two year commitment to the Multi-Agency Conspiracy Eradication Task Force.

Many other examples are available.

TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE

The audit statement that "...The lack of focus has impaired ACISA's tactical intelligence role," is also without foundation in fact.

The flow of criminal information to ACISA is adequate and the numerous data bases available to law enforcement agencies are on-line at ACISA. In addition, ACISA has its own unique and unduplicated criminal intelligence data base.

Intelligence collection guidance has been provided to all field offices and, in our opinion, quality intelligence is being collected. Although the review separated the subject cards into ACISA submittals and other-agency submittals, it should be remembered that virtually all subject cards and inquiries (over 12,000 in FY 82/83) are in direct support of a primary law enforcement agency. The level of submittals by ACISA agents is a direct result of the close working relationships established with these agencies throughout the state.

Finally, although ACISA has strict quality control standards regarding input of criminal intelligence into files, we will in no way dictate to the primary agencies their intelligence requirements. Each agency, depending upon numerous local factors, has different criminal intelligence needs. Therefore, the types of support they request will vary greatly (See Tab B).

SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE GOALS

In regard to the New Jersey State Police goal statements referred to earlier, ACISA cites the following examples of its current activities which directly address the individual subsections of New Jersey's primary goal:

1. Provide a descriptive analysis of organized crime systems operating in the State...

ACISA organized crime profiles published in its "Intelligence Bulletin" are excellent examples of descriptive analyses of systems operating in Arizona (See Tab C).

2. Depict the capabilities of these organized crime systems and provide alternatives to reduce the effectiveness of these systems.

ACISA's recent presentation before a U.S. House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control exemplifies our involvement in depicting capabilities of organized crime and presenting alternatives to reduce their effectiveness (See Tab D).

3. Identify the major crime problems affecting the State... and provide recommendations for remedial action.

ACISA is in the forefront in Arizona in developing criminal intelligence and threat assessments. The advent of Cultism and the threat potential of Terrorism in our state are two recent examples.

4. Assess the efforts of law enforcement in the control of organized crime in the State...

Not ACISA's mission according to its enabling legislation.

5. Provide the operational units within the... police with the necessary data to investigate organized criminal activity.

ACISA's 2-year involvement in Project M.A.C.E. (Multi-Agency Conspiracy Eradication), a statewide narcotics distribution case, is illustrative of our activity in this area.

6. Identify those person(s) engaged in organized criminal activity in the State...

ACISA's computerized capabilities are being used, for example, to aid the National Park Service and the Arizona Livestock Board in combatting unique crime problems in Arizona concerning burglary and thefts.

SPECIFIC CRIME AREAS

ACISA, like the New Jersey State Police, identifies crime areas for focusing its intelligence capabilities. We demonstrated this in our May revamping of ACISA's analytical staff into four (4) teams (by crime category):

PROPERTY CRIMES TEAM

PERSONS CRIME TEAM

CRIMES:

arson
burglary
fencing
forgery
fraud in nat'l parks
thefts

CRIMES:

assaults
crimes against children
extortion
unlawful flight
homicide
kidnapping
obstructing justice
outlaw bikers/prison gangs
robbery
sex offenses
weapons

NARCOTICS/SMUGGLING TEAM

ORGANIZED CRIME TEAM

CRIMES:

dangerous drugs drug rip-offs import violations marijuana narcotic drugs U.S. Customs Intell

CRIMES:

ethnic organizations terrorism traditional o.c. vice offenses white collar crime

ENABLING STATUTE SPECIFIC

ACISA's mandated mission, scope, and authority are spelled out explicitly and concisely in the single statute A.R.S. 41-2152 as follows:

"There is established the Arizona Criminal Intelligence System Agency which shall be a law enforcement agency with peace officer authority for the limited purposes of collection, control, analysis and dissemination of criminal intelligence information to governmental authorities involved in the investigation of violations of the criminal laws. Agency personnel shall not otherwise engage in law enforcement activities." (emphasis added)

In contrast, the authority of the DPS is found in two separate statutes clustered between and among various other authorities unrelated to the intelligenc process, as follows:

A.R.S. §41-1711.A

"There shall be established a department of public safety which is <u>responsible</u> for creating and coordinating services for use by local law enforcement agencies...

A.R.S. §41-1761.A

"There is established a division of narcotics enforcement and criminal intelligence within the department..." (emphasis added)

ACISA's enabling legislation, the more recent statute, clearly expresses the Legislature's wisdom and the Select Law Enforcement Review Commission's intent when ACISA was created and mandated to be the State's primary intelligence agency.

POLICY BOARD DIRECTION

In addition to the previously mentioned goals and objectives, the ACISA Policy Board has provided direction for the agency in the following areas (See Tab E):

1. Quality Control Standards:

Guidelines to insure that the intelligence data base is accurate, pure, and up-to-date for law enforcement use;

2. User Access to Criminal Intelligence:

Guidelines as to who is eligible to receive intelligence information from ACISA, thereby authorizing disclosure under A.R.S. §41-2156;

3. Approval of the ACISA Policies/Procedures:

Manual containing policy for ACISA operations; and

4. General Direction:

Dealing with specific types of intelligence support to give to law enforcement agencies.

SUFFICIENCY OF STRATEGIC PRODUCTS

The audit's pronouncement that ACISA intelligence functions are limited to consulting with users on a case-by-case or in a reactive mode in an unfair characterization. While neither ACISA's capabilities nor its users demands are yet fully matured, our record for two short years is admirable in terms of the time-consuming process of educating Arizona law enforcement as to the value of the strategic services provided by ACISA.

The structure and process inherently involved in ACISA's provision of intelligence products is extremely systematic (i.e. the Quality Control Standards document) and quite proactive in nature. The Auditor's User Survey Section dealing with "Current Intelligence Services" (Question #2, page II-6) reveals that Arizona law enforcement clearly rates the value of ACISA's intelligence contribution in the "95 percentile" on each category of (1) currency of data, (2) accuracy and reliability, (3) usefulness, and (4) sufficiency of data.

In addition, Auditor's Survey Question #3 under "General Information" indicates that respondents (users of our services) revised their operational actions as a result of ACISA intelligence by (1) adjusting enforcement/investigative priorities (30%), (2) initiating increased investigations (63%), and (3) making arrests/serving warrants (49%).

COLLECTION PLANS

While ACISA Collection Plans are still in the refinement stages, specific collection requirements of ACISA personnel are in place and working well. These collection requirements contain specific elements such as (1) crime areas targeted for information gathering, (2) justification for collection, (3) collection participants, (4) collection tasks,

(5) recommended suspense dates, (6) date transmitted to participants, and (7) management approval (see Collection Request Form, Tab E).

Further, Audit Survey Questionnaire Section entitled "Sharing of Intelligence Information" (Question #2, page II-4) reveals that 65% of the user respondents related that ACISA provided them with descriptions of specific types of information and crime areas to guide their submittal of data to the statewide intelligence data base.

ADEQUACY OF INFORMATION FLOW

While ACISA does not routinely ask for or receive police reports full of raw data, we do solicit regular intelligence reports of our own personnel. These reports are prepared in concert with user agency personnel and address specific crime problems in specific locales.

In addition, ACISA regularly receives input from law enforcement through (See Tab G):

intelligence inquiries;

intelligence subject cards;

3. law enforcement investigations meetings;

intelligence bulletins, digests and special reports from:

out-of-state police agencies, and

various federal and state authorities such as the DEA, FBI, *EPIC, Calif. DOJ, etc.

(Note: ACISA is EPIC's only authorized Arizona statewide accessor; See Tab H).

The audit report indicates that only 954 out of 3,162 subject cards submitted during 1982/83 originated with other law enforcement agencies, and that the remainder came from ACISA employees. While we do not dispute our own statistics, we feel that erroneous conclusions about them have been drawn. Specifically, until recently ACISA agents who filled out subject cards at the request of user agencies (often telephonically transmitted) credited those cards statistically to themselves. This resulted in an imbalance in the tabulation. While ACISA management had no particular problem with this practice, it was modified to present a truer picture of what really was happening statistically. Our current practice is to credit the user agency originating the intelligence data. This should correct any future

imbalance in the statistics, and eliminate the erroneous assumption that law enforcement was not providing much data into ACISA's system.

Auditor's Survey Section "General Information" (Question #4, page II-2) reveals that ACISA's users prefer to go through ACISA agents (54%), or telephone ACISA's Intelligence Center (35%) when requesting services such as data submission (Total of 89%).

Reference is made to Table 2 on audit page 22 concerning crediting the DPS with 299 (or 31 percent) of all externally generated subject cards during 1982/83. This information is inaccurate on several bases:

- The correct number of subject cards to be credited to DPS is 203 not 299. The 96 card difference is attributable to an erroneous double count by the auditor staff.
- 2. Of the remaining 203 cards, 195 of them (all but 8 cards) were prepared by ACISA staff and credited to DPS since the data came out of 2 DPS products (96 cards from an outlaw motorcycle gang booklet and 99 cards from a prison gang booklet). ACISA initiated this action and contacted DPS since their approval was needed to put the data into ACISA's system.
- 3. The remaining 8 subject cards were submitted by 5 different DPS personnel over the entire annual period.

It would appear that if the 203 cards credited to DPS (but submitted by ACISA) were handled exactly the same way the auditors handled the other 2,208 cards done by ACISA, the 203 cards would be excluded completely from the substantive portion of Table 2. This would leave DPS with 8 subject cards or a small fraction of 1 percent of the total submissions. It would be as equally unfair of ACISA to characterize DPS support for our system in this manner as it would be for the audit staff to claim that DPS is the largest supporter in Arizona.

In addition, Audit page 22 identifies seventeen (17) unnamed law enforcement agencies who indicate that it is too time consuming to send information to ACISA on every case. We believe this to be typical of law enforcement agencies and is compounded in agencies who have extreme manpower shortages, and that this is further justification for maintaining field agents at ACISA. Also, this would tend to explain some of the reduction in subject cards experienced.

