

REPORT ON SECURITY
ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
PREPARED FOR THE STATE OF ARIZONA
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL

Vincent M. Nathan

William H. Dallman

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PREFACE

On March 27, 2000, the Auditor General contracted with Nathan & Roberts, Ltd. for the conduct of a security audit at a number of penal facilities operated by the Arizona Department of Corrections ("ADC").

Specifically, the contractor agreed to perform the following services:

assess security systems and operations at selected Arizona state prison complexes ... to provide information to assist the Auditor General in determining if the ADC could strengthen security practices by modifying existing prison facilities and improving policies and procedures.

The contractor also agreed to conduct the assessment in accordance with the Auditor General's Request for Proposals, issued on February 3, 2000, and the contractor's proposal, dated February 21, 2000, in response to that Request for Proposals.

The proposal identified Vincent M. Nathan as the Project Manager for this project and indicated that Mr. Nathan and William H. Dallman would serve as members of the audit team conducting the assessment.

Mr. Nathan and Mr. Dallman reviewed voluminous documentation and inspected facilities at six ADC

complexes. Based on the information they obtained from these sources, Mr. Nathan and Mr. Dallman prepared the following report.

This report reflects its authors' views and opinions, and not those of the Office of the Auditor General. All references to "we" throughout the report identify Mr. Dallman, Mr. Nathan, or both.

I. Introduction

We began this project by conducting a telephone conference with the members of the Office of the Auditor General's office who assisted us at every stage: Audit Manager Shan Hays, Audit Senior Lisa Eddy, and Auditor II Mark Haldane. The audit team, consisting of these staff from the Auditor General's Office and the two of us, identified six complexes that would be the subject of on-site visits and determined the dates for those visits. We also concluded that we would identify at least one "focus unit" for a full-scale audit at each of the selected complexes, giving varying degrees of attention to other facilities at each such complex. We determined that we would base our choices of focus units at each complex on the impressions we gained during our general tour of the complex or on other factors that either we or other members of the audit team identified as warranting special attention to a particular facility. The following table identifies these complexes, the focus facilities the audit team agreed upon, the security level of inmates at the focus units, other facilities we visited at each complex, and the dates of our visits.

(Table follows on next page)

Facilities the Audit Team Visited

Complex	Focus Facility	Level of Inmate	Other Facilities Visited	Dates of Visits
ASPC-Lewis	Morey Unit	Level 4	Stiner Unit	4/3/00
	Stiner Unit (visiting)	Level 3 general population & Levels 2 & 3 protective segregation		4/8/00
ASPC-Florence	South Unit	Level 3	Central Unit East Unit Cellblock 6 North Unit	4/4/00 4/6/00
ASPC- Phoenix	Alhambra Unit	All levels (reception)	Aspen Unit	4/5/00
	Flamenco Unit	All levels (mental health)	ACW (mail & packages only)	4/7/00
ASPC - Douglas	Mohave Unit	Level 3	Papago Unit Detention Unit Maricopa Unit Gila Unit	5/1/00 5/2/00
ASPC - Tucson	Cimarron Unit	Level 4, with some Level 3	Complex Detention Unit Echo Unit Santa Rita Unit Rincon Unit Minors Unit St. Mary 's Hospital Prison Ward	5/4/00 5/5/00
ASPC - Eyman	SMU II	Level 5	Cook Unit	5/3/00

We also had an opportunity to meet with Terry L. Stewart, the Director of the ADC, and Charles L. Ryan, the Deputy Director for Prison Operations. During the course of our two trips to Arizona, we had

several occasions to meet with other members of the audit team and to exchange ideas and observations regarding the facilities we saw together.

Prior to and during the course of these on-site visits, we obtained extensive documentation regarding the ADC and each of the complexes we visited. This documentation included personnel rosters (both daily rosters and post charts), post orders relating to most security-sensitive posts, count sheets, incident reports relating to escapes, attempted escapes, homicides and injuries requiring hospitalization, as well as information regarding the ADC's current shift relief factor, authorized security staff complements, perimeter security inspections, interior security inspections, cell searches, and the use of special response teams. We also had the benefit of reviewing the November 1985 and May 1991 Performance Audit reports the Auditor General prepared regarding the ADC, a 1991 report concerning security practices within the ADC submitted to the Auditor General's Office by James D. Henderson and David E. Musacchio ("the 1991 report"), and the most recent annual audits conducted by ADC staff of each of the complexes we visited. Finally, the members of the audit team representing the Office of the Auditor General shared with us information and summaries of information they had gathered and analyzed regarding incidents at various prisons within the ADC, as well as other observations these staff had made during the course of their own visits to the institutions.

In summary, we enjoyed the benefit of enormous assistance in obtaining the information necessary for this report. Director Stewart, as well as complex and institutional administrators and staff, met every request we made for documents and for assistance; we enjoyed unfettered and unrestricted access to all physical facilities; and audit team members from the Office of the Auditor General went out of their way to facilitate every facet of the audit. As a result, we believe that we have gained a thorough understanding of the ADC's security policies and procedures and that we are in a position to offer sound opinions on that subject.

II. The Organization of the Arizona Department of Corrections

What follows is a brief description of the organization of the ADC as it relates to the provision of security. Three deputy directors (for health, prison operations, and administration) answer directly to the Director Stewart. The Deputy Director for Prison Operations supervises two regional operations directors – one for the southern region and another for the northern region. Each regional operations director, in turn, is responsible for supervising the wardens at all complexes within that director's region.

The chief executive officer of each complex is denominated a warden, and each complex consists of several prisons. For example, ASPC-Eyman consists of the following prisons (or "units"): Cook, Meadows, Rynning, SMU I, and SMU II. A deputy warden, assisted by an associate deputy warden at the larger units, administers each of these units. Like prisons in other jurisdictions, ADC units consist of a number of buildings, including cellblocks, dormitories, and support facilities. Thus, the position of deputy warden in Arizona is equivalent in all respects to that of warden in other jurisdictions with which we are familiar, and the position of warden in the ADC would be denominated complex manager (or some similar title) in most other correctional systems.

We include this description to assist the reader in understanding the physical scope of the complexes and individual prisons we visited, as well as the true nature of the responsibilities of persons serving as wardens and deputy wardens in Arizona.

III. The Role of Security in a Correctional System

A. General

Before turning to specific observations regarding security in ADC facilities, we wish to describe briefly the role of security in any correctional system, including the ADC. Sound security is the bedrock that supports all correctional functions. It affects the public safety by reducing to the greatest possible extent escapes from secure institutions; it contributes directly to the safety of staff and inmates; and it provides a safe and secure environment in which staff can provide essential services and useful programming to prisoners. In sum, a prison without effective security procedures and practices inevitably will harm prisoners, staff, and the public and will create an atmosphere of violence and predation.

B. The ADC's Inmate Classification System

Inmate classification is directly related to sound security. This is true because inmates presenting varying degrees of danger to the public, staff, and other inmates require different levels of supervision to ensure safe and secure correctional environments. Unless correctional officials can identify the degree of risk an inmate presents to the community, as well as the extent of danger the inmate presents to staff and to other prisoners in an institutional setting, the department will be unable to identify the appropriate level of security needed for that prisoner. The mis-classification of that prisoner, in turn, may endanger other inmates with whom he is housed, staff working in the institution in which the prisoner lives, or the general public. The only substitute for an effective classification system is the provision of the highest level of perimeter security and internal control for all prisoners - an impracticable and extremely costly arrangement.

The ADC has promulgated its classification policy in Department Order 801, effective September 1, 1996. This policy scores inmates on a number of traditional factors (*e.g.*, severity of current offense, prior institutional adjustment) to establish the each prisoner's public risk score and his institutional risk score. Each score ranges from 1 (lowest risk) to 5 (highest risk). Thus, an inmate who presents a significant risk

to the public, for example because of his use of a lethal weapon during the commission of a crime, but whose institutional adjustment during previous incarcerations has been unexceptional, may have a relatively high public risk score but a low institutional risk score, *e.g.*, 3-1. The department could house this hypothetical inmate in a facility with a secure perimeter to deter escape, but in a unit with a staffing level (and, thus, a degree of direct surveillance) appropriate for essentially non-problematic prisoners.

We are particularly impressed by the extent to which the ADC differentiates between public risk and institutional risk in scoring and ultimately classifying its inmates. The attempt by some other correctional systems to blend these factors in our opinion leads to a less useful classification indicator. This is true because the factors that suggest a high level of risk to the public in the event an inmate escapes do not lead directly to the conclusion that the prisoner will present serious management problems within a secure facility. Thus, the ADC's practice of using separate risk scores for these factors is one we commend.

We did not conduct an in-depth examination of the ADC's classification process. Department Order 801, however, identifies the factors most systems tend to use to identify risk factors. The order also establishes procedures for classification and reclassification that are consistent on their face with sound correctional practice. While we cannot vouch for the fact that the department is following all of these procedures, we can say that we saw no indication that the Arizona penal population is significantly misclassified. Such evidence might take the form of a high number of escapes, frequent inmate-on-staff violence, or frequent serious inmate-on-inmate violence. None of these phenomena characterize the ADC at this time.

IV. General Observations

During the course of this report, we shall address a number of discrete issues relating to security within the facilities we visited. At the outset, however, we have formed a number of general conclusions

about several fundamental issues that relate directly to the state of security within ADC institutions. We discuss these observations in this section of our report.

A. ADC Written Policies and Procedures

The ADC has developed, adopted, and promulgated correctional security policies that are equal to or that exceed accepted standards. These policies cover most areas of prison operations and practices. The ADC has policies addressing the management of armories, inmate counts, special incidents, security threat group (gang) responses, escapes, posts, and many other subjects. Central Office staff have communicated these policies to the managers of correctional facilities. To a large degree, these policies are in place and prison security operations reflect their mandates and impact. The ADC enforces its policies and procedures on a systemwide basis through annual internal (*i.e.*, departmental) audits to determine the level of compliance with departmental standards. As a result of this process, most complex wardens and unit deputy wardens are highly sensitive to audit processes and are attentive to compliance with departmental policies. This is not a system that promotes deviation in the operation of its prisons; to the contrary, the central office has exerted strong leadership and has succeeded in implementing excellent and largely uniform standards throughout the prisons. Complex and unit managers sometimes articulated their belief that their career success is directly related to the outcome of departmental (and perhaps external) audits conducted of their operations. We regard the ADC's internal audit policies and practices to be among the greatest strengths of this correctional system.