ACISA has responded to this situation by simplifying the transmittal form used by law enforcement to submit data, and by initiating an effort to streamline and speed-up the entire data flow process through ACISA systems (see audit page 47 for details on our "screen driven format" automated system - See Tab I for the revised transmittal form).

DATA BASE VALUE

Contrary to Audit conclusions that the value of ACISA's intelligence data base is questionable, the ability of ACISA to provide a quality response to user needs has never been stronger. Unlike a typical police record bureau which houses vast amounts of raw public data (heavily quantity oriented), the ACISA data base has by design only selected timely, relative and sensitive intelligence data housed within it (the emphasis is on quality and on significant data).

Further, Auditor User Survey Question #5 B (pg. II-3) reveals that 80% of the respondents felt that information received from ACISA was useful for their day-to-day operations or was used in a specific case. Also, Survey Question #3 in the Section entitled "Sharing of Intelligence Information" (pg. II-5) indicates that 88% of the respondents believed that ACISA was "sometimes" or "most always" effective in coordinating user efforts with other law enforcement agencies with similar cases or suspects under investigation.

In addition, Survey Question #3 (pg. II-6) in the Section entitled "Current Intelligence Services" indicates that 73% of the user respondents either "rely upon" or "rely heavily upon" ACISA information for their law enforcement operations. Lastly, Question #1 (pg. II-5) of the same survey section reveals that ACISA users overwhelmingly believe that information from ACISA's Intelligence Center (analysts and data base) ranks as the ACISA service most important to their operations (#1 of 7 priorities).

INFORMATION AVAILABLE FROM ACISA'S DATA BASE

A data base cannot be better than the information in it. "Garbage-in, garbage-out" is one of the cliches of the computer field. This is particularly true of law enforcement computers and data bases. If the sole desire of any agency is to ensure a high response, or "hit rate", this can easily be accommodated. One of the major tasks that ACISA confronted early on was the development of strict and detailed quality control standards for information

retained in the data base and the application of these standards to a prior agency. The result was elimination of voluminous files that did not meet the new quality standard. The natural outcome is a higher quality, more accurate, timely and legal data base with a lower percentage of "hits" on inquiries due to a smaller intelligence base. This reduction in hits is almost in direct proportion to reduction in the total number of files and has occurred simultaneously with the introduction of the quality control standards.

Five qualitative improvements of the intelligence data base took place during ACISA's massive purge effort in 1981-82:

- 1. Criminal history record information was separated from intelligence.
- 2. Quality Control Standards were implemented.
- 3. Review of the entire data base to remove unevaluated or invalid information.
- 4. Evolution from a narcotics intelligence data base to an all-crimes intelligence data base commenced.
- 5. Previous counting practices tended to inflate the statistics and were changed.


These five factors had a cumulative effect of ensuring a lower hit rate. As time progresses, and the recently instituted five year review cycle allows the data base to grow, it is projected that the hit-rate cycle will again rise. In any event, the primary thrust will continue to be qualitative, not quantitative.

The long-run, all-source hit rate is depicted in the graph on the following page. It shows quarterly rates between 48% and 70% since 1981. During the past year, the percentage of inquiries for which ACISA was able to provide additional information increased in the year ending June 30, 1983 from 48% to 57%. This is a marked upturn and illustrates that stability is being achieved.

DATA BASE USAGE

The concept of information sharing is "alive and well" within the Arizona law enforcement community. The file review conducted by the Auditors (as of March 1, 1983), revealed that 12,482 subjects (or 51% of those in the data base) had been inquired about by system users during the past two years. Auditor claims that the data base is "rarely used" (audit, pg. 26) don't hold up in light of the 51% usage rate.

PERCENTAGE OF INQUIRIES TO WHICH ACISA SUPPLIED INFORMATION ALL-SOURCES



^{*}Pre-ACISA rates

Auditor's Survey Question #4 (pg. II-5) indicates that of the respondents who knew whether or not ACISA's involvement improved the extent to which other law enforcement agencies cooperated and shared information with them, over 61% stated that it had.

ACISA OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

Since its inception, ACISA managment has had an operational philosophy that emphasizes a proactive operational mode and strategic intelligence functions. ACISA has made progress in this direction since its creation.

A large part of ACISA's responsibility will always involve consulting with and supporting user agency requests for information or assistance on a case-by-case basis. This is basic intelligence and analytical support and is the type of support typically requested by law enforcement agencies who are learning to work with a new criminal intelligence agency. Initially, it was essential for ACISA to become expert in performing this intelligence support and to satisfy user demands for that type of service. ACISA has made excellent progress in performing and providing basic intelligence support and has for some time now been emphasizing the more sophisticated aspects of intelligence work in a more proactive manner.

Specifically, ACISA is enhancing efforts in threat analysis, target identification, target tracking and case building on a statewide basis. ACISA was restructured on May 15, 1983, specifically with enhancement of these functions in mind and has taken steps in that direction. For example, our resident agents have been and will continue to work in assessing threats, identifying targets, tracking targets and building cases within their own local jurisdictions. We have also initiated strategies in this regard on a statewide basis on, for example, motorcycle gangs, terrorist groups, and satanic cults.

Additionally, ACISA has made, and is continuing, efforts to focus and guide state and local law enforcement agencies in providing ACISA information needed in the statewide strategic analysis of crime problems. Recent statewide requests for our agents to collect information on organized crime, marijuana cultivation, and drug and narcotics smuggling are examples.

ACISA is continually refining its own role and that of the user as they relate to the statewide intelligence system. The shift from a reactive to a proactive mode is being accomplished transitionally and, though demeaned by the auditors, reactive support in response to Arizona's law enforcement agencies will continue to be a part of ACISA's service for the foreseeable future.

ACISA FINDING II

THE ARIZONA CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM AGENCY SHOULD REMAIN AN INDEPENDENT STATE AGENCY.

For the numerous reasons presented below and in other sections of this response, ACISA should continue as the State's independent, impartial, criminal intelligence agency.

ACISA was established after long and careful deliberation by the legislature, appropriate legislative committees, and the Select Law Enforcement Review Commission (SLERC). The SLERC was established to deal with long standing problems regarding the utilization of criminal intelligence assets. None of the factors, which were identified by SLERC as the rationale for the establishment of ACISA as an independent entity, have been negated. The deliberations which resulted in the formation of the Agency are still fresh and germane. They are not musty documents of prior decades that have been overtaken by events. All deliberations and considerations took place in the 1980's.

An objective examination of ACISA and DPS reveals that each has an important role in Arizona law enforcement. These roles are markedly different in size and scope. As an agency focused on the criminal intelligence needs of the State, ACISA is able to perform a vital function not only for the State as an entity, but for each individual law enforcement agency. ACISA is the only organization with the flexibility and expertise needed to respond to widely varying intelligence requirements of small rural agencies as well as large urban departments.

The importance of impartiality, independence and flexibility cannot be overemphasized in providing criminal intelligence support to Arizona. These elements, so essential for a statewide intelligence unit, already exist within the philosophy of ACISA. They are necessary ingredients that serve to unite all Arizona law enforcement agencies in their efforts to curtial the varied crime problems of our state. It is particularly important that the State not take a critical step backward at this point by regressing to methods already discredited as inoperative and ineffective.

FIELD INTELLIGENCE AGENTS

The auditors have stated (of ACISA and the DPS):

"Both agencies utilize field agents...
enforcement. Each agency has 19 full-time
intelligence agents. However, DPS has another
52 agents in 22 cities which offer investigative
and intelligence assistance to local law enforcement."

ACISA field agents have the primary mission to assist local law enforcement in intelligence gathering, evaluation and dissemination, training, and the use of investigative and flash funds. The limited support that is provided by DPS has the primary purpose of obtaining information needed by DPS.

ACISA agents obtain information and assistance from intelligence agents, investigators, and detectives from 109 other law enforcement agencies located throughout Arizona with approximately 6000 sworn peace officers (excluding DPS and ACISA).

The 52 DPS agents located in 22 cities, that are credited in the audit report with assisting local law enforcement agencies, have been redirected toward investigating liquor violations. The recent targeting of Mexican border problems by the Federal Government has been a prime target for intelligence collection by ACISA, federal, state, and local agencies and has not yet been fully addressed by DPS.

SUPPORT TO OTHER AGENCIES

The auditors characterize the intelligence capabilities of both ACISA and DPS as being fairly equal (pg 32):

- (1) "Each agency received approximately 8,900 requests for information during calendar year 1982";
- (2) "In both instances, 22 percent of the inquiries were from city or county law enforcement agencies"; and
- (3) "Thus ACISA and DPS are providing approximately the same amount of intelligence support to local agencies."

ACISA management disagrees that one can determine the amount of intelligence support being provided solely on the basis of the number of requests for information. The statistics used to support that determination establish a commendable record for ACISA in light of ACISA's very short two year "track record", with only 70 FTE's and a budget of \$3.3 million. Contrasted to DPS which has over 1,500 FTE's and a budget of approximately \$57 million, ACISA would appear to be doing "more with less" for the taxpayers.

AGENCY AVERAGE PERSONNEL COSTS

Personal Services and E.R.E. - \$24,000 for ACISA Personal Services and E.R.E. - \$34,000 for DPS

The auditors state that ACISA was only able to provide information for 59% of the total inquiries made to its system, while DPS was able to provide data on 86% of their inquiries received. Such a comparison should surprise no one in light of the detailed continuous, and quality purge effort going on with the ACISA data base (to comply with self-imposed Quality Control Standards). Additionally, the former ACISA purge cycle of two years compared with the DPS cycle of five years explains some of the difference.

Finally, the auditors neglected to mention that their own research revealed that the State of Florida intelligence unit had a "hit rate" of approximately 40%. This would place ACISA between the two numerically (Florida and DPS).

It is ACISA's position that the entire comparison is meaningless since it is an obvious oversimplification of an inherently complex process. It is probably a disservice to Florida, ACISA and DPS to make such comparisons in light of the differences in mandated missions, resources, and composition of data bases.