B. Staff Professionalism

Throughout the six complexes the audit team visited, we found clear and consistent indications of high employee morale and good employee training in applicable policies and procedures. Correctional officer training at this time consists of seven weeks of pre-service training plus one week annually of on-the-job training. The ADC intends to increase the length of pre-service training to eight weeks. Staff exhibited

knowledge of their duties, loyalty, and industriousness. Even while seeing staff operate under the stresses associated with understaffing, we did not observe negativism, hostility, or indifference on the part of employees. The vast majority of line staff behaved professionally and made a neat, clean, and well-groomed appearance.

C. Sanitary and Well-Maintained Physical Facilities

The ADC operates very clean prisons. We were very favorably impressed by the cleanliness and good sanitation we observed in all units we visited, including the older ones. Floors literally shined; walls were clean and well painted; eating areas, kitchens, restrooms and showers were sanitary; yards and grounds were beautifully landscaped and free of debris and trash; visiting rooms were pleasant and well appointed; and offices and assembly areas were clean and orderly. It was next to impossible for us to find litter, cigarette butts, or other forms of trash in plain sight in the complexes we visited. While these observations may appear to be of only peripheral relevance to security findings, we believe that cleanliness and sanitation are a reflection of high management standards and control in general and that the absence of good sanitation and cleanliness has a direct and negative impact on the behavior of prisoners and staff.

D. Inadequate Physical Facilities: Working With the Impossible

Without doubt, some of the physical facilities we encountered are inadequate for the correctional purposes they serve. These include the following:

1. Alhambra/Flamenco and Aspen Units at ASPC-Phoenix
2. South and North Units at ASPC-Florence

ASPC-Phoenix

Clearly, the most substandard physical plants within the ADC are the units that comprise ASPC-Phoenix. Located in the midst of a run-down area of Phoenix, this complex - built in approximately 1927 - is inadequate to process virtually all new male intakes into the system or to house chronically and acutely

mentally ill and other special need prisoners.¹ We understand that one of the department's highest capital spending priorities for several years has been the replacement of the Alhambra/Flamenco Unit, which is used, among other things, for reception, and we strongly endorse the department's position on this matter.

We observed one critically important problem at the Alhambra/Flamenco Unit that the Department should address immediately. The Baker Ward in this facility includes an acute mental health unit. We found 20 double-occupancy cells during the course of our tour. Each cell has a two-level bunk bed, an arrangement that can facilitate suicide attempts (*See Exhibit A, Photograph 1*). In fact, we learned that an inmate had committed suicide by hanging from the metal support of a top bunk only a few days before our visit. We urge that the replacement of these beds with one or two beds at the floor level be a highest priority in order to prevent the repetition of incidents of this type.

¹ The only male prisoners who do not pass through the reception center are persons under a sentence of death and juveniles convicted and sentenced as adults. The reception unit for female inmates is at ASPC-Perryville.

During the past decade, there has been a steady increase in the number of inmates the ADC processes through the reception center - from 6,919 in 1990 to 11,893 in 1999. As a result of this increase and a court order that limits the number of inmates that can be housed at Alhambra/Flamenco, the average length of stay has been reduced to ten to twelve days. This average includes everyone coming through the facility, including inmates under a non-capital sentence for first degree murder, who remain only long enough to be fingerprinted and photographed. Among the results of this shortened period for reception, most inmates are not routinely tested for tuberculosis until they reach their assigned housing units, and inmates are not routinely tested for HIV/AIDS.²

Even with the shortened period of stay at the reception center, the reception center has been unable to keep its population at or below its court-ordered capacity of 336 and, as a result, is experiencing serious crowding. On the day of our visit, we saw inmates convicted of DUI in a room with 21 mattresses on the floor, and we observed a very crowded adjacent room holding other types of reception inmates. These inmates, who had not necessarily completed the classification process and whose behavior thus was unpredictable because of unknown institutional risk levels, were living together on the floor in dangerously crowded conditions with virtually no opportunity for appropriate correctional surveillance.

Housing units in the Flamenco Unit, which houses chronically mentally ill prisoners, are designed with single and multiple occupancy rooms off long hallways. This configuration does not lend itself to direct surveillance on a continuous basis. Correctional officers must make rounds and conduct counts virtually without backup by other officers who can see or hear them. This is a particularly dangerous situation in

² Inmates are screened for tuberculosis (*i.e.*, inquiry is made regarding symptoms of active illness), but are not tested or x-rayed unless they are symptomatic. No HIV testing occurs at the reception center. Thus, testing for tuberculosis and HIV - when it occurs - is delayed until the inmate reaches his institution of assignment, thus increasing the likelihood of the spread of disease from infected inmates.

housing units for this type of prisoner, some of whom are regarded as “less stable.” Although less extreme, the inability to provide direct surveillance in housing units in the Aspen Unit is inadequate for the inmates housed there, as these prisoners’ cognitive, physical, or mental impairment makes them particularly vulnerable.

These criticisms notwithstanding, we must underscore the very favorable judgments we made of the quality of management at the ASPC-Phoenix. Despite the inadequacy of the physical facility with which they are coping, the Warden and the Deputy Wardens at this complex were accomplishing their correctional objectives (particularly reception) as effectively as anyone could under the circumstances. Moreover, the widespread evidence of sound maintenance, emphasis on cleanliness, and attractive grounds keeping - all of which characterized each of the ADC facilities we visited - were impressive.

ASPC-Florence (South Unit)

Another prime example of a dangerous and inadequate physical plant is the South Unit at ASPC-Florence. Housing units at this prison, which Mr. Henderson and Mr. Musacchio criticized in their 1991 report, generally consist of four dormitories connected by a single corridor, forming the shape of an H. These housing units are among the most dangerous the consultants have observed, requiring the housing unit officer to isolate himself during rounds and counts in dormitories in which beds are separated by visibility-impairing, 43½” high partitions. We asked one housing unit officer how he felt about making rounds in these housing units. Understandably, he responded, “I’m kind of frightened to do it.”

Mr. Henderson and Mr. Musacchio also noted the problem with this unit’s configuration in their 1991 report. Yet, no changes in this configuration have occurred in the intervening nine years.

ASPC-Florence (North Unit)

The North Unit at this complex includes 40 tents that serve as housing units. Surveillance of these housing units, even though they hold only Level 2 inmates, is too restricted. This is true because roving

officers cannot see into these tents unless they enter them during rounds or counts. In this respect, tents are like open dormitories of any kind; these housing units require continuous surveillance from a floor officer and/or a control room officer. Apart from these problems, staff reported serious problems related to maintenance and water leakage.

Unlike tents we observed in other facilities, a legislative mandate requires the tents in the North Unit to be part of the ADC's permanent inventory of beds. While it is unfortunate to have to resort to tents even to accommodate rapid population expansion, it is all the more troublesome to treat these makeshift housing units as permanent beds. The department also has tents at other units but has designated these tents as temporary beds and will discontinue their use when they are no longer needed to deal with the increased penal population. We believe the same should be true with respect to the tents at the North Unit.

E. Problematic Physical Facilities: Doing More With Less

The problems related to physical plant we have described in the immediately preceding section are by no means the only issues of this nature within the ADC. We were most favorably impressed, however, by the ability of ADC managers to maintain and make productive use of other physical facilities that, in most systems, would be altogether unusable. A good example is the quonset huts at the East Unit at ASPC-Florence. Each quonset hut holds between nine and eleven inmates. Ongoing surveillance of these units is not possible, limiting observation to that which occurs during irregular rounds. The 1991 Henderson/Musacchio report also noted the undesirable nature of these units. When we saw them, however, the housing units were well-maintained and clean and appeared to be at least marginally adequate for inmates with low institutional risk scores.

Another example of doing more with less is the operation of the Echo Unit at ASPC-Tucson. The Henderson/Musacchio report described those housing units as follows:

Echo unit is of modular construction similar to house trailers, totally inadequate, but helping to meet the overcrowding problem of the system. The Consultants realize that these units replaced tents, so they do constitute an improvement. These trailers were well-maintained and good in appearance, but still must be considered temporary, since it is inevitable that normal deterioration and wear and tear will more quickly act on these structures than on typical prison construction.³

While we agree with Messrs Henderson and Musacchio that these housing units are far from ideal, the fact of the matter is that the predicted deterioration had not occurred as of the date of our visit. These units remained clean, neat, and well-maintained. So long as these maintenance efforts continue, we believe that these housing units can continue to be used safely for the time being for Level 2 inmates.

Ultimately, we recommend that the department replace the quonset hut housing units at the East Unit and the modular housing units at the Echo Unit. Given the other more pressing capital priorities we have described in the immediately preceding section of this report, however, we believe that the replacement of the housing units at the East Unit and the Echo Unit is less urgent. In the interim, we strongly encourage the ADC to increase staffing at these units so as to provide increased direct surveillance of inmates in occupied units. One correctional officer is responsible for a cluster of seven discrete quonset huts at the East Unit; at the Echo Unit, one correctional officer is responsible for three dormitories with which he has very limited visual contact from the control room. All rounds and counts at both units occur outside the sight or sound of other staff members.

Complex and unit administrators also are getting more for less from physical facilities at ASPC-Douglas. The Papago Unit for DUI offenders at that complex consists of two former motels. This facility,

³ 1991 Report at 35.

which is surrounded by a wall and fencing, is in downtown Douglas, Arizona. Prisoners are primarily classified at Level 2, though some are at Level 3. Several hundred of these inmates work in the local community providing labor for local government agencies, and the remainder work within the compound.

When prisoners are not at work, they must participate in restorative and educational programs. The town of Douglas reportedly is happy with its relationship with the prison, and the facility has received awards from various civic and governmental entities in Douglas for community services. Local government agencies report that the prison has provided the equivalent of several million dollars in labor; at the same time, inmates have the opportunity to do meaningful work, learn skills, and perhaps gain abilities and habits that will help them succeed upon their release from prison.

Converted hotel rooms in the Papago Unit typically house four prisoners under adequate conditions (See Exhibit A, Photograph 2). Since the majority of inmates from this unit work outside of the prison perimeter and since they are assumed to have substance abuse problems, all prisoners receive drug tests at least once per month. Failure rates are not high, as might be expected from this level of exposure to the community. Of 340 inmates tested, approximately 15 inmates per month fail drug testing, and prisoners failing a test experience an immediate loss of privileges. Specifically, they are allowed only non-contact visiting, are disqualified from working on outside work crews, and receive a disciplinary report that results in an increased institutional risk score that may ultimately require transfer to a higher custody unit.

No escapes have occurred from the Papago Unit during the past year. Staff make frequent checks on prisoners working in the community, with no more than 120 minutes elapsing between checks. Because of the facility's location within the city and in view of the absence of any buffer zone around its perimeter, there exists a substantial chance that contraband can be tossed over the perimeter wall and fence. Nevertheless, the facility has had few significant incidents in the recent past. Construction of a new and modern facility - perhaps at the cost of tens of millions of dollars - might eliminate some of these problems

or potential problems. It is doubtful, however, that the statistics and success rate of the facility would improve significantly.

F. Security Staffing

1. Introduction

There are three essential components to appropriate security staffing of a correctional facility. The first of these is an accurate and comprehensive post analysis that identifies all posts requiring staff and determines the days and shifts during which employees must fill these posts.⁴ The second is the development of an accurate shift relief factor that will identify the actual number of employees needed to fill all identified posts, including those that operate seven days a week, 24 hours a day. Finally, the department must recruit and train sufficient employees to provide the level of coverage the results of the post analysis and the application of a correct shift relief factor require. To date, we do not believe that the ADC has fully accomplished these tasks.

2. Comprehensive Post Analysis

Although we did not attempt to make a thorough analysis of all aspects of the adequacy of the post analysis upon which the ADC bases its post charts, we saw several units that clearly required additional posts. One example was the H-shaped dormitories at the South Unit at ASPC-Florence, the focus institution we selected at that complex. As we have noted in the section of this report concerning inadequate physical

⁴ Typically, a correctional system's post analysis will identify some posts as "mandatory," meaning that they must always be filled, and others as "pull-posts." A pull-post is one that the facility manager may leave unfilled or may vacate in order to fill a mandatory post without the use of overtime. The routine failure to fill pull-posts, however, negates the fundamental purpose of the post analysis, which is to identify posts the institution requires to accomplish its mission relative to security, services, and programming.

facilities, the configuration of the dormitories in this unit is such that the assignment of only one officer to each housing unit is unsafe. Furthermore, the officer assigned to the Yucca dormitory at the South Unit also is responsible for gate control at Gate 26. Although a control room officer can operate this gate, the housing unit officer from the Yucca dormitory must open the gate to admit inmates to the dormitory unit so that he can make a proper identification. We observed the housing unit officer performing these duties, which took him away from his unit of assignment for a considerable period of time.

We also have concerns about the posts the ADC has allocated to the Echo Unit at ASPC-Tucson and the East Unit at ASPC-Florence. The physical configurations of the housing units in these facilities argue for a reassessment of the posts identified as being necessary for these unit. As we have indicated, the modular housing units at the Echo Unit and the quonset huts at the East Unit do not permit adequate direct surveillance of the prisoners assigned to these facilities. Although truly adequate staffing of these units would be cost-prohibitive, some increase is needed to improve the level of safety of staff and prisoners.

We saw other areas, *e.g.*, Cellblock 7 and Cellblock 5 at the Central Unit, where we believe that the allocated posts were insufficient even to provide minimally adequate surveillance and security. The approved complement for each of these buildings - two control room officers, one floor officer, and one escort officer - would not be sufficient for buildings of these multi-floor housing units with four tiers of cells on each side of the building.

There are other problems we observed that suggest the need for a comprehensive reevaluation of the ADC's current list of authorized posts. For example, we noted the absence of a permanent security post in the kitchen that serves ASPC-Phoenix. In addition, during our visit to the Baker Ward at the Alhambra/Flamenco Unit a floor officer had to leave his post to provide rooftop armed surveillance of prisoners from another unit exercising on the yard.

Because of the obvious need to reassess the staffing pattern at virtually all the institutions we visited, as well as because of acute staffing shortages at several large ADC complexes, we believe that a logical starting point for the department's resolution of its security staffing problem is the conduct of a comprehensive, zero-based post analysis. Although it is obvious that the department has conducted this exercise in the past in order to produce its current post charts reflecting every post in priority order, the ADC should repeat this process periodically. There may be some reductions in posts that the department can realize at various institutions, including those we did not evaluate during the course of our audit. In the end, however, we feel strongly that the analysis we are recommending is likely to show the need for a net increase in authorized posts.

3. Shift Relief Factor

The Department should apply a realistic shift relief factor to the results of its new post analysis. A "shift relief factor" results from the calculation of the number of days during a year an employee actually will work. The resulting number is divided into 365 in order to determine the relief factor, which is the number of staff required to fill one post for one shift, seven days a week. The ADC has calculated its shift relief factor as follows for seven-day posts:

365 days
- <u>104 days</u> (regular days off)
261 days
- <u>10 days</u> (annual leave)
251 days
- <u>10 days</u> (sick leave)
241 days
- <u>10 days</u> (holidays)
231 days
- <u>5 days</u> (training)
226 days

This calculation indicates that ADC correctional staff, on average, work 226 days per year. Thus, the shift relief factor for the department will be $365 / 226 = 1.62$. Using this relief factor, one makes the following calculation to determine how many staff are required to fill a seven-day post on all three shifts - a typical housing unit post: 3 shifts x 1 post x 1.62 = 4.86 staff. This is the number the ADC uses for critical security posts such as housing unit security officers and floor officers.⁵

In addition, the ADC has calculated a 1.3 shift relief factor for selected five-day, eight-hour posts to ensure the full-time presence of an officer. This figure is in line with shift relief factors we have seen in other systems for five-day, eight-hour posts. Examples of such posts are the accountability/movement security officer, the armorer, and an escort security officer. The department applies a lower shift relief factor to other five-day, eight-hour posts, such as the fire/safety security officer and the hazardous materials security officer.

The ADC's shift relief factors do not rely on historical data specifically related to the agency. Instead, these shift relief factors apply the number of days the department allocates for annual leave, sick leave, holidays, and training. The department could not provide evidence of any study of its actual departmental experience in any of these areas or of other factors such as military leave patterns that are likely to be relevant.

⁵ See Arizona Department of Corrections Post List of Uniformed Personnel (November 5, 1998).

The ADC shift relief factor is lower than any we have encountered in any correctional system, and administrators (including the Warden) at ASPC-Florence confirmed our evaluation that the ADC's shift relief factor is unrealistically low.

The ADC has incorporated its shift relief factors into Director's Instruction 108, which establishes, *inter alia*, four correctional officer staffing levels. These are the following: Level D (lockdown); Level C (restricted operations); Level B (reduced operations); and Level A (full operations). Post charts developed for each complex, as well as for each institution within the complex, identify - in descending order of priority - the posts necessary to achieve each of these levels.

During the course of our on-site visits, we encountered some **units**, *e.g.*, at ASPC-Douglas, that were operating at Level B staffing, we encountered no **complex**, however, that was operating above Level C staffing. ASPC-Eyman was operating with Level C staffing on the date of our visit. According to the Warden of the complex, this is typically the case. The same was true of ASPC-Phoenix at the time of our inspection of that complex. According to the Warden, staffing has not exceeded Level C for the past ten months. We also learned that the Cimarron Unit, the focus unit we selected at ASPC-Tucson, was operating at Level C at the time of our visit. According to the Warden, this is typically the case at that prison. The Central Unit at ASPC-Florence was operating below Level D and the remainder of the complex was at Level D.

4. High Vacancies

Thus, it appears that the ADC has neither identified all necessary posts nor applied a correct shift relief factor to calculate the number of security employees it needs to fill those posts. Compounding these problems is the fact that the department is encountering severe problems related to its vacancy rates at several of its complexes. This problem is particularly acute at ASPC-Florence and ASPC-Eyman, both of

which are located in the small town of Florence, Arizona. In addition, the inability to attract security staff in sufficient numbers has made it impossible for the ADC to open half of the housing units at ASPC-Lewis, one of the most modern and well-designed complexes in the state. The table that follows identifies the vacancy rate at each of the complexes we visited, as well as the systemwide vacancy rate, as of March 13, 2000:

Vacancy Rates by Complex and Systemwide

Institution	Authorized	On-Site	Difference	Actual %	Out on Leave	Operational % Difference
Florence	824	706	118	14.32	17	16.39
Eyman	1177	974	203	17.25	8	17.93
Lewis	1109	486	623	56.18	1	56.27
Phoenix	217	204	13	5.99	5	8.30
Tucson	891	855	36	4.04	11	5.28
Douglas	436	412	24	5.51	1	5.74
System	6,417	5,289	1,128	17.58	68	18.64

These vacancy rates are a matter of great concern, particularly at the Florence, Eyman, and Lewis complexes. The inability to attract staff to ASPC-Lewis has delayed the opening of 1,830 critically needed beds for higher security prisoners. Moreover, the situation we observed at the Central Unit at ASPC-Florence during our April 4 tour was dangerous for staff and for essentially unobserved prisoners.

The staffing numbers we observed in the Yard Office at the Central Unit on April 4 are even more problematic than those reflected for the complex in the March 13, 2000 report set forth above. The data on the board in the Yard Office indicated that 20 (or 26%) of 77 allocated correctional officers for the day shift were vacant; that 15 (19%) of 77 allocated correctional officers for the swing shift were vacant; and that 7 (11%) of 64 allocated correctional officers for the graveyard shift were vacant. Although the Warden

explained that additional staff can be pulled from other (non-security) posts, these vacancy levels - particularly those during the first two shifts - are the most significant staffing deficit either of us has ever encountered in any prison, let alone one like the Central Unit that houses high security prisoners.