To our knowledge no one in the intelligence field has ever established an intelligence flow "Norm" which would be applicable to all criminal intelligence agencies, ACISA has set standards which are legally and ethically sound and which are best suited for the State of Arizona.

DUPLICATING STATEWIDE SYSTEMS

There is a strong suggestion by the auditors that ACISA has independently created intelligence functions which duplicate those already existing in DPS. This suggestion ignors several important factors, not the least of which is that the Attorney General also has an intelligence capability resulting in triplication:

- 1. The DPS failed to provide an effective intelligence sharing system for 13 years and this contributed to the creation of ACISA:
- ACISA has statutory authority to develop and maintain the states' primary intelligence system; and


3. The Select Law Enforcement Review Commission recommended the creation of ACISA in order to satisfy state intelligence needs.

The auditor's report cites areas of similarity of intelligence capabilities and services. In many of these areas ACISA's function is not accurately portrayed. ACISA's experienced staff and its existing information systems far outperform those of the DPS. It is incorrect to characterize our capabilities as basically "similar."

COMPUTERIZED SUBJECT FILE

The size of a file does not measure the effectiveness and quality of the data which it contains. The content of ACISA's data base is determined by our agency's quality control standards which have been applied to all 24,000 files (originally over 50,000 files inherited). The Agency's intelligence functions have always been supported by a computer system which has been developed and dedicated solely to intelligence information management. The system is structured to perform three (3) major operational capabilities which support the processing of criminal data into nine (9) major divisions with over 400 multicomplex data analysis capabilities:

ACISA OPERATIONAL COMPUTER STRUCTURE



These system capabilities apply to our entire intelligence data base.

The 50,000 files presently maintained by DPS are not in a computerized, integrated database system. Only very recently has DPS combined their intelligence functions and begun to computerize their information. The DPS information systems are not all intelligence, and are more accurately described as basic police information.

ANALYTICAL CAPABILITY

ACISA's intelligence analysis capability is not restricted to the computer's multiple data processing. The Analytical Section of ACISA is actively involved in data interpretations for crime overview, follow-up, research and dissemination of criminal summaries and publications, as well as detailed analysis on complex criminal conspiracies.

The Analysis Section serves as the Agency's quality control focal point for criminal intelligence data submitted to the Agency. Currently, the Analysis Section has established four major crime categories with 28 specific subcategories for review and analysis.

TELEPHONE TOLL ANALYSIS

The telephone toll capabilities of ACISA have existed for five years. The telephone toll program is an interactive, independent data base. The system can provide analysis of independent investigative data and be merged with other similar investigations to make links between criminal associations three levels deep. The Agency's telephone toll program is routinely instrumental in assisting law enforcement conspiracy investigations. On several occasions, this assistance was provided to DPS as well.

The success achieved from ACISA's telephone toll capability motivated DPS to copy ACISA's basic system design in 1981.

ACISA RELIANCE ON DPS

ACISA's use of DPS information sources has been characterized in such a way as to be critical of ACISA.

The information sources housed in DPS have been misrepresented to be DPS maintained and collected data bases. This is not totally correct. DPS acts only as an "electronic switch" to other automated systems for many of the data bases which are included in the ACJIS system. These systems are basic information sources which any law enforcement agency needs to use routinely. During fiscal year 82-83, ACISA did use these basic sources of information to support other agencies's intelligence inquiries. Contrary to the auditor's findings, ACISA actually contacted DPS 971 times for support on intelligence inquiries. The main reason for contacting DPS on those occasions was to obtain arrest information which is contained in an automated system requiring limited support by DPS. ACISA actually received direct intelligence support on only eight occasions or less than 1% of its inquiries to DPS.

The auditors criticized ACISA's efforts to use data sources to support inquiries. The auditors fail to comprehend the difference between information and intelligence. ACISA, as an intelligence agency, must use various sources of information to draw together a finished intelligence product. Many law enforcement agencies appreciate and value ACISA's proactive research efforts on behalf of their intelligence inquiries.

On various occasions, law enforcement agencies have approached ACISA to take over responsibilities for their external data sources. One example is the Maricopa County pawn shop file mentioned in the auditors' report. Another example was a DPS request for ACISA to assume responsibility for the Public Documents Computerized System because the system lacked development and updating (over three years out-of-date). These changes were sought because ACISA's computer design could improve the requestors' sources for investigative analysis use.

Queries to other information sources by ACISA is a normal responsibility of the Agency in providing support to law enforcement. This support, combined with criminal intelligence information, is a direct part of ACISA's mission.

INFORMATION SOURCES

DPS public documents files are over three years out of date. This contributes to a 30% error rate on information contained in those files.

Other information systems listed as "internal sources" to DPS are utilized for the advancement of DPS and are rarely used by other Arizona law enforcement agencies.

ACISA has information sources from over 100 law enforcement agencies in Arizona, as well as agencies located throughout the United States, Canada, Mexico and foreign countries. These sources provide a wealth of criminal intelligence and criminal information which is then made available to all law enforcement agencies that have a

"need to know and a right to know" under the guidelines of our enabling statute and quality control standards.

ACISA utilizes the same information sources listed for DPS (page 36 of the audit report) on a routine basis. These "public information" sources are available to all Arizona law enforcement. Agencies utilizing ACISA services ask for these checks in addition to checking ACISA intelligence, other intelligence sources throughout the United States, and foreign countries.

ACISA PERFORMS MANY FUNCTIONS

ACISA performs many independent intelligence activities in order to develop a quality intelligence service for its users. While our enabling legislation and mission statement clearly identify our support role to law enforcement, ACISA has been proactive in seeking out its users independent of and prior to their requests for assistance. Further, the Auditor's Survey Question #5, reflects that 68 percent of the respondents received intelligence reports and information from ACISA before they had requested it.

Additional major functions performed by ACISA include the following services and assistance to law enforcement agencies in the State of Arizona:

- Coordinate and facilitate exchange of information between law enforcement agencies;
- Maintain a computerized Criminal Intelligence Repository;
- 3. Operate an Intelligence Center:
 - a. Respond to inquiries for Criminal Intelligence support from law enforcement agencies.
 - Make inquiries to other agencies in support of criminal investigations.
 - c. Maintain a toll free telephone patch service between agencies for criminal case coordination.
- 4. Provide Analytical Services:
 - a. Analysis of Criminal Intelligence:
 - (1) Crimes against Property
 - (2) Crimes against Persons
 - (3) Narcotics & Smuggling
 - (4) Organized Crime

- b. Case Management
- c. Trend Identification
- d. Telephone Toll Analysis
- e. Financial Analysis
- f. Link Analysis
- g. Event Flow Analysis
- h. Graphics support for Courtroom presentations during Grand Jury & Trials
- Develop and control informants;
- 6. Provide training in conducting surveillances;
- 7. Provide investigative expense and flash funds;
- Provide specialized investigative equipment;
- 9. Provide technical assistance on conspiracies crime scene searches, and warrant preparation;
- 10. Provide and coordinate training to law enforcement agencies in the area of intelligence and organized crime; and
- 11. Disseminate criminal intelligence information to law enforcement agencies:
 - a. Written reports on criminal activity.
 - b. Publish criminal Intelligence Bulletins on a wide variety of crimes.
 - c. Circulate Intelligence Flyers on criminals and their activity.
 - d. Computer printouts of analytical summaries.

TRAINING

ACISA has been supporting Arizona's law enforcement efforts through intelligence training throughout the State. In addition, a 40-hour basic intelligence curriculum for Arizona intelligence agents and other peace officers engaged in intelligence work has been designed by ACISA and approved by the Arizona Law Enforcement Advisory Council (See Tab J).

In the past year, on-site training in the intelligence process has been provided to over forty agencies and hundreds of peace officers. In addition, ACISA has sponsored seminars on terrorism, vice, cults, and undercover disguise attended by peace officers throughout the State. Additionally, ACISA has provided experienced instructors to provide training on intelligence topics for courses and seminars presented by other agencies including the Drug Enforcement Administration, DPS, National Park Service, Arizona Auto Theft Investigators, and others.

INDEPENDENCE AND COOPERATION A NECESSITY

Law enforcement officials generally agree that it is important to separate intelligence functions from enforcement activities. Two main reasons are given for the separation. First, intelligence is a staff function and if not insulated from enforcement its resources can be cannibalized or siphoned for enforcement activities or other functions whose results are more visible or easier to measure. Second, widespread cooperation from most local law enforcement agencies can be ensured if the risk of usurping their enforcement authority is reduced. The Select Law Enforcement Review Commission recognized the need to insulate intelligence functions from enforcement activities. The State of Arizona recognized this need by creating ACISA as a separate agency.

As a separate agency, ACISA can, and has, coordinated efforts between law enforcement agencies as an independent "broker" of information. ACISA is free to do this because law enforcement agencies do not fear that ACISA will usurp their authority.

No other state in the nation has had the foresight to establish a statewide intelligence system as an independent agency. Other states still use conventional ideas and techniques to combat crime. Arizona has taken the initiative to ensure that the law enforcement community has the intelligence resources necessary to fight crime in the most efficient manner possible.

ACISA's greatest potential contribution to law enforcement in Arizona is in assisting in overcoming the traditional barriers of lack of trust. ACISA is in a position to make this contribution because it does not compete with other law enforcement agencies.

ACISA has experienced considerable success in coordinating law enforcement efforts, and will improve as the agency matures to its potential as the state's independent intelligence agency.

ACISA's mission, goals and objectives, and current philosophy, provide the direction, focus, and agency incentive that is ideal for the cooperative exchange of intelligence. This exchange has resulted in many agencies working together and sharing intelligence that otherwise might not have been shared.

SLERC COMMISSION

DPS was given some intelligence authority in 1968. By 1931, they still had not developed an effective statewide intelligence system, necessitating the creation of ACISA.

An indepth study of the criminal intelligence needs of Arizona law enforcement was made in 1980 by the Select Law Enforcement Review Commission. This high level commission's findings are very pertinent, since they address many of the issues brought forth in the Sunset Review.

The SLERC Commission found (See Tab K):

"There is a duplication of effort and facilities in maintaining two competing statewide intelligence information organizations...It is apparent that only one such statewide system needs to be maintained."

However, the Commission also found:

- 1. "There are occasional instances when local law enforcement agencies believe that officers of the Department of Public Safety have usurped the authority of local law enforcement agencies in making investigations and arrests within their local jurisdictions and without sufficient cooperation with the local agencies...These concerns have been intensified in recent years to the point that there is a lack of sufficient cooperation and trust between the DPS and local law enforcement agencies in some areas of the State.
- 2. "There exists an extreme degree of concern on the part of local law enforcement agencies that, if a statewide intelligence agency were controlled by the DPS, the Department's interest in furthering its own investigatory and enforcement operations would lead to its preemption of the functions of local agencies who supply information. It is imperative therefore that, wherever the intelligence system is located, the system must be insulated from any agency's investigatory and enforcement mission so that users will perceive no risk to their own interests in contributing information to the system.

- 3. "There appears to be the following alternatives available to the Legislature in any consideration of reorganization of present law enforcement agencies responsible for the control of criminal intelligence information and narcotics and organized criminal activities. They are listed as follows:
 - 1. Make no changes in present structures.
 - 2. Merge Arizona Drug Control District into Department of Public Safety.
 - 3. Transfer all intelligence capability from Department of Public Safety to Arizona Drug Control District.
 - 4. Transfer all intelligence capability from Department of Public Safety and Arizona Drug Control District to the Attorney General.
 - 5. Maintain Arizona Drug Control District as a separate agency but amend the statutes to structure it as other state agencies are structured.
 - 6. Transfer Arizona Drug Control District to the Department of Public Safety but maintain it as a separate bureau or division within the Department of Public Safety and with a separate board to determine policy for the division.
 - 7. Other variations.

The Commmssion has determined that the fifth alternative is the best one presently available.

"We have examined the problem of a statewide intelligence system from many perspectives and have concluded that at present the needs of the state would best be served by a separate agency ultimately responding to the governor. The agency must have several characteristics. It must be limited to the intelligence function and certain necessary activities in support of law enforcement agencies...

"The agency must not have direct investigative or enforcement powers. The agency must have the trust of the law enforcement agencies, and to that end, representatives of those agencies must play leading roles in policy making for the intelligence system.

"The service of the agency must be available to all law enforcement organizations, and in turn, they must cooperate fully in providing intelligence information to the system...

"Finally, in the service for efficiency, the <u>need to</u> provide safeguards for possible abuse of sensitive intelligence information must be carefully met.

"We believe that an agency such as that created by the proposed legislation attached hereto will fulfill these criteria and will move the state of Arizona along the path toward the ultimate goal of coordinated law enforcement efforts." (emphasis added)

As the SLERC Commission found, the key lessons learned regarding intelligence agencies over the years are:

- a. The agency must have no "vested interest" in the outcome of the intelligence process. This means that the agency is seeking only criminal intelligence and not tied to any political need of the moment or specific investigation it has to "make."
- b. There must be a "separation of powers" so that the criminal intelligence collected is not the basis for operations conducted by the intelligence agency.
- c. There must be responsiveness to inspection by the legislative and executive branches to ensure that the agency operates strictly within its mandate and in accordance with established policies.

Only a distinct and separate agency, subject to legislative oversight, can meet these tests. ACISA is already functioning in this manner.

DPS, on the other hand, will:

- a. Almost always have a vested interest in intelligence outcomes because of its broad investigative powers.
- b. Will always be in a position to conduct operations based upon intelligence of its own manufacture.
- c. May be more difficult to monitor as an intelligence agency because the function can be buried out of sight of the Governor, the legislature, and even the Director, DPS.

Based upon the Commission's exhaustive review, the state intelligence collection function was given to ACISA rather than to DPS. A.R.S. § 41-2151 et. seq. gives ACISA this authority and any law enforcement agency performing this function beyond what is necessary for that agency's internal operation is duplicating a function assigned to ACISA!

ACCESS TO CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE

The SLERC Commission recommended that in creating a state intelligence agency "the need to provide safeguards for possible abuse of sensitive intelligence information must be carefully met." As a result of this recommendation, the state legislature passed A.R.S. §41-2152 and A.R.S. §41-2156:

"There is established the Arizona Criminal Intelligence System Agency which shall be a law enforcement agency with peace officer authority for the limited purposes of collection, control, analysis and dissemination of criminal intelligence information to governmental authorities involved in the investigation of violations of criminal laws.... (emphasis added)

"Criminal intelligence information maintained by the agency is not a public record and is exempt from title 39, chapter 1. The information is not subject to disclosure, except that the agency may disclose information to local, county, state and federal agencies as authorized by the board."

Based upon these statutes, ACISA can only release intelligence information to "governmental authorities involved in the investigation of violations of the criminal laws... as authorized by the board." Since the Auditor General's Office does not meet this criteria, ACISA cannot legally provide that office with intelligence information. It is unfortunate if the auditors felt this limited their review of ACISA.

LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT

Auditor conclusions concerning local law enforcement support for a criminal intelligence function performed by DPS appears to be based upon their user survey questionnaire. The survey instrument was strongly biased to ACISA's disadvantage. Only the last of eight pages of questions addressed the issue of making ACISA a division of the Attorney General or DPS. Even that single question was biased in several obvious ways to include:

- 1. Responders were not given an opportunity to express their opinions concerning the <u>best</u> option for providing intelligence support to them; specifically, they were not given the option of selecting ACISA in its present configuration or of transferring DPS intelligence assets to ACISA.
- 2. The question implies incorrectly that ACISA would continue to operate as it is now operating if it were to be assigned to DPS.
- 3. Responders are not provided an opportunity to evaluate their expectations concerning the quality of support and cooperation which they would receive from DPS vs. the AG or ACISA (obviously many agencies would cooperate as well as they could with whatever agency(s) the State elects to provide since a "proud but starving man will patronize a soup line").

In spite of survey bias, responses to the question, if properly interpreted, strongly support ACISA! Responses show that if ACISA were made a division within DPS or the AG, cooperation with or use of the system would decrease under either, particularly under DPS where almost a third of the respondents said they would decrease their degree of cooperation or not use it at all. Approximately half of those surveyed indicated that nothing would be gained by relocating ACISA resources to DPS or the AG. (See Tab L).

This is an obvious and dramatic reconfirmation of the SLERC finding that local law enforcement still distrusts DPS and that an independent state intelligence agency is essential for improved law enforcement cooperation within the State. The auditors summarily dismissed this reconfirmation by stating that those agencies do not "significantly use or contribute" to the statewide system. That evaluation appears to be based solely on those agencies documented participation in the intelligence data base. This argument is fallacious in at least three respects. First, the data base is only one of several functions provided by ACISA. Second, ACISA agents frequently provide input on behalf of user agencies, making the individual agency figures meaningless (subject cards and inquiries are now being attributed to the originator when submitted on their behalf by ACISA agents). Third, the evaluation is refuted by responses to the auditor's survey (81% of agencies have taken actions over the year as the result of information received from ACISA; and 88% of respondents have received useful information or assistance "sometimes" or "most always").

A final, ludicrous interpretation of the survey in regard to local law enforcement support is the negative interpretation accorded to the responses from 24% of law enforcement agencies (which received support from ACISA) that they had contacted DPS first (Question #6, page II-3). The relevancy of which agency is contacted first is highly dubious at best. However, if it is relevant the results could just as easily be stated as follows: "users obviously have much greater confidence in the promptness, accuracy, and usefulness of information provided by ACISA since 63% contacted ACISA first!

COST SAVINGS

The auditors argue that "ACISA's intelligence function can be consolidated with DPS' intelligence functions and established as a separate bureau within DPS..." and still "...maintain independence and avoid redirection of intelligence resources." They further argue that this can be accomplished while providing a cost savings of approximately \$1,428,000 in the first year and eliminating 28 employee positions.

This estimated cost savings was based on a DPS plan to merge the ACISA function into DPS. However, under this plan, DPS proposed to eliminate 28 positions and allocate the remaining positions into existing DPS bureaus. This proposal contradicts the auditors' argument that this savings can be obtained while maintaining independence and avoiding redirection of intelligence resources.

This integration is not harmonious with the recommendation of the SLERC Commission. It would also give rise to the fear of local law enforcement that DPS' interest in furthering its own investigatory and enforcement operations would lead to its preemption of the functions of local agencies who supply information to the intelligence system. Additionally, this concept was considered by the SLERC Commission and rejected as not being the best approach available for the reasons previously stated.

ACISA is currently performing the intelligence function for the State in a cost effective manner. However, it could accelerate its present activities and broaden its scope with the additional resources of DPS that are devoted to a state intelligence function.

INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES

Intelligence resources available to the State of Arizona are limited. It is incumbent upon all agencies to become as efficient as possible and to scrupulously avoid duplication of functions. There is no disagreement among

agencies on that point, but there is often confusion as to where duplication exists, which agency is duplicating, and what should be done to eliminate it.

Consolidation of resources is often looked upon as a solution to such problems. The performance audit suggests such a consolidation, but does not examine all alternatives. The reader is asked to proceed in a proposed direction without being shown the pathway to follow and without knowing the ultimate outcome.

One unexamined alternative is to transfer those Department of Public Safety intelligence resources in excess of its internal requirements to ACISA. This would enhance ACISA's ability, as the State's independent intelligence agency, to provide support to more than one hundred law enforcement agencies throughout the State. It would also allow the acceleration of the statewide proactive operations and strategic intelligence collection that are mentioned elsewhere in this report, while having no adverse effect on DPS internal intelligence needs. An in depth study of this alternative is beyond the scope of this response, but is appears that it is an essential prerequisite before the legislature is asked to make a decision with such a major impact on law enforcement in Arizona.

ACISA FINDING III

TRANSPORATION COSTS HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED

In the short history of the agency, transportation costs have been reduced significantly. An inherited fleet of five aircraft was determined by ACISA to be cost ineffective. Four of these aircraft were subsequently transferred to other agencies. ACISA now operates one single-engined aircraft at minimal cost.