As the following table reflects, the vacancy rate for Correction Officer II positions was greater at the Central Unit than it was at any other unit of the ASPC-Florence Complex:

**Correctional Officer Vacancies at the Central Unit
(March 27, 2000)**

UNIT	AUTHORIZED	ON-SITE	DIFF.	% VAC	LWOP	OPER. % DIFF.
Complex CO II	66	65	1	1.52	4	17.58
Central CO II	247	206	41	16.6	6	19.03
CB-6 CO II	80	75	5	6.25	1	7.5
North CO II	154	131	23	14.94	1	15.58
Pichacho CO II	35	34	1	2.86	0	2.86
South CO II	116	98	18	15.52	0	15.52
East CO II	117	99	18	15.38	2	17.09
Totals CO II	815	708	107	13.13	14	14.85

During our April 4, 2000 tour we observed several problems resulting from the high vacancy rate at the Central Unit. In Cellblock 3 of that unit, we observed one correctional officer who was responsible for eight tiers of cells, four on each side of the building. The second floor officer 's post for this building was

vacant. In addition, as noted previously, one correctional officer was serving as the floor officer for all of Cellblock 7 and all of Cellblock 5 at the time of our visit to those units. This officer was responsible for 16 tiers of cells.

According to the August 3, 1999 post chart for that unit, the minimum staffing required for Level D operation at the Central Unit is 36 correctional officers. In fact, the day shift roster for the Central Unit on April 4, the date of our visit, reflected eight vacant posts among the 36 that constitute Level D staffing: Cellblock 1 Escort, Cellblock 3 Escort; Cellblock 4 Basement Control, Cellblock 5 Upper Control, Cellblock 7 Upper Control, Cellblock 7 Floor, Law Library 1, Law Library 2. The post chart for the Central Unit identifies all these positions as mandatory for Level D operation. At the time of our visit, staff were covering two additional positions, Tower 5 and Tower 4, which the post chart reflects as Level C posts. Thus, the Central Unit was operating at a sub-minimum level with 30 security staff B the number we counted as we toured the unit.

Staffing below the minimum level clearly compromises essential security functions. According to Director's Instruction 108, Level D "will require inmate activity to be drastically reduced." At the complex level, this staffing complement provides "minimal support for communications, traffic and key control, the armory, perimeter patrol, laundry operations, emergency inmate transportation, and other unique security operations ..." In prison units themselves, Level D permits "minimal support for accountability, control rooms, gates and towers, to ensure inmate control in housing units, health units, kitchens and on the yards, and other unique security operations (detention, etc.)"

5. Recruitment Difficulties

The ADC is making strenuous efforts to address the problems it is encountering in employing the number of security staff it has identified as being necessary, even in the absence of the comprehensive post

analysis and the revised shift relief factor we believe to be needed. A 10% stipend is in effect at ASPC-Florence, ASPC-Eyman, and ASPC-Lewis for correctional officers to supplement the starting salary of \$23,500. The department is engaging in massive recruitment efforts in Texas and New Mexico and is offering van transportation from major metropolitan areas such as Phoenix to ASPC-Florence and ASPC-Eyman. Approximately 600 correctional officers are participating in this program at this time. Apart from these efforts, the department has developed a "cross-leveling" system, pursuant to which "excess" security staff are moved from one unit to another within a given complex. This device, as well as the temporary assignment to mandated security posts of officers whose regular assignment is to five-day, eight-hour shifts, is intended to ensure that all units meet minimal security staffing levels and to even out gross disparities among units within the complex. In summary, the ADC recognizes that it has a serious problem in this area and is taking steps to address it. To date, however, those efforts have not been sufficient to overcome the obstacles of relatively low compensation in a generally quite good economy, particularly with respect to employment at prisons located near urban areas but too far away for convenient commuting.

In summary, despite the ADC's highly commendable efforts to address the issue, understaffing is the single most substantial operational difficulty we found during our evaluation. This understaffing and the inadequate physical facilities that we have discussed above are the department's most serious systemic security problems.

On a positive note, ADC security staff on the morning (graveyard) shift work ten hours, permitting an overlap for briefings with the shifts that precede and follow the graveyard shift. An exception is ASPC-Phoenix, where all three shifts work eight hours. Warden Hood has asked for the conversion of the graveyard shifts at all units within ASPC-Phoenix to permit this needed communication between shifts.

Another positive observation we made is that staff were actually present on the posts to which they were assigned. In all cases, a post the daily shift roster showed as being filled in fact had an officer at that post or there was a satisfactory explanation for the assigned officer 's temporary absence from that post.

V. Specific Observations Regarding Selected Security Issues

A. Armories, Firearms, and Chemical Munitions

The firearms and chemical munitions the ADC has chosen are widely used and are popular with both correctional systems and law enforcement agencies. The Glock pistol, the Colt AR-15 rifle, and the Remington 870 shotgun are wise choices. They are safe and reliable weapons. Both male and female employees can handle and control them, and training in the use of these weapons is not overly difficult.

All ADC staff who may be armed during the performance of their duties receive firearms training. Staff must pass a proficiency and safe handling process meeting ADC standards in order to be certified as weapons-qualified. Successful completion of this process results in the issuance of a laminated card attesting to the staff member 's qualifications. Employees must display this card whenever they are issued a firearm. All employees to whom we spoke about their qualifications were able to produce their qualification cards, and all such employees were able to articulate weapons policies and accepted use of force standards. In summary, the use of firearms qualifications cards is an excellent procedure.

We evaluated armories at ASPC-Lewis, ASPC-Florence, ASPC-Phoenix, ASPC-Douglas, ASPC-Eyman, and ASPC-Tucson. We found the conditions in these armories to be excellent; indeed, they were free of any significant deficiencies. All armories were secure, clean, and managed by an officer trained in the maintenance, care, control, and regulation of firearms, ammunition, and chemical agents. Entry at all armories was restricted to a small number of authorized personnel. Entries were sally-ported, and inventories of firearms, ammunition, chemicals, and other assorted security equipment were accurate.

Armory officers maintain logs of all issued equipment, and these logs were accurate at the time of our inspections. All firearms were clean and well-maintained, and sufficient numbers of weapons and ample supplies of chemicals and ammunition were present. The armory officers rotate ammunition and weapons on a regular basis and pull and identify equipment found to be in need of repair in order to prevent its issuance. Sniper equipment is secured in locked gun storage containers to prevent anyone but the assigned sniper from handling or tampering with the sniper rifle.

Rifles and shotguns at ASPC-Florence revealed more wear than was the case elsewhere. Moreover, we noted one weapons-related issue at ASPC-Florence that, while constituting a single incident not symptomatic of a department-wide problem, nonetheless had the potential for causing a disaster. The officer assigned to Tower 1, which overlooks the yard and sally port to the Central Unit, set his AR-15 rifle on a narrow stool only inches from the edge of the wall. A slight accidental nudge would have sent the weapon over the wall into an area where at least one prisoner was working. Tower and perimeter officers should keep their weapons in hand, attached to them by a sling, or in a rack at all times.

This exception notwithstanding, the practices relating to armories, firearms, and chemical munitions at the facilities we visited were excellent.

B. Control of Contraband

Fundamental to prison security is the prevention of access by prisoners to weapons, drugs, intoxicants, money, and a host of other items and materials that can compromise the control of prisoners and the safety of inmates, staff, and the public. The volume of contraband, like that of vandalism and graffiti, tends to be a barometer of the effectiveness of prison security. Successful contraband control relates to many issues and security operations. Staff's honesty and their ongoing adherence to sound security policies are completely essential. Because defending against a corrupt employee who is willing to convey contraband

into a prison facility is exceptionally difficult, careful screening and training of employees is important.⁶

Training must ensure, among other things, that employees know how to identify and search for contraband.

Numerous policies and practices directly affect the extent of contraband that is available (or likely to be available) to prisoners. Some of the more important of these are the following:

- limiting what prisoners are allowed to receive through the U.S. Postal Service
- limiting the property visitors may bring into the prison;
- making effective searches of mailed items and materials visitors carry with them;
- using drug dogs and drug scanning equipment for detecting drugs in the possession of inmates, visitors, and staff;
- using metal detectors to avoid the introduction of weapons or the possession of metal from which prisons can fabricate weapons;
- employing sound operations at sally port or vehicle entry ports;
- making regular searches of work and housing areas;
- making frequent searches of prisoners;
- closely observing visitors during visits with inmates;
- maintaining accurate inventories of tools and hazardous materials capable of being used as weapons;
- controlling the use of dangerous medications and the accessibility of caustics and chemicals;

⁶ On this subject, we were particularly impressed to note that the ADC conducts background checks on all civilian hospital workers who enter the prison ward at St. Mary=s Hospital in Tucson. This is an excellent practice.

- maintaining sound tool control and key control practices; and
- eliminating or regulating metals, hard plastics, and other materials that inmates can convert or use to manufacture contraband items.

Although all prisons encounter contraband-related problems to some degree, we did not find evidence that the ADC experiences an unusual quantity of contraband within its prisons, and we observed a number of anti-contraband activities during our visits. Staff inspect all mail outside the presence of any inmate workers, and the department imposes stringent and appropriate limits on property prisoners may possess. Departmental Order 909, which became effective in late 1999, proscribes all incoming packages, but permits inmates to spend larger sums of money to purchase goods from the commissary during the Christmas holidays. The property an inmate may have is related to his classification level and the custody/security level of his unit of assignment.

Certain practices that are in effect make it easier for staff to search property, *e.g.*, limiting inmates to television sets with clear plastic bodies that are sold through the commissary. Inmates in prison when Departmental Order 909 took effect, however, may keep their older television sets with opaque casings under a grandfather clause until October 2002.

Although the ADC does not use drug-testing devices such as the Ion Scan 400 machine, except in a pilot “zero tolerance” program at ASPC-Perryville, the department relies extensively on drug-detection dogs. While sophisticated drug testing equipment such as the Ion Scan 400 machine is a security enhancement, this equipment is certainly not as versatile or as able to cover large areas as rapidly as can dogs. When we monitored visiting at the Stiner Unit at ASPC-Lewis, we observed the proper use of drug-detection dogs to search all visitors, prison employees, and other persons entering the facility. Staff closely monitored prisoners and visitors during visits at the Stiner Unit. When an inmate required the use of the restroom

during his visit, an officer accompanied him. After the visit and prior to leaving the visiting area, each inmate underwent a strip-search, and we noted that staff used proper strip-search techniques. Staff informed us that at the close of visiting, they thoroughly search the visiting room and use the drug-detection dogs to assist in these searches.

Records we reviewed and statements we heard from staff indicate that tactical squads conduct searches of all housing areas at least quarterly, and more often if facility administrators deem it necessary to do so. At all but one complex, the warden expects officers assigned to housing areas to conduct cell searches on a random and probable cause basis. In actual practice, however, the number of such searches appears to be insufficient. When questioned, most housing area officers claimed that although they conducted random and targeted cell searches, their numerous other duties and depressed staffing levels prevented as many searches as they felt would be desirable. This problem was particularly evident at the Central Unit at ASPC-Florence, where understaffing was most severe. We entered four randomly selected cells in Building 5 and found nuisance contraband in plain sight in all four of these cells. Despite the small size of this sample, our findings indicate insufficient attention to the enforcement of cell restrictions and to the conduct of searches (*See Exhibit A, Photograph 3*).

Indeed, it appears that housing unit officers, as a matter of policy, do not conduct cell searches at least at the Central Unit, and perhaps throughout ASPC-Florence. One of the chief responsibilities of housing unit officers should be to search a number of cells on a random basis on every shift during which inmates are awake.

Cell Search Tracking Sheets and a Cell Search Log we reviewed indicate that approximately 10% of the cells at the Central Unit undergo a shakedown each week. In addition, in March staff searched 12 additional cells in Cellblock 1. In our opinion, this number is insufficient; it also strikes us as being

noncompliant with the spirit of the department 's own written policy. Department Order 708.01 mandates that "(s)earches of common access and living areas are conducted as part of the daily operation of the institution." In fact, however, an inmate has a good chance of going ten weeks without experiencing a shakedown of his cell. In all likelihood, inmates are aware of these odds and behave accordingly.

Prisoners often are very clever and resourceful in adapting pieces of ordinary hardware or scrap into weapons. Pieces of sheet metal that prisoners can break off or separate, as well as rigid wire, often become weapons or tools to aid in escape or other misdeeds.. We noted significant efforts, particularly in the higher security units, to control such material. The prompt disposal of scrap materials, the extensive use of locked cabinets and closets, and frequent inspections of storage areas for such materials were among the most significant of these efforts. The emphasis on securing items that prisoners could misuse extended as well to the control of restraint equipment. In the Detention Unit at the ASPC-Douglas, for example, staff had padlocked handcuffs and leg irons to their storage rack, even though the storage area itself was a controlled one (*See Exhibit B, Photograph 4*).

In summary, we found that the ADC 's efforts to control the introduction of contraband are fundamentally sound. Nonetheless, the inability of security staff to conduct sufficiently frequent random searches of housing areas, at least at some units, was the most significant deficiency we noted. This is a serious shortcoming, which we encourage the department to address promptly. Quarterly searches by tactical teams are not sufficient to control inmates ' possession of contraband; to the contrary, the practice of engaging in random shakedowns of some cells and other living areas on all shifts every day should cause each inmate to feel a credible threat of a shakedown of his living area during every day of his incarceration.

On a related subject, we inquired of a member of the Criminal Investigation Unit at ASPC-Lewis regarding the maintenance and ultimate disposal of the contraband staff seize. Based on that conversation,

we are satisfied that staff treat such contraband properly by logging it, storing it in a secure area, and maintaining a chain of evidence report. Seized contraband is not available to anyone other than those persons responsible for its storage and disposition, and Departmental Order 909 specifies the proper procedures for the ultimate disposal of contraband.

C. Control Centers

We evaluated numerous control centers at all the complexes we visited. Apart from several exceptions we discuss below, we found no significant problems. The control centers in the Special Management Unit II at ASPC-Eyman are particularly impressive and serve as models for maximum security architecture (*See Exhibit A, Photograph 5*). All the control centers we visited at all facilities were clean and orderly. Staff had stored security and safety gear properly, and officers issuing keys from these centers maintained keys in cabinets and lockers and otherwise practiced good key control procedures. (*See Exhibit A, Photograph 6*). We found activity logs, post orders, and inventories in order in all control centers. Officers posted to these centers could articulate the duties of their job, could quickly locate reference material, and were attentive to monitors, alarms, and communication equipment.

Line-of-sight observation from several control rooms was poor. One example of this problem is the Santa Rita Unit at ASPC-Tucson (*See Exhibit A, Photograph 7*). This facility, which houses Level 3 inmates, offers a poor line of sight into housing unit areas from the control rooms. The inability to staff all control rooms exacerbates this problem, leaving some housing unit officers with no back-up surveillance of any kind. The physical design also creates blind spots into which neither the control room officer nor the

housing unit officer can see easily. In addition, the control rooms at this unit are not sally-ported or double-doored, increasing the risk that someone could make a forced entry when the single door is opened.⁷

Likewise, as we have noted above, observation from control rooms in the South Unit "H" shaped dormitory buildings at ASPC - Florence is very poor.

The main control center at the Cimarron Unit does not have a pass-through port; as a result, staff must open the control room door whenever they issue or receive items. Additionally, there is inadequate regulation of staff who can enter this post. We found no list of persons authorized to enter the control room. When questioned, the officer assigned to the control center said that any employee who wanted in would be admitted.

The control center at the Cimarron Unit maintains a list of telephone numbers of all employees. At the time of our visit, however, the list did not include the number for the recently-employed deputy warden for the facility. Staff in the control room also informed us that checks of alarm systems occur only on the graveyard shift and not on every shift, as they should.

At our request, the deputy warden of ASPC-Tucson ordered a DART (Designated Armed Response Team) exercise. This exercise required the members and the leader of the team to enter the control room through a locked grill gate to put on protective equipment and to draw weapons. Because members of the team reached the control room from their regular posts throughout the unit at different times, the control room officer had to open and close motorized corridor gates repeatedly, open and close

⁷ On a positive note, there are five large and separate outside fenced areas at the Santa Rita Unit to hold groups of inmates in the event of a disturbance, fire, or other emergency.

the control room door for each team member, issue weapons, and attend to other tasks. As a result, this officer clearly was overwhelmed, and the entry of team members into the control room was unnecessarily delayed. Consequently, considerable time was lost getting the DART squad equipped, out of the control center, and into action - a delay that could have disastrous consequences in the event of an actual emergency. If assigning a second officer to the control center on a full-time basis is not feasible, we strongly recommend the assignment of another officer to the DART unit to assist the control center officer during a DART response.

At the Central Unit at ASPC-Florence, cellblock control centers in Cellblock 5 and Cellblock 7 are designed to permit simultaneous observation of two floors of cells. Although upper control room officers and lower control room officers are mandated Level D posts, only one officer was present in each of these control rooms at the time of our tour. As a result, the control room officer could not provide adequate surveillance of both floors, particularly since that officer must open entry gates to the buildings. As we have noted earlier, this situation is all the more dangerous in view of the fact that there is not a floor officer present on all floors (or even in the building) at all times.

D. Post Orders

We found post orders on all the posts when we inquired about this matter during our visits to various facilities. With only two exceptions, all staff of whom we inquired had read their post orders and indicated such by making a log entry with the frequency required. One control center officer in the Central Unit and a yard officer with whom we spoke at the South Unit of ASPC-Florence were the only officers we encountered in any ADC facility who had not made the necessary review of the orders for their posts. Some facilities, *e.g.*, ASPC-Florence and some units at ASPC-Tucson, require that employees read the post orders every day; others require that employees certify that they have read their post orders every 30 days.

We reviewed a number of post orders and found them to be complete and relevant. They provide staff with the knowledge they require to fulfill the responsibilities of the post. They also provide useful instructions as to the steps staff should take during various types of emergencies. In summary, we consider the development and dissemination of post orders to be one of the ADC's greatest strengths in the area of security.

E. Inmate Counts

Director's Instruction #42, issued on April 4, 1997, requires that formal inmate counts be "conducted at least once each shift." The Instruction defines a "formal count" as "(a) physical or identification card count of all inmates conducted at a specified time, recorded, reported to and confirmed by the designated accountability officer." Instruction #42 also requires that informal counts "shall be conducted at the direction of the shift commander and may (1) include any segment of the inmate population, (2) be either a physical or identification card count, and (3) be recorded on the appropriate AIMS count sheet." The Instruction defines an "informal count" as "(r)andom and periodic checks of the inmate population to determine if all inmates are present and to monitor their well-being."

Thus, it appears to us that the principal difference between formal and informal counts is that the former are complex-wide and that the results of formal counts are recorded and reconciled on a complex-wide basis. This being the case, we do not agree with the recommendation of the Henderson/Musacchio report that the department should mandate five official counts in each facility.⁸ We do believe, however,

⁸ 1991 Report at 78.

that all inmates should be subject to a formal or informal count, as those terms are used by the ADC, at least five times each day, and that at least one formal count should occur on each shift.

All units we visited were complying with the requirements of Director's Instruction #42. Warden Parin at ASPC-Tucson informed us that staff conduct five formal counts in addition to at least three informal counts at the Cimarron Unit each day. Warden Hood informed us that staff conduct four formal counts in addition to informal counts on a daily basis at ASPC-Phoenix.

We observed physical counts at several units, including the East Unit at ASPC-Florence, the Flamenco Unit at ASPC-Phoenix, the Mojave Unit at ASPC-Douglas, and the Echo Unit at ASPC-Tucson. With one exception, all were without problems: we believe that too many inmates were on out-count status on a grounds keeping detail during the count we observed at the Echo Unit.

We noted that record keeping in connection with counts is appropriate. Employees do not know in advance the number of inmates they are expected to count, thereby minimizing the likelihood that staff will report that number without actually conducting the count. Generally, counts appear to be completed and reconciled quickly, without infringing on other prison routines.

The ADC is experimenting with a new device for inmate accountability that offers great promise. The PASS system in use at the Cook Unit at ASPC-Eyman employs a bracelet that inmates wear on their wrist. If the inmate attempts to remove or otherwise tamper with the bracelet, it sounds an alarm on a monitoring computer. When perfected, the system will permit staff to identify an inmate by the image his bracelet creates on a computer screen. This system has potential applicability to the conduct of counts, the discovery of escape attempts, the identification of inmates involved in altercations, and many other features of correctional security. Though far from perfected at this time, the PASS system, if it comes to function

reliably, will represent a technological leap of enormous consequence in the area of inmate accountability in general and the surveillance of prisoners in particular.