The vehicle fleet has been reduced by over thirty percent since 1981. Further savings in transporation costs can be achieved by substituting state owned vehicles for state leased vehicles and by replacing the older, high mileage vehicles with newer gasoline-efficient models. The average annual savings of approximately \$36,000 suggested by the auditors appears realistic once the legislature appropriates sufficient funds for vehicle purchase.

ACISA has recognized this potential saving for two years and submitted requests in the current and previous budget for this purpose (See Tab M). Although the legislature provided partial relief last year, funds just have not been available to replace leased vehicles over the short term.

Again, while we concur that these recommended savings are possible, we have taken budgetary action previously to effect these savings and will continue to pursue them. Additionally, we feel encouraged that this agency has been particularly careful to ensure that the funds with which it has been entrusted have provided maximum value to the taxpayers of the state.

APPENDIX

- * A. Summary of Quality Control Standards.
 - B. President, Arizona Chiefs of Police Association letters of March 17, 1983, and March 23, 1983.
- * C. ACISA "Intelligence Bulletin" publication covers (contents restricted).
- * D. ACISA Director's Congressional testimony U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control.
 - E. ACISA letter of June 14, 1983, to its Policy Board Chairman re: policies effectuated.
 - F. ACISA Intelligence Collection Plan and Request Form.
 - G. Inquiries submitted to ACISA FY 1982/83.
- * H. El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) brochure D.E.A.
- * I. Intelligence Transmittal (subject-card) form.
- * J. Intelligence Agent Specialized Training Curriculum.
- * K. Final Report Select Law Enforcement Review Commission.
 - L. Proposed Unbiased Survey Question.
- * M. ACISA Budget Requests for Vehicles FY 1983/84 and 1984/85.

^{*} As explained in the Auditor General Note preceding the response, these Appendices are not presented in this report.

APPENDIX B

President, Arizona Chiefs of Police Association Letters of March 17, 1983, and March 23, 1983.

CASA GRANDE

POLICE DEPARTMENT

520 North Marshall Street Casa Grande, Arizona 85222

Rue 8-583

GEORGE COXEY-CHIEF OF POLICE

March 23, 1983

The Honorable Bruce Babbitt Governor of Arizona Office of the Governor State Capital Phoenix, AZ 85007

Dear Governor Babbitt:

Recently, I was asked by Mr. Steve Udall, Chairman of the Policy Board for the Arizona Criminal Intelligence System Agency, to conduct a brief survey on the attitude of police departments towards the new Agency. At about the same time, I was asked by Mr. Steve Thacker of the Auditor General's Office to suggest some performance standards to evaluate ACISA in light of the State's "Sunset Law".

As you well know, we who serve the public usually hear more about mistakes and problems than we do about the good things that come about as a result of our efforts. I am enclosing a copy of my letters to Mr. Udall and Mr. Thacker for your review and information. I thought you would be interested in my findings as they reflect very favorably upon the Agency and therefore on you as head of our state government.

Your support of law enforcement is genuinely appreciated. If you should have any questions, or if I may be of assistance to you, please be sure to call on me.

Sincerely.

George Coxev

Chief of Police

GC/cq

Enclosures: 2

CASA GRANDE

POLICE DEPARTMENT

520 North Marshall Street Casa Grande, Arizona 85222

GEORGE COXEY-CHIEF OF POLICE



March 23, 1983

Mr. Stephen G. Udall Chairman ACISA Board P. O. Box 637 St. Johns, AZ 85936

Dear Mr. Udall:

Pursuant to your request, I checked with a few of the police departments around the state (twenty-five in all) to ascertain how ACISA is perceived some twenty months after their coming into being.

All of them expressed their deep satisfaction with the level of cooperation from both their field agents and top management. Everyone seemed pleased with the quality of the information they received as well as the timliness of its arrival. None of the agencies reported having any difficulties in either supplying or receiving intelligence information.

Most of the agencies do not really gather intelligence themselves that they feel would be of use to the entire system. None expressed any problem whatsoever of putting the information they had in, but said it may not meet ACISA standards. I did not ask all of the agencies, but those that I did ask, expressed no problems in letting ACISA agents review all of their crime and arrest reports for data of interest to the ACISA system.

I talked with the chiefs of the following agencies and included mine in the survey.

Apache Junction
Avondale
Casa Grande
Chandler
Clifton
Coolidge
Douglas
Eloy
Flagstaff

Florence Gilbert Globe Goodyear Kearney Kingman Mesa N.A.U. Peoria Prescott Scottsdale Sierra Vista Superior Tempe Tuscon Willcox

Telephones: Area Code 602

Mr. Stephen G. Udall March 23, 1983 Page 2

From the comments I received, ACISA is doing a very good job. Let me share some of them with you.

"Bill Willis and Frank have brought Agency credibility up to the highest level."

"We like the bulletins."

"More than cooperative."

"Agency and the Director get an 'A'."

"Quite a bit of help."

"Absolutely no problems. Very cooperative. Very informative."

"We love our ACISA agent." (This comment made by two agencies)

"ACISA is there when needed. They're doing a good job. Very responsive."

"Our (ACISA) agent bends over backwards to help."

"Frank has put out extra effort to help us."

"Our agent is a real go getter."

"Relations with Leo (Fisher) and Frank have improved drastically over the Drug Control District."

"We like the telephone capabilities."

"We trust ACISA and hope they will become even more productive."

In regards to specific targets or areas that these chiefs suggested ACISA work in, the following were mentioned.

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Mr. Stephen G. Udall March 23, 1983 Page 3

Other suggestions included:

An inventory of equipment, personnel and resources Nickname File
Modus Operendi File
Criminal Profiling
Criminal Pattern Profiling
Victim Profiling
Early warnings to agencies of activities in their

Early warnings to agencies of activities in their area and the state Ability to identify and recommend effective countermeasures to criminal activity

Close monitoring of legislation and case law concerning Intelligence and related activities such as wiretaps and surveillance.

Maintaining close working relations with local, state, regional, national and international intelligence sources and law enforcement agencies

Other concerns, at least from my point of view, are covered in my letter to the Auditor General's Office.

I hope this survey reflects both the progress made by ACISA under Frank and its acceptance by the law enforcement community. If I may be of further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,

George Colly Chief of Police

GC/cg

· CASA GRANDE

POLICE DEPARTMENT

520 North Marshall Street Casa Grande, Arizona 85222

GEORGE COXEY-CHIEF OF POLICE



March 17, 1983

Mr. Steve H. Thacker Performance Audit Supervisor Office of the Auditor General 111 W. Monroe - Suite 600 Phoenix, AZ 85003

Dear Mr. Thacker:

Thank you for your letter of March 1 inquiring about performance standards for the Arizona Criminal Intelligence System Agency. As you know, ACISA is less than two years old and still developing as a new organization. Considerable time and effort has been spent modifying and improving the agency's image over the old Drug Control District. These efforts have covered a wide range of problems from entering data into the system to purging data out of the system; from in-house accounting procedures to resolving employee problems; and from establishing regional offices to finding a new headquarters location.

During the course of these problems and events, ACISA has been making tremendous strides towards meeting the basic reasons for its existence. I have recently discussed ACISA's performance with twenty-five law enforcement agencies around the state. Every single one of them gave the agency extremely high marks in the areas of cooperation, providing useful and timely information, and willingness to support the law enforcement community. These are certainly a few of the critical aspects of ACISA.

These characteristics of ACISA should not be construed to mean a laxity in control concerning who has access to these sensitive files. In fact, one standard of concern is security and to date, there have been no compromises.

Telephones: Area Code 602

Steve Thacker March 17, 1983 Page 2

Crime Analysis had long been a very important part of criminal intelligence. The analysis provided by ACISA to date, to my knowledge, has been clear, concise and correct. A concern in this area, however, is the extremely limited number of field agents and analysists available at the agency.

In direct response to your questions, let me attempt to answer them in the order presented.

1. Concerning the role of ACISA:

The basic activities of collection, control, analysis and disseminiation of criminal intelligence information appears to be most appropriate. ACISA is limited to this role in a staff function. In my view, Intelligence work should not be a line function as far as enforcement activities are concerned. I believe this view to be held by most, if not all, police agencies.

Some of the low profile, but very important functions or services that law enforcement looks to ACISA to provide include:

- A. National and International intelligence contacts as well as statewide.
- B. Buy money.
- C. Investigation money.
- D. Covert equipment, i.e., cameras, listening devices, wiretaps and personnel trained in their set up and use.
- E. Legal expertise and guidance concerning Intelligence matters, criminal investigations and procedures.
- F. Profiles on targets individuals, organizations, actual/ potential victims.
- G. Crime trend and pattern information.
- H. Periodic reports to local agencies on specific problems in their area and/or of concern to the state in general.
- I. Data build-up on specific information topics, i.e., congames, arson, organized crime, motorcycle gangs, etc.

- J. Data build-up on nicknames, modus operandi, etc.
- K. Provide early warning on criminal activity.
- L. Provide recommendations, suggestions or ideas as to effective countermeasures and procedures to problems.
- M. Keep current on state and national legislation and judicial decisions concerning intelligence matters and procedures.
- N. Provide training to local agencies on intelligence matters, operations, informant control, surveillance, etc.
- 2. In regards to ACISA being an independent agency:

As I touched on earlier, Intelligence is a staff function. As part of an enforcement agency, an Intelligence Unit can sometimes be quickly cannibalized for enforcement activities or other functions whose results may be more visible and dramatic and easier to justify. Intelligence is a very time consuming, tedious, difficult and low profile operation. Its separation from other organizations helps insure that it will concentrate on intelligence functions only.

Without going into any depth, I would simply offer the various concepts and reasons why we have several branches of the armed forces and the many different intelligence gathering agencies at the national and international levels. In a nutshell, this approach provides unique and sometimes different resources, theories, philosophies and opinions of real value to decision makers.