F. Body Alarms

The ADC provides high-quality radios to its security staff. Unlike many correctional systems, however, the ADC does not distribute body alarms to correctional officers. Body alarms send an emergency signal to a central location whenever something triggers the alarm. This may occur, for example, when the officer pushes a button on the alarm.

The ADC is experimenting at the Cook Unit at ASPC-Eyman with an electronic personal alarm system manufactured by Technology Systems International, Inc. This device includes a button the officer can push to activate an alarm, as well as a cord that sends an alarm if someone (presumably an inmate) pulls it in an effort to gain control of the device. This system also includes a "man-down" feature, which is useful when an officer is disabled and unable to activate an alarm by pushing a button. Whenever a staff member wearing an alarm with this feature assumes a horizontal or near-horizontal position, the device emits an emergency signal; thus, the correctional terminology for these devices is "man-down" alarms.

Unfortunately, body alarms with a man-down feature frequently signal a false alarm when, for example, an officer bends over to retrieve a dropped item. As a result, Cook Unit staff have deactivated the man-down feature of the alarm device the ADC is piloting at that unit.

False alarms are troublesome because they divert staff to the scene of an apparent emergency; eventually, frequent false alarms may have the even worse effect of causing staff to ignore alarm signals. Particularly in view of the problems of understaffing we have discussed earlier in this report, we hope that the department will be successful in obtaining a perfected product that will offer this important form of supplemental protection to all staff, including housing unit officers.

G. Compound and Grounds Security

We did not have an opportunity to visit any complex at night; as a result, we were unable to assess the adequacy of outdoor lighting. Security device inspection records that we obtained from all six complexes, however, reflect regular inspection of indoor and outdoor lighting. Moreover, our daytime observation of the outdoor lighting devices indicated that the Special Management Unit II at ASPC-Eyman and all of ASPC-Lewis have superior lighting. Lighting at the South Unit of ASPC-Florence, however, appeared to be marginal. We believe that there would be many dark and obscure areas in this compound at night.

Security device inspection records and oral statements we obtained from staff indicate that all units are making regular checks of outdoor fencing, gates, locks, wire, and other security hardware and that items found broken or deficient are quickly repaired. Our own observations lend support to these records and claims. We found little evidence of neglect or of devices in need of repair. We also noted that retaining wires and brackets on interior and perimeter fencing were spray-painted so that any tampering with or movement of these wires or brackets would be evident. This is an excellent practice.

We found an unsecured manhole lid at the Morey Unit at ASPC-Lewis, near the area where staff dispense yard tools and other supplies. A member of the audit team was able lift it. Although unit staff were correct in their assertion that an inmate could not actually escape through this manhole (which leads to the septic sewage system), someone could hide or secrete contraband in it. For these reasons, unit staff should secure this manhole. Because we found another manhole unsecured at ASPC-Phoenix, we further recommend that staff conduct a department-wide evaluation of all manholes.⁹

⁹ We informed the warden of the location of this manhole.

Yards within ASPC-Eyman and ASPC-Tucson (*e.g.*, those at the Cook Unit and the Cimarron Unit) are enormous in size, making adequate observation and supervision difficult (*See* Exhibit A, Photograph 8). The size of these yards also increases the response time needed for a DART squad to move to a trouble spot across the yard from the control center.

ADC administrators do not neglect the supervision of yards. To the contrary, we always saw officers on yards where inmates were present. The ADC has begun to build smaller and more manageable yards, as evidenced by those at the new ASPC-Lewis complex. The design of the Morey Unit yard, which we observed, is excellent. The location of the control center overlooking the yard, the tall observation tower, and the fenced runway we saw are particularly good features of this compound. These elements promote good observation of the entire yard and permit armed or unarmed staff to move rapidly through the compound.

Finally, staff in at least some unit yard offices or yard control centers use video cameras to record unusual events. This good practice not only creates a visual record of events, but also helps deter inmate misbehavior.

H. Security Practices for Inmates Working Outside the Perimeter

We evaluated practices relating to inmates working off prison grounds at the Papago Unit of ASPC-Douglas. We found practices to be sound, and most importantly, to produce good results in terms of the rate of escape, endangerment of the community, and the introduction of contraband into the facility. Papago Unit staff permit only properly classified and screened prisoners to work in the community, where governmental units employ them. Civilian supervisors of these inmate workers receive training regarding rules, responsibilities, and forbidden behaviors relating to inmates. "Checkers" from the prison complex

make irregularly-timed checks on the inmate workers, and the time intervals between these checks do not exceed 120 minutes. Escape packets and photographs are on hand in the event of an escape.¹⁰

Staff strip-search all inmates upon their return to the unit. These inmates also must engage in drug testing at least once per month. Inmates who fail tests or break rules receive sanctions and are subject to re-classification and the loss of their outside work clearances. There have been no escapes from this unit over the past year, and the results of drug testing do not indicate a high rate of substance abuse. As we noted earlier, approximately 15 of 340 inmates fail drug testing each month. Considering that all inmates in this unit have been substance abusers and that most of them work in the community, this is a relatively low rate.

In summary, we are satisfied by the security procedures we observed relating to inmates working in the free community. The program at the Papago Unit is a virtual model for work-release programs of this type.

I. Key Control

We evaluated key policies and practices at all six complexes we visited. In general, we found few key-related problems, and we discuss below those we observed. Key accountability is good. Key centers are secure, and keys are maintained in key lockers or locked cabinets. Each key ring has a designated position on a key board, and key rings are tamper-resistant. Metal chits indicate the number of keys on each ring and the chit 's location on the key board. Staff record all issued keys in a log they maintain for

¹⁰ An "escape packet" contains the inmate 's photograph, vital statistics, last-known address, names of relatives, and other information - including a flyer for distribution to law enforcement agencies - that will aid in the apprehension of an escaped prisoner.

this purpose. We observed no officer or other employee being careless with keys or allowing prisoners to have access to them.

Each complex has a lock shop and one or more locksmiths.¹¹ These lock shops are impressive. Locksmiths have all the necessary equipment for repairing locks and making keys. The locksmith at ASPC-Eyman demonstrated his computerized ability to correlate locks, keys, and personnel. Staff in the lock shops maintain maps showing the location of all locks and their corresponding keys. The lockshops were neat and orderly at the times of our visits, and inventories were accurate.

With the exception of the lock shop at ASPC-Tucson, lockshops were secure. The main entrance gate to the open area in front of the lock shop for that complex was open and unattended at the time of our visit (See Exhibit A, Photograph 9). The same was true of the door leading directly into the lock shop itself (See Exhibit A, Photograph 10). There were several "job boxes" in the unsecured outdoor area; according to the locksmith with whom we spoke, some of these boxes were empty but others held magnetic locks and other discarded materials. Although these boxes were secured by padlocks, they represent a security threat, as did the general lack of security around the lock shop yard and building. We observed inmate movement in the vicinity of this lockshop.

Another concern we have regarding key control relates to the ability of staff to use emergency keys to reach an area of the prison in the event of an emergency during a loss of electrical power. We asked staff at ASPC-Florence to conduct an emergency key run from the main control unit of the complex to the fire door of the Lincoln Dormitory in the South Unit. The Captain who conducted the run encountered

¹¹ For example, there are five positions for locksmiths at the lock shop serving ASPC-Tucson. At the time of our visit, four of these positions were filled and one was vacant. According to the locksmith at that facility with whom we spoke, the lock shop staff is "always behind."

serious difficulty in opening heavy gates separating the lobby outside the control room from the interior of the institution.

A similar exercise at the Cimarron Unit of ASPC-Tucson was slower than it should have been. The exercise required the presence of medical unit staff, who were locked in the medical area. The shift commander had all necessary keys to reach the location of the hypothetical emergency, but did not realize that he also had a key to enter the medical area. Fortunately, the medical staff had a key to unlock that door and were able to release themselves to join the exercise.

Even more unsuccessful was an emergency key run we observed at the Morey Unit at ASPC-Lewis. The staff person performing the exercise (the key control officer) had great difficulty opening the first two doors in the administration building, and he was unable to open the door to exit that building without electronic assistance. The officer also encountered difficulty in opening the door to a housing unit because he could not identify the correct key for this door.

It is our understanding that simulated emergency key runs are not a matter of practice at ADC facilities. This may explain why the key runs we observed were unimpressive and why none of those simulations gave us great confidence in staff's ability to obtain and use emergency keys to reach a remote area of the prison in the event of a power failure disabling electronic locks.

J. Living Unit Security

We found a wide disparity in conditions relating to living unit security. These problems are primarily related to architecture and staffing, subjects we have discussed earlier in this report.

We evaluated housing units at the six complexes we visited. All housing units were clean and orderly. Another sign of effective supervision was the absence of graffiti or other evidence of vandalism throughout the facilities we visited. Apart from several minor examples within cells, we did not find any

evidence of these problems in any of the six complexes we visited. Prisons that manifest an abundance of graffiti and vandalism frequently suffer from marginal or poor control of prisoners; thus, our findings in this respect are directly related to security issues. As might be expected at a new facility, housing unit security at ASPC-Lewis is excellent. In addition, as we have pointed out above, the ADC is getting good service from less-than-ideal housing at some units (e.g., Gila, Echo, and Papago), mainly due to excellent management and maintenance.

From a security point of view, we cannot endorse the use of tents; likewise, we find the use of double-occupancy cells in detention units such as those at ASPC-Lewis and ASPC-Tucson unsafe; the legislature, we understand, planned and budgeted these units to include double-occupancy cells, and we hope that legislative and executive leadership will reconsider this issue. We also question the use of double-occupancy cells for acutely mentally ill prisoners in the Baker Ward of the Alhambra/Flamenco Unit, though the census at the time of our visit made double-celling here unnecessary. We have already pointed out the extreme danger of the continued use of two-tiered double bunks in the Baker Ward, a situation that already has permitted one inmate to complete a successful suicide.