A third argument for independence is this: ACISA, in its design as a staff or support agency, facilitates the sharing of intelligence information instead of being in a position of competing for it with local agencies. This is without a doubt a key element that contributes without parallel to the quality of results and success of law enforcement efforts statewide.

- 3. Determining Effectiveness:
 - A. The number of substantiated and legitimate complaints from users.
 - B. Satisfaction of users in regards to:
 - 1) Usefulness of information.

- 2) Timeliness of information.
- 3) Correctness of information.
- C. Meeting training needs.
- D. Cooperation with local agencies.
- E. Security and access control.
- F. Purging of useless and outdated information.
- G. Ready access to ACISA resources.
- H. Maintaining a satisfactory/significant level of case/information sharing or connecting of agencies with common needs and information for operations.
- I. Maintaining a satisfactory/significant level of "hits" in response to legitimate inquiries. (Legitimate in the sense of having useful information that is not readily available from routine, public sources such as the phone book).

Again, let me thank you for letting me offer these comments. I hope they will be of real value to you. If you should have any questions or if I may be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

George Coxey

Chief of Police - Casa Grande

President - Arizona Association of Chiefs of Police

GC/cg

APPENDIX E

ACISA Letter of June 14, 1983, to its Policy Board Chairman Re: Policies Effectuated.



ARIZONA CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM AGENCY



BRUCE BABBITT Governor

4370 South Fremont • Tucson, Arizona 85714 • (602) 628-5104

FRANK F. NAVARRETE Director

June 14, 1983

The Honorable Stephen G. Udall Apache County Attorney P. O. Box 637 St. Johns, Arizona 85936

Dear Steve:

At the May 12, 1983 ACISA Policy Board meeting, you requested a list of policies which the Board had effectuated. Enclosed is a list of policies set by the Board, which were extracted from minutes of previous meetings. I am providing a copy of this list of policy issues to the other Board members as well.

If there is any additional information you need, please let me know.

Sincerely,

Frank F. Navarrete

Director

FFN/gc

Enclosure

cc Policy Board members

POLICIES SET OR AGREED UPON BY ACISA POLICY BOARD

August 26, 1981

*1. Policy for Proxies

Motion made that proxies be allowed but that they be limited to another current member of the Board (the Attorney General's office was suppose to research the possibility of an opinion regarding proxies).

- 2. Legal Advisory Subcommittee (consisting of Steve Twist, Steve Udall, Jim Howard, Tom Collins, John Verkamp and A. Bates Butler, III) proposed the following:
 - a. That the LEMSC would set classifying, reclassifying of positions, hearing appeals and advising on salaries.
 - b. Decided that Director Navarrete should develop an "issue statement" which would address the definition of criminal intelligence and how it will be structured within the Agency, and that he incorporate into that purge criteria, intelligence entry criteria, and interfacing with other information systems.

November 18, 1981

1. The ACISA Policy Board adopted the following Attorney General's legal opinion on "proxy vote":

Those members of the Board who have independent statutory authority to appoint deputies to act in their stead may be represented on the Board by proxy through one of their deputies. However, those members who do not have independent statutory authority to appoint deputies may only be represented by proxy through another member of the ACISA Policy Board. (It was suggested that representation by proxy by those members with statutory authority to appoint deputies be limited to one certain person within their department in order to establish some sense of continuity in attendance.

- 2. The Policy Board suggested that it be made policy for ACISA to maintain flash funds, intelligence expense funds and intelligence gathering equipment and that those resources be made available to state, local, and federal law enforcement officials in the State of Arizona.
- *3. The Board requested that the Governor and the Attorney General's office issue an executive order stating that ACISA is a law enforcement agency and that the Attorney General's office indicate that the Agency is authorized to receive and disseminate criminal information and criminal history.

*4. Draft policy to be presented to the Policy Board stating that ACISA agents may, upon request from a law enforcement agency, participate in law enforcement activities solely for the purpose of gathering intelligence.

January 27, 1982

- 1. Draft document of "Quality Control Standards" be adopted with the following amendments:
 - a. Page four, first paragraph under "VI. Information Evaluation" shall be, "Information to be retained in the criminal intelligence file shall be.....".
 - b. Page six, under "VII Information Quality Control", first paragraph needs an explanation of what "input guidelines" refer to.
 - c. Page seven, under "Collection of Intelligence information", second paragraph shall be, "No Intelligence Agent shall act in bad faith or unreasonably with regard to the collection of criminal information."
 - d. Page eight, second paragraph shall be, "Because ACISA is usually not the author...".
 - e. Page 10-11, In addition to the definition for "criminal intelligence", a definition for "criminal information" be included.
 - f. Page 11, under "Criminal Intelligence", shall be
 "...and is not necessarily directed at specific
 arrest or prosecution."

2. Policy Manual

Pursuant to discussion the following motions were made by Steve Twist and approved by the Board:

MOTION: Page 2 of 2, Section A-5, under "Searches and Searching", shall be, "Agency personnel shall not apply for warrants or executive searches of persons, places, or things while in the performance of their duties.

MOTION: Page 2 of 2, Section A-5, under "Searches and Searching", second paragraph shall be, "Agency personnel may act as advisors during searches of persons, places...".

(This motion was passed with an opposing vote by Ruben Ortega.)

The following motions were made by Bates Butler

MOTION: That the Board adopt the "General Provisions Policy Manual" beginning on page 1 of 1, Section A-1, in its entirety with the following amendments:

- 1. Page 1 of 5, Section A-4, Under "Objective 2", sentences 4, 5, and 6, to be included under "Objective 3" of same page.
- 2. Page 2 of 5, Section A-4, under "Objective 2", sentence 6 shall be, "The operation uses court ordered or authorized intelligence collection techniques; and".
- 3. Page 4 of 5, Section A-4, under "Objective 3", sentence 2, shall be "Ensure the timely analysis of the criminal information;".

MOTION: That a provision be included in the "Policy Manual, Use of Force" document which exempts agents while acting under A.R.S. 11-441.

3. Media Relations Specialist

The Board decided that this position should not be pursued in view of the fact the Agency is not large enough to require that position, and because the Board felt it best that the Agency maintain a low profile with regard to media coverage.

April 29, 1982

- 1. The Policy Board shall have the responsibility to set policy and review rules and regulations. The Director of ACISA shall have the right to implement rules and regulations without the prior approval of the Board.
- 2. A membership criteria committee, consisting of three members to be selected by the Board, was to be established to review members on an individual basis who possibly, by reason of questionable character, should not be accessing the system.

Policies Set or Agreed Upon by ACISA Policy Board Page Four

August 26, 1982

- 1. Screening Committee policy which was drawn up by ACISA staff as guidelines for the committee was accepted.
- 2. The Board accepted the Agency's recommendation for change in the regional boundaries.
- *3. The ACISA staff would prepare a list and policy statement of all recognized law enforcement agencies in Arizona.
- *4. It was decided that ACISA staff would prepare a recommendation on purge policy to be provided at the next Board meeting.

February 25, 1983

- 1. Motion passed that the staff be directed to develop and plan a method for increasing the use of the system by the agencies served.
- 2. Use of Force policy approved.
- 3. Motion passed to adopt the access to criminal intelligence policy the staff had prepared.

May 12, 1983

- 1. That the <u>purge cycle</u> be changed from every two years to every five years was passed.
- *2. Motion made that the ACISA Policy Board resolve that ACISA be the agency to apply to RMIN to continue to be the Host Agency for RMIN; the Policy Board would inform the Governor that they didn't think any other state agency in Arizona should apply to be the Host Agency for RMIN.

^{*}Wasn't sure if this would be considered a policy.

APPENDIX F

ACISA Intelligence Collection Plan and Request Form.

ACISA

COLLECTION PLAN

- 1. Analysts, agents, supervisors, in conjunction with input from the Criminal Intelligence Committee, will identify specific geographical areas, type of criminality or person(s) involved in crime as target(s) for the first phase of the offensive.
- 2. Field elements of ACISA and local law enforcement will initiate a collective effort from public documents, criminal history and intelligence sources throughout Arizona, United States, Mexico and Canada. Collection efforts may be diversified to accommodate tasking from Headquarters. Possible that all offices will not collect on the same target at the same time.
- 3. Information forwarded to specific crime teams for evaluation and dissemination.
- 4. Reevaluate initial target(s), add, delete, or change target(s) based upon the first three steps.
- 5. Provide strategic criminal intelligence reports to Arizona and other law enforcement agencies that can use the data to assist in criminal investigation.
- 6. After 3, 6, or 9 months, depending on the intensity and quality of data collected and evaluated, prepare comprehensive criminal intelligence products (reports, bulletins, briefings):
 - 1. for law enforcement
 - 2. legislative
 - 3. news media
- 7. Continue the cycle to assure up-to-date data and timely reports.

SOURCES

- 1. News Media
- 2. Public Documents
- 3. Intelligence Sources
 - a. Multistate projects
 - b. Federal agencies
 - c. Arizona law enforcement
 - d. Confidential informants
 - e. Other sources
- 4. CHRI
- 5. Others

HILLSHA LAW

DIRECTOR_BASIC_STATEMENT

Organized Crime Offensive
by
Arizona Criminal Intelligence System Agency

Currently realized by ACISA are elements of criminal activity which are organized and coordinated to the point where the leaders of these groups are insulate and prosperous. Information from law enforcement and regulatory agencies have revealed these indicators. Additionally private media network probes have also reported this probable activity.

As an intelligene agency ACISA perceives its role to be proactive when possible and constantly coordinate the critical flow of intelligence information to the action law enforcement units throughout the state. For this reason ACISA is asserting itself to provide the state law enforcement community with a threat analysis of criminal activity. The analysis will provide intelligence information for criminal and civil investigation in these areas:

- traditional organized crime influence
 (mafia type)
- non-traditional organized crime (outlaw motorcycle gangs)
- terrorism (pre U.S. Olympics threats)

Phase I

The first phase of this analysis will require the coordination and collection of this information with every criminal justice agency in the state. ACISA's use of its resident field offices and agents will be tasked to accomplish this.