The quality of supervision of housing areas varies greatly from unit to unit. Units such as SMU II, Morey, Cimarron, and Mohave had staffed control rooms and floor officers making regular rounds. Though staff we observed were working hard to discharge their housing unit-related duties, the effects of understaffing at the Central Unit at ASPC-Florence were obvious. As we have discussed above, one roving floor officer was responsible for making rounds on 16 different runs in two different cell houses while the control room officer could watch only one floor at a time. We also found that fire extinguishers were untagged and unchecked at the Central Unit. Likewise, staff did not enforce cell regulations at this unit, where nuisance contraband was openly visible. Another deficiency we noted at the Central Unit was the

failure to control cleaning fluids, which we found one inmate had hoarded in his cell. We also observed inmates distributing commissary (*See Exhibit A, Photograph 11*).

As we have noted above, one control center officer in the Central Unit could not find his post orders. Another indication of poor security within housing units occurred in a dormitory in the South Unit at ASPC-Florence. When asked, the housing unit officer there could not tell us the security level of the inmates in the dormitory.

Staffing problems also contributed to poor housing unit surveillance at the Santa Rita Unit. A high-ranking administrator at ASPC-Tucson informed us that the current staffing level leaves some control rooms in this badly-designed facility unstaffed on some days.

We noted unsecured brooms, mops, and mop buckets in housing units at some prisons. This was true of a dayroom in Ida Run at the Flamenco Unit at ASPC-Phoenix, Housing Unit 8C at the Rincon Unit at ASPC-Tucson, and the Roosevelt and Lincoln dormitories at the South Unit at ASPC-Florence. There also was an unlocked closet holding caustic cleaning materials in the Lincoln Dormitory, and we saw an unlocked room between B dormitory and C dormitory in the Aspen Unit at ASPC-Phoenix. These instances are indications of less-than-adequate security practices in these housing units.

K. Mail Operations

One of the advantages of the organization of the ADC's facilities into complexes - as opposed to stand-alone prisons - is that units can share certain operations such as mail departments, armories, motor pools, and other services. Many prison systems must replicate these services and departments in each prison. Arizona avoids this redundancy, economizes on staff, and achieves greater consistency in operations. This observation applies to the centralized mail rooms we observed.

We evaluated mail room operations at ASPC-Lewis, ASPC-Phoenix, and ASPC-Florence. Mail room personnel were knowledgeable about relevant policies and procedures, and they were trained and experienced in locating and identifying contraband. Drug-detection dogs assisted mail room personnel on occasion. Within the prevailing litigation-related boundaries under which the ADC is operating, mail operations were sound and did not present any security issues.

L. Tool Control

1. General

With the exception of ASPC-Tucson, we found excellent tool control through all the complexes we evaluated. Maintenance staff were very conscious of the need for careful control of dangerous tools. We not only found good tool control procedures in tool centers themselves, but also observed the application of sound procedures to tools staff took into the institutions to make repairs. Most tool centers were outside of the security envelope of the units, thus reducing the security problems related to these centers.

We found the tool center at ASPC-Tucson to be clean and orderly, and we found tools there secured in locked cages and cabinets. Typical shadow boards, tool inventories, and sign-out logs were in place. Neither the entry door nor the inner door that secured the tool storage areas, however, was locked. Inmates work outside in adjacent areas, and an inmate was inside the tool center at the time of our visit. We watched the inmate assist the tool officer conduct an inventory of tools staff had returned to the tool center.

The inner tool center grill gate should remain locked at all times. Moreover, inmates should not work inside the tool center except perhaps to do porter work under direct supervision, and then they should be searched thoroughly after the completion of their duties. Inmates should never help conduct an inventory of tools.

2. Food Service Tool Control

Kitchens require a large array of implements, many of which can be dangerous and are subject to misuse. Moreover, prison dining rooms are often staging areas for disturbances and riots, and inmates often work in kitchens. For these reasons, the control of tools, implements, and hazardous materials in food preparation and food service areas is a matter of great concern from the point of view of prison security

We visited kitchens and dining rooms in all of the evaluated complexes. Without exception, tool, implement, and chemical control procedures and practices were superior. Food services managers and other employees demonstrated aggressiveness in this area. Tools and implements were stored in secure areas, shadow-boarded, and inventoried in all the kitchens we observed. Inventories of tools were accurate and sign-out logs were in use. Staff made frequent checks to determine if the person to whom a tool had been issued still had possession of it. When and where appropriate, staff had secured tethers or lanyards to implements so they could be locked to tables, thereby limiting their use and movement. We found that chemicals and caustics were secure and that staff used accountability systems for those materials similar to those they observed for kitchen tools and implements. We noted at the Echo Unit at ASPC-Tucson that oven doors were padlocked when they were not in use.

All kitchen and eating areas that we visited were clean. Food storage areas, lockers, and cold storage areas were clean, orderly, and secured. Prisoners are not permitted to meander into or out of kitchens.

We encountered one construction problem at ASPC-Lewis that encourages the loss of tools (and storage of other forms of contraband) in the kitchen. The ceiling in the kitchen that serves the Morey Unit

had a drop ceiling. Staff informed us that searches had discovered contraband in this ceiling. An obvious design defect of this nature in such a generally superb physical plant is disappointing.

3. Tool and Medication Control in Medical Areas

a. Maintenance of Inventories

In general, the control of needles and other dangerous instruments such as scalpels was excellent in the medical areas of the prisons we visited. We saw both complex-wide medical units that supply all prisons within the complex, as well as smaller units operated for these individual prisons. Inventories of these instruments was excellent at the Echo Unit at ASPC-Tucson, the ASPC-Eyman medical department, the Flamenco Unit at ASPC-Phoenix, the ASPC-Douglas medical unit, and the central pharmacy, as well as the pharmacy serving the Morey Unit, at ASPC-Lewis. The only discrepancy we noted in this area occurred at ASPC-Florence, where the inventory of insulin syringes at the South Unit did not balance. A nurse had taken and used two insulin syringes without accounting for them on the inventory.

The only "controlled" medication in use at ASPC-Eyman was Valium. Medical staff employed the same inventory techniques with respect to this drug that they use in connection with sharps. The same was true with respect to the inventory of narcotic medications at ASPC-Lewis. Medical staff at the Echo Unit at ASPC-Tucson also maintain an inventory of narcotics, but a separate inventory exists for each inmate for whom a physician has prescribed such a drug.

b. Proper Dispensing of Medication

Medical staff should dispense all narcotics and psychotropic medications in liquid form, which the medication exists in that form, and all inmates receiving these drugs should be subject to a "watch/swallow" procedure. Such a procedure requires a medical staff member to visually observe the inmate swallow the medication and should include a requirement that the prisoner open his mouth and move

his tongue to show that he has swallowed the medicine. Prisoners also should receive no more than a single (unit) dose of any narcotic or psychotropic medication. The security-related justification for these procedures is the need to prevent inmates from hoarding, selling, or stealing these drugs. Hoarding can result in an intentional or accidental overdose; moreover, there is a ready market for these forms of medication in a prison setting, and this market can result in the sale or theft of drugs medical staff distribute.

Although some drugs are available in ADC facilities in liquid form, it does not appear that the ADC has adopted a uniform practice of relying exclusively on liquid forms of narcotics or psychotropic medication when those forms exist. At ASPC-Eyman, for example, the medical department maintained Valium, Haldol, Prolyxin, and Decanoate only in injectable (and thus, liquid) form. Nursing staff at the Flamenco Unit at ASPC-Phoenix, however, informed us that they use liquid forms of psychotropic medications only when a physician orders the use of that particular form. Yet, no psychotropic medications are available in liquid form at ASPC-Florence. Finally, the pharmacist at the central pharmacy at ASPC-Lewis informed us that liquid forms of psychotropic medications were unavailable because of their higher cost. Thus, the practice with respect to the use of liquid forms of these medications is quite uneven throughout the system.

Although an inmate at ASPC-Eyman died of an overdose of medication in December 1999, a consistent “watch/swallow” policy was effective for only three months after that incident in the A Unit and the D Unit, which house mentally ill prisoners. At the time of our visit, the “watch/swallow” policy - even for narcotics and psychotropics - depended on the physician’s orders, and the nurse with whom we spoke indicated that she “more or less remembers” which inmates require this procedure. The nurse informed us

that there were no inmates on “watch/swallow” status in units other than the mental health units, but she assured us that this could occur if the physician prescribed this regimen for a particular inmate.

A similarly uneven policy appears to exist at other facilities as well. For example, only 12 of 85 inmates receiving daily dosages of medication at the Echo Unit at ASPC-Tucson were on a “watch/swallow” regimen at the time of our visit. The “watch/swallow” procedures at the South Unit at ASPC-Florence are particularly ineffective, as the nurse only observes the inmate through a window. Under these circumstances, the nurse agreed, it is relatively easy for the inmate to beat the system by retaining a medication in his mouth without swallowing the drug. Equally problematic is the situation at ASPC-Lewis, where medical staff told us that they could not effectively watch inmates from the Stiner or Barchey units ingest their medications.

Although medical staff distribute all narcotics on a unit dosage basis, the pharmacist at ASPC-Lewis informed us that medical staff issue a week’s supply of certain psychotropic medications, *e.g.*, Carbamazepine, Valproic Acid, and Zoloft. For the reasons we have set forth above, this is an unsafe practice from the point of view of security.

c. Summary

In summary, while the control of syringes, other dangerous implements, narcotics, and psychotropic medications is generally excellent in the medical units we observed, we recommend that the ADC adopt more stringent policies regarding the use of liquid forms of medication, the implementation of a “watch/swallow” policy, and the provision of unit doses in the case of narcotics and psychotropic medications. Specifically, all such medicines available in liquid form should be dispensed only in that form; medical staff also should limit dosages of these medications to unit doses and employ a “watch/swallow”

regimen. Though time-consuming, this combination of practices will reduce the hoarding of medication - a practice that has extremely negative security ramifications in a prison setting.

M. The Use of Prisoners for Institutional Operations

We found no evidence in any unit that prisoners have access to or control of security keys, control security doors, work in control centers, have access to employee or inmate records, or handle mail. Staff at the Central Unit of ASPC-Florence told us that prisoners never handle keys, mail, or other prisoners' commissary. As we have noted above, however, we saw several prisoners passing out commissary to other prisoners in Cell Block 1. As also noted above, we observed one inmate performing improper tasks in the tool control room at ASPC-Tucson.