Phase_II

The second phase of this effort will be to compile a report which will identify the key influence, activity, and geographical areas of organized crime in our state. This report will be disseminated throughout the law enforcement community.

Phase_III

The third phase will involve ACISA facilitating primary law enforcement agencies with intelligene and coordination toward targeted investigations for prosecution of individuals for both criminal and civil violations.

Director Basic Statement Page Two

It is expected that some immediate focus of ACISA intelligence resources will be directed at some current crime problems very soon. These problems are traditional organized crime in nature which impact the entire state, i.e., Lake Havasu City.

GENERIC ACTION Plan/Guide

Every targeted area of the organized crime offensive should contain these basic elements of operations.

- -Subject:
- 1) A specific limited/realistic topic.
- -Collection:
- Coordinated, headquarters directed, and concise report.
- -Analysis:
- 1) A coordinated, accurate, defendable and professional analytical summary.
- -Product:
- 1) An item which will be given to every contributing or impacted law enforcement agency.
- Any other need to know source. (legislature)
- -Dissemination:
- 1) Complete dissemination of any product created to all law enforcement.
- -Action/recommendation:
- 1) Know what our continued involvement will be.

Premise

Knowledge is difficult to prove, appreciate, or measure unless there is a product of its existance, i.e., report, pictures, charts, and media generated perception/image.



INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUEST

(When completed this form will be treated as criminal intelligence and will be the basis of a collection plan)

NO.#:			•		
GINATOR:					

SUBJECT: _____ DATE: ____

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETTION OF FORM

- 1. TARGET: (Describe person, crime type, geographic area or other specific targets)
- 2. JUSTIFICATION: (Why should the plan be established?)
- 3. EXPECTED BENEFITS: (What will be gained by implementation of the plan?)
- 4. EXTENT OF INQUIRY: (What resources are necessary to complete the plan?)
- 5. PERIOD COVERED: (Start and completion dates)
- 6. TYPE OF DATA TO BE COLLECTED: (Records, raw data, tracking, etc?)
- 7. COLLECTION METHODS: (CI, Sources, public records, etc?)
- 8. PARTICIPANTS: (ACISA Only, selected areas, selected agencies?)

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION NEEDED:

- 9. SUBMITTED BY/DATE:
- 10. APPROVED BY/DATE:
- 11. TRANSMITTED TO PARTICIPANTS BY/DATE:
- 12. COMPLETED:
- 12. COMMENTS/RECOMMENDATIONS:

Requested			· .	Supe	rvisor:	
	(Name)		(Title)		1)	Name)
Approving	Authority:		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		*	Date:
		(Name)		(Title)		
Assigned:					Suspense	e Date:
•	(Name)		(Title)	(Date)		

inquirtes submitted Fiscal 1982-1983

The following section is a list of Arizona agencies that submitted inquiries to ACISA.

Agency name	No. of requests
AT&F AZ Game & Fish Dept AZ Livestock Sanitary Bd/Phx. AZ State Lottery Apache Junction PD Apache SO Atty Gen/AZ	. 2 . 16 . 8 . 12 . 11
Bisbee PDBuckeye PD	
Casa Grande PD Chandler PD Cochise SO Coconino SO Coolidge PD	. 1 . 48 . 73
DEA/Nogales. DEA/Phoenix. DEA/Tucson. DPS Nogales/AZ. DPS/Coolidge. DPS/Nogales. DPS/Phoenix. DPS/Sierra Vista. DPS/Tucson. DPS/Yuma. Davis Monthan AFB. DMAFB OSI. Dept of Agriculture/Phoenix. Dept of Liquor & Licenses/Phx Douglas PD. Eager PD.	40 98 1 10 28 43 1 144 2 2 3
FBI/Tucson	. 2
Game & Fish/Phoenix	. 33 . 2 . 7
Hayden PD	. 14 . 21
IRS/PhoenixIRS/Tucson	

Kearny PD Kingman PD	1 4
La Paz SO Lake Havasu PD Livestock Sanitary Bd/Phoenix.	2 1 126
Maricopa AO	16 127 72 51
NPS Glen Canyon	2 1 1 9 2 2
Page PD. Papago PD. Paradise Valley Marshall. Parker PD. Phoenix PD. Pima AO. Pima Probation. Pima PD. Pima SO. Pinal AO. Pinal Adult Probation. Pinal SO.	5 10 8 2 136 757 3 6 452 10 1 44 3
Santa Cruz AO	7 1 18 9 5
Taylor PD Tempe PD Tucson Airport Authority Tucson PD U of A PD	1 18 1 233 1
US Border Patrol/Tucson US Customs Air/Phoenix US Customs Air/Tucson US Customs Inspection/Nogales. US Customs Invest/Nogales US Customs Patrol/Lukeville US Customs Patrol/Sells US Customs Patrol/Tucson US Customs Patrol/Yuma US Customs Service I&C/Nogales US Customs Service/Phoenix US Customs/Douglas US Customs/Douglas US Customs/Nogales	34 2 5 41 7 30 93 2 22 1 3 23 131

US Customs/Nogales. US Customs/Phoenix. US Customs/San Luis. US Customs/Sells. US Customs/Tucson. US Customs/Yuma. US Dept of Agriculture. US Marshall/Phoenix. US Marshall/Phoenix. US Marshall/Phoenix. US Marshall/Tucson. US Postal Inspector. US Probation & Parole. US Secret Service/Phoenix. USDA/Phoenix. University of AZ PD.	14 335 8 1 4 2 4 5 3
Wickenburg PD	8 1
Yavapai Adult Probation Yavapai SO Youngtown PD Yuma PD/AZ Yuma SO	4

87 Agencies

4,217

Inquiries Submitted Fiscal 1982-1983

The following section is a list of out-of-state agencies that submitted inquiries to ACISA.

AGENCY NAME		#
Albuquerque PD/NM		
Billings PD/MTBoulder SO/CO		
CBI/CO	• • •	1 3 1 3
DA Del Rio/TX DA Jefferson County/CO DPS Dallas Ft Worth Airport/TX		1
El Paso PD/TX	• •	1
Grant SO/NM	• •	2
Humboldt SO/NV	•	5
La Plata SO/CO Las Cruces PD/NM Las Vegas PD/NV Littleton PD/CO	•	5 11
MAGLOCLEN		
NPS Yosemite/CA	• •	1
Parole & Probation/NV		1
RMIN/CO. RMIN/ID. RMIN/MT. RMIN/NM. RMIN/NV. RMIN/UT. RMIN/WY. ROCIC.		9 170 112 201 . 15

State Fire Marshall Carson City/NV2 State Patrol Olympia/WA
Twin Falls PD/ID3
US Atty Del Rio/TX
/7 A

47 Agencies

1,514

SURYEY

Which of	the following options for providing
criminal	intelligence support to Arizona
law enfo	rcement do you prefer? (check one)
//	ACISA continues as the State's independent intelligence agency.
//	ACISA absorbs DPS intelligence resources.
//	The AG absorbs all ACISA resources.
/	The DPS absorbs all ACISA resources.

APPENDIX I

ACISA MISSION STATEMENT, GOALS AND OBJECTIVES



GENERAL PROVISIONS MISSION STATEMENT

POLICY NUMBER

A-2

EFFECTIVE DATE
July 26, 1981

The mission of the Arizona Criminal Intelligence System Agency is to assist local, county, state and federal authorities in the reduction of criminal activities, and in the identification of criminal suspects and trends through the effective and efficient collection, evaluation, collation, analysis and dissemination of criminal intelligence.

This mission is mandated to the Arizona Criminal Intelligence System Agency by Arizona Revised Statute 41-2152.

"There is established the Arizona Criminal Intelligence System Agency which shall be a law enforcement agency with peace officer authority for the limited purposes of collection, control, analysis and dissemination of criminal intelligence information to governmental authorities involved in the investigation of violations of the criminal laws. Agency personnel shall not otherwise engage in law enforcement activities."

Frank F. Navarrete, Director



GENERAL PROVISIONS
GOALS

POLICY NUMBER

A-3

EFFECTIVE DATE
July 26, 1981

The goals of the Arizona Criminal Intelligence System Agency are:

- 1. The collection of criminal information.
- The control of criminal intelligence information, including the management, collation, and analysis necessary to increase the quality and timeliness of the intelligence product.
- 3. The dissemination of criminal information and intelligence.

Prank F. Navarrete, Director



GENERAL PROVISIONS
OBJECTIVES

POLICY NUMBER

A-4

FFECTIVE DATE
July 26, 1981

To ensure the achievement of the goals of the Arizona Criminal Intelligence System Agency certain objectives have been established. In support of these objectives, detailed programs have been developed which will lead to the fulfillment of the agency's goals and mission.

GOAL: COLLECTION OF CRIMINAL INFORMATION

Objective One -

Establish a comprehensive liaison program for collecting criminal information, disseminating criminal intelligence and providing resources in support of other agencies.

Provide liaison with:

- 1. Law enforcement agencies;
- 2. Regulatory agencies; and
- 3. Citizens, citizen groups, schools, etc.

Objective Two -

Establish overt intelligence projects. In support of this objective the following program has been developed:

Maintain procedures that ensure:

- 1. The operation is lawful;
- 2. The operation is directed toward the collection of criminal information;
- The Resident Intelligence Agent Program is maintained to meet the needs of member agencies;
- 4. The operation is in support of primary law enforcement agencies;

- 5. The operation uses and develops collection techniques;
- 6. The operation uses authorized or ordered intelligence collection techniques; and
- 7. The activities and results of the operation are reported through the appropriate chain of command.

Objective Three -

Establish covert intelligence projects. In support of this objective the following program has been developed:

Maintain procedures that ensure:

- 1. The operation is lawful;
- 2. The operation is directed toward the collection of criminal information;
- The operation is targeted on selected criminal activity. Prior approval must be obtained from the Operations Administrator;
- The activities and results of the operation are reported through the appropriate chain of command;
- The operation is at the request of a specific primary law enforcement agency;
- 6. The operation uses and develops collection techniques; and
- 7. The operation uses authorized or court ordered intelligence collection techniques.

Objective Four -

The training of ACISA and other agencys' personnel. In support of this objective the following program has been developed:

 Provide training of ACISA personnel, as required, to ensure certification by the Arizona Law Enforcement Officers Advisory Council;

- Provide training required to maintain and improve qualification of all agency personnel;
- Provide agency personnel training required for the safe, legal and proficient operation of the agency's technical equipment;
- 4. Provide training in specific criminal areas as requested by supported agencies;
- Provide training in specialized areas of intelligence collection such as surveillance, photography and source development; and
- 6. Provide training to other agencies in the use of criminal intelligence information.

GOAL: CONTROL OF CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

Objective One -

Develop necessary forms and filing systems. In support of this objective the following program has been developed:

- Forms for accurate and complete reporting and transmission of criminal intelligence information;
- A central filing system for the storage, retrieval and purging of reports and documents;
- Continuous reevaluation and upgrading of forms and documents;
- 4. A systematic compilation of statistical data;
- Standard operating procedures; and Maintenance of Agency filing systems.

Objective Two -

Ensure the submission of criminal information to the agency. In support of this objective the following program has been developed:

- Procedures for submission of criminal information and its inclusion in the data base; and
- Criteria of criminal information to be submitted to the data base.

Objective Three -

Collate and analyze criminal information. In support of this objective the following program has been developed:

- Ensure timely collation of the criminal information with the data base;
- 2. Ensure the timely analysis of the criminal information;
- Ensure minimal retrieval time of requested criminal intelligence information; and
- 4. Detail the retrieval process including the documentation of each retrieval.

Objective Four -

Establish agency security measures. In support of this objective the following program has been developed:

- Ensure strict physical security and control measures for access to the agency's computer, data base and files;
- 2. Ensure the integrity of the agency's headquarters and regional facilities; and
- 3. Ensure the safety of agency personnel and resources.

GOAL: DISSEMINATION OF QUALITY CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION.

Objective One -

Efficient handling of requests for criminal intelligence information. In support of this objective the following program has been developed:

- 1. Identify persons and agencies who may have access to the data base;
- 2. Prefiled security card identification and updating system;
- 3. Dissemination criteria for criminal intelligence information; and
- 4. Dissemination restrictions based on ARS 41-2156 and federal guidelines.

Objective Two -

Establish authority levels for dissemination. In support of this objective the following program has been developed:

- 1. Authority levels for dissemination of criminal intelligence information;
- 2. Agency personnel authorized to disseminate criminal intelligence information; and
- 3. Classification criteria for personnel and intelligence.

Objective Three -

Establish methods of dissemination. In support of this objective the following program has been developed:

- 1. Person to person coordination;
- 2. Formal briefings; and
- 3. Dissemination of written synopses and other criminal intelligence documents.

Frank F. Navarrete, Director

REVISION DATE 1/11/82

PAGE _5 OF _5

POL. NO. A-4

APPENDIX II

AUDITOR GENERAL SURVEY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE FOR USERS OF ACISA SERVICES

(ALL RESPONSES WILL REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL)

name:	surveyed all city Police Departments p	ate:
Agenc	cy: County Sheriffs and County Attorneys P	Position:
	. P	Phone No.:
	Results based on 90 agencies responding GENERAL INFORMA	(104 surveyed) TION
1. 0	Over the past year have you utilized the servi	ces of ACISA?
6	(If yes, answer all remaining q	uestions)
[2	22 No (If no, go to question 1 on pag	e 7)
	What kind of assistance/information have you r	equested from ACISA during the past
[6	Information from intelligence center to an	swer inquiry on subject/suspect
	Gonsultation for cases you are investigati 49%	ng
[3	33 Evidence gathering or field assistance on 49%	current cases
	32 Analysis of information or use of computer 47%	
	Coordination of task force or liaison betw enforcement agencies 35%	een your agency and other law
	15 Intelligence-related training 22%	
	31 Use of ACISA equipment 46%	
_ [9 Other (Please specify)	
	. T24	

э.	by ACISA personnel? (Check as many as apply)
•	19 Adjust enforcement or investigative priorities
	30% 43 Investigations initiated/increased
	63% 13 Warrant/subpoena
	19% 19 Arrest 30%
	6 Case dropped
	9% 5 Other (Please specify)
	7%
	13 None 19%
4.	How do you contact ACISA when you need information or assistance? (Please indicate the percent of times each method is used.)
	54 % ACISA field intelligence agent
	10 % Intelligence analyst at ACISA headquarters
	Phone call to ACISA without preference to person contacted
	1 % Other (Please specify)

	46 Yes 68% 22 No 32%
If y	yes,
Α.	How was the information given to you?
В.	Was the information reactived concrelly useful for your deveto-day energtions of
Д.	Was the information received generally useful for your day-to-day operations oused in a specific case?
	36 Yes 9 No (1-Sometimes)
. If v	
	36 Yes 9 No (1-Sometimes) you need intelligence information or assistance, which agency do you usually eact first?
	you need intelligence information or assistance, which agency do you usually eact first?
	you need intelligence information or assistance, which agency do you usually
	you need intelligence information or assistance, which agency do you usually eact first? 42 ACISA 63%
	you need intelligence information or assistance, which agency do you usually eact first? 42 ACISA 63%
	ou need intelligence information or assistance, which agency do you usually eact first? 42 ACISA 63% 16 DPS 24% 9 Other (Please specify)
	ou need intelligence information or assistance, which agency do you usually eact first? 42 ACISA 63% 16 DPS 24% 9 Other (Please specify) 13%
cont	ou need intelligence information or assistance, which agency do you usually eact first? 42 ACISA 63% 16 DPS 24% 9 Other (Please specify)

SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

la.	How often do you forward information you have regarding suspected criminal activity
	or cases being investigated to ACISA to be included in the state-wide data base?
	(Check only one answer)
	Routinely send information on 75 percent or more of all cases or persons 8%
	8 Send information on 50 to 74 percent of all cases or persons
	Send information on 25 to 49 percent of all cases or persons 21%
	Send information on less than 25 percent of all cases or persons 44%
	9 Send no information to ACISA for inclusion in the statewide data base 14%
1b.	(5-No answer) Do you only send information on the cases or persons where you require
	information or assistance from ACISA?
	31 Yes 32 No (5-No answer)
lc.	Why do you not send more or all of the available crime and criminal information to
	ACISA?
	i i
	r e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e
2.	Has ACISA provided you with a description of specific types of information and crime
	areas to guide your submittal of information to the statewide intelligence data base?
	44 Yes 65% 14 No 21% 10 Don't know 15%

3. When you have requested information from ACISA, has ACISA been able to tell you of or coordinate your efforts with other enforcement agencies who have information or are investigating the same case/person?
Most always 24 37% Sometimes 33 51% Very infrequently 3 5% Never 5 8% (No Answer 3) 4. Has ACISA involvement improved the extent to which other law enforcement agencies cooperate with you and share information?
21 Yes 32%
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
1. What current ACISA services do you view as most important to your operations? (Please rank from 1 to 7 with 1 being the highest)
1 Information from intelligence center to answer inquiry on subject/suspect
5 Consultation for cases you are investigating
6 Evidence gathering or field assistance on current cases
2 Analysis of information or use of computer
3 Coordination of task force or liaison between your agency and other law enforcement agencies
7 Intelligence-related training
4 Use of ACISA equipment
8 Other (Please specify)

2. Please rate the value of the intelligence information generally provided by ACISA.

Good	Satisfactory	Poor	No <u>Answer</u>	
33	29	3	3 -	Currency of information provided
40	23	2	3 -	Accuracy/reliability of information provided
32	29	4	3 -	Usefulness of information provided
21	42	2	3 -	Information sufficient for need or purpose
19	41	3	5 –	Information received is not already known by you

- 3. How much do you rely on ACISA assistance or information for your law enforcement operations? (Check only one answer)
 - Assistance is rarely required or relied upon 15%
 - Although assistance is used, enforcement in jurisdiction would not suffer without ACISA help

12%

- Assistance is sometimes required and relied upon 58%
- Rely heavily upon ACISA assistance/information; enforcement would suffer significantly without ACISA help

15%

1 No Answer

FUTURE STATEWIDE INTELLIGENCE EMPHASIS

1. What particular statewide intelligence functions should be performed by ACISA in the future? (Mark as many as apply) $_{\rm Based}$ on 86 responding to question.
Statewide assessments of particular crime problems
Seeking out and targeting criminal operations and operatives to turn back cases
to local law enforcement
59%
Direct analytical support to specific investigations by enforcement agencies
63% Field <u>investigative</u> support for current enforcement cases
43%
67 Field intelligence support to local law enforcement
78% $\boxed{62}$ Facilitate information exchange among the numerous law enforcement agencies 72%
58 Computerization of modus operandi data to recognize similar crimes in separate
regional areas 67%
Recognizing and targeting multi-jurisdictional criminal operations 59%
Specific training in intelligence-related topics 55%
39 Coordination of statewide law enforcement equipment and resources
Responding to inquiries for routine checks on subjects
9 Other (Please specify) 10%

2. If ACISA was made a division of the Attorney General's Office or the Department of Public Safety, how would this affect your cooperation with and use of the ACISA system? (Check one answer for D.P.S. and one for the A.G.)

<u>A.G.</u> <u>D</u>	.P.S.		Based on 77 responding to question
47	38	49%	Would not affect my cooperation or use (67.5%)
8	14	18%	Would increase the degree of my cooperation or use
13	15	19%	Would decrease the degree of my cooperation and use
4	10	13%	Would not cooperate or use the system
Please explain	the re	asons	for your answers.

If you have any questions regarding this survey questionnaire, please call Brent Nelson or Steve Thacker at (602) 255-4385.

Please return the completed survey by June 8, 1983, in the business-reply envelope to Office of the Auditor General, 111 W. Monroe, Suite 600, Phoenix, AZ 85003.