Throughout the audit, we observed inmates performing various and appropriate housekeeping, yard work, kitchen, and maintenance chores. Supervisors generally were nearby during this activity. The nature of the work and the level of supervision were appropriate for the prisoners' classification levels.

N. Perimeter Security

1. Front Entrance Security

Entrance security procedures for the various complexes and units were generally good. Entrances had functioning walk-through, as well as hand-held, metal detectors. Officers used this equipment in a competent manner. As we noted earlier, the ADC does not employ drug testing equipment, such as the Ion Scan 400 machine (except in a pilot program at ASPC-Perryville), but relies on trained dogs to supplement drug interdiction activities. Staff scrutinized photo identification cards closely, and most officers made good eye contact with the members of the audit team, thus indicating a careful matching of the appearance of the visitor with his photographic identification.

Some units, such as the Morey Unit at ASPC-Lewis, periodically challenge and test the vigilance of entry personnel by having someone attempt to use another employee's identification card. In one instance, a staff member successfully substituted a picture of a dog for that of the employee. Security challenges to catch such discrepancies pay dividends. The department's most recent escape in October 1999 in all likelihood would have failed had security staff observed that the escaping inmate was carrying a fake identification badge bearing a picture she had taken from a magazine.

Where the architecture permits, such as that at ASPC-Lewis, staff return the photographic identification through a different control center port than the one through which the officer received it. This practice forces the officer to look at the person to whom he is returning the identification in order to know which card to return. These are excellent practices.

We quizzed entry officers regarding their duties, techniques, and knowledge. In all cases, these employees were well-informed. We found post orders at all entry posts, and these orders provide ample direction for entry officers.

These positive observations notwithstanding, we noted a few serious performance failures. Mr. Dallman was able to by-pass the metal detector at the East Unit at ASPC-Florence as a result of a temporary lack of vigilance by the entry officer. While entry procedures and techniques were excellent at ASPC-Lewis, the control room center door for the visitor entry into the complex was propped open during the entry of visitors, thus making it possible for anyone to enter the control center.

2. Perimeter Fencing

ADC prisons have perimeters appropriate for their custody level. Many individual units enjoy the protection of two perimeters, their own and that of the complex. The higher security units have very secure and formidable perimeters that make escape extremely difficult and unlikely.

Both the Arizona Center for Women in Phoenix, which is about to close, and the Papago Unit of ASPC-Douglas are located on busy streets in metropolitan areas. As a result, it is not possible keep members of the public a great distance from the perimeter of these units, and persons could easily toss contraband over the fence into either of these compounds. Neither of these units, however, holds high-security inmates; most are Level 2. Moreover, as we have noted earlier, most Papago Unit inmates engage in a work release program in the community during working hours.

We gave attention to the complex perimeter at ASPC-Lewis and ASPC-Tucson, as well as to the security perimeters of all the individual prisons we evaluated. The ADC uses high-quality fencing, razor wire, and alarms. We found wire strategically located on fences, and climb-resistant mesh augments the security of these fences. We saw no debris or vegetation around or near the fences that would impede surveillance (*See Exhibit A, Photograph 12*).

Staff control and secure items such as ladders that inmates might use to scale fences. Security officers check fences on all shifts, and mobile patrols provide an added degree of perimeter security. Armed perimeter officers are weapons-qualified, and all perimeter posts we observed had post orders. The bare gravelly and sandy soil in Arizona serves a good purpose. Employees and supervised inmate workers rake it regularly so that the footprints of any person who defeats or attempts to defeat the fencing will be apparent. Internal buffer zones exist for outside perimeter fences, thus deterring prisoners from getting near the fence. Although we did not evaluate perimeter security fencing after dark, fence lighting appeared to be good at all units.

A threat to perimeter security exists in the rear area of the Lincoln Dormitory at South Unit in ASPC-Florence. Inmates can climb out of the windows of this dormitory, which is close to the perimeter fence (*See Exhibit A, Photograph 13*). The nearest tower, which actually serves an adjacent unit, does not

permit visual surveillance of the area near this fence in the interior of the South Unit, even if the officer were to make concentrated efforts to do so. Furthermore, according to staff, there is no microwave alarm protection at this point. For these reasons, we recommend that the rear windows of the Lincoln Dormitory be secured with grill-work and that the ADC extend the microwave alarm system to cover this area. In addition, we recommend the addition of supplemental wire to this fence.

We noted one other problem related to perimeter security near the Lincoln dormitory. A large tree grows next to and over the wall near this unit (*See Exhibit A, Photograph 14*). Because this tree could easily facilitate an escape, staff should remove it.

3. Vehicle Entrances

Because of the formidable nature of perimeter fencing at ADC facilities, a prisoner bent on escaping may be more likely to attempt to hide in cargo or in vehicles passing through vehicle entrances. (Other substitutes for climbing a perimeter fence are escapes during medical, funeral, or bedside visit trips, the employment of disguises to gain exit from a prison, or the use of a hostage to effect an escape.) These entrances also can serve as avenues for the introduction of contraband. As a result, we evaluated at least one vehicle entrance at each of the six complexes.

We found no significant deficiencies at ASPC-Lewis, ASPC-Phoenix, ASPC-Douglas, or ASPC-Eyman. Indeed, the procedures we observed at these complexes could serve as models. Post orders were in place. Officers assigned to vehicle entry posts either demonstrated their search techniques on actual traffic or verbally explained them when we asked about them. We found these officers to be well-informed and trained. Officers required drivers to exit their vehicles for a search, and staff searched all areas of vehicles, including the inside, top, undercarriage, engine compartment, and cargo areas. Staff at these complexes took as much time as they needed to conduct a thorough search. To accomplish this, they

used mirrors, flashlights, and elevated mirrors on towers. They required proper identification from drivers and used metal detectors properly when searching drivers or passengers.

The correctional officers assigned to vehicle entrance posts at these complexes required contractors to present inventories of materials they were taking into the facility. At the Papago Unit at ASPC-Douglas, we witnessed a search and inventory of a contractor's vehicle. The officer removed every tool and item in the vehicle and compared it to the inventory description. This was a lengthy but thorough and effective procedure. Using proper strip-search techniques, staff strip-searched inmates entering pedestrian sally ports from sites outside the perimeter

We noted several problems, however, at the main vehicle entrance of ASPC-Tucson. This is a very busy vehicle entrance. Unfortunately, the storehouse and motor pool for the complex are located inside the perimeter. This arrangement creates a large volume of traffic into and out of the complex. The inside access drive to the vehicle entrance is long and straight, and there are many vehicles inside the compound. No "dead-man" barrier is present to prevent a driver from crashing through the vehicle entry.¹²

As many as four vehicles may occupy the space between the double gates of this vehicle entrance at one time (*See Exhibit A, Photograph 15*). This lax approach enhances the likelihood that an escaping prisoner may move without detection from an un-searched vehicle to one staff have already searched. An officer on this post searched the audit team vehicle and processed the audit team's entry into the complex; we questioned him about his duties and the techniques he used. He indicated he does not make drivers who are ADC personnel exit their vehicles when they leave the complex - an oversight that violates sound

¹² A "dead-man" barrier is a swinging metal bar that is installed across the opening of a vehicle entrance. Security staff posted in the vehicle entrance raise the barrier only after they have inspected the vehicle, its driver, and its contents. This unusual term reflects the hope of corrections officials that anyone attempting to crash through the barrier will become a "dead man."

security principles. When asked about searches of contractor 's vehicles and delivery trucks, the officer posted at the vehicle entrance indicated he did not have time to always search everything in these vehicles. When asked how - under these circumstances - he could be sure a gun was not in a vehicle, he simply shrugged his shoulders.

In summary, we strongly recommend that the ADC take the following steps with respect to this vehicle entrance:

- install a dead-man barrier;
- retrain vehicle entry officers at this post;
- relocate the complex storehouse to reduce traffic through this entrance; and
- permit only one vehicle into vehicle entry sally port at one time.

The vehicle entry sally port at the South Unit of ASPC-Florence had no mirror or hand-held metal detector. Apart from this, we noted no deficiencies in vehicle entrances at this complex.

O. Inter-Prison Transportation

Transportation policies and practices throughout the ADC are good. The Department has developed a centralized transportation system that permits inmates in transit from one institution to another to remain overnight - on transient and segregated status - at a prison located between the inmates ' points of departure and their ultimate destinations. The hub units for these overnight stays are ASPC-Tucson, ASPC-Eyman, and ASPC-Lewis. This procedure shortens the length of transports and increases the efficient use of limited transportation-related resources.

In addition to inter-prison transfers, the ADC transports inmates to outside medical appointments, to funerals, and to special bedside visits. Funerals and bedside visits require the complex warden 's

approval, subject only to the final decision of the Director or his designee. Although the department has experienced attempts to escape and/or to disarm transportation officers, the process has been essentially trouble-free.

Transportation officers receive special training and are qualified to use firearms and chemical agents. Staff at ASPC-Florence provided us with training records for all officers assigned to the transportation roster as of April 6, 2000. All 14 of these officers had received specialized transportation-related training. Staff use security holsters for sidearms, thus reducing the likelihood that an inmate can disarm an officer during the course of a transport.

The clothing inmates wear when they leave a prison is bright orange, and staff search the inmate and his clothing before the prisoner leaves a unit and again before he enters a prison. Staff also search the holding area in which a prisoner stayed before boarding a transportation vehicle. Inmates remain in restraints whenever they are outside the prison unless medical reasons require the removal of those restraints. Staff prepare escape packets for all inmates who are moving from one facility to another.

The only concern we noted in this area is the absence of chase cars, at least in connection with transports from ASPC-Tucson.¹³ A transportation officer at that complex told us that as many as 44 inmates may be on a bus at one time with two officers and no chase car. The transportation officer we interviewed at ASPC-Florence, however, informed us that a chase car always accompanies a bus. We believe that the added and independent security a chase car provides is necessary when the ADC transports such a large number of prisoners.

¹³ A "chase car" is a vehicle that follows a bus, van, or automobile in which staff are transporting prisoners. Armed staff in the chase car are able to aid in thwarting an escape, particularly if the officers in the transport vehicle itself become disabled.

III. Conclusion and Recommendations

The two authors of this report approach corrections from quite different backgrounds and perspectives. One has been a career employee and administrator, having served as the longest-tenured warden in the history of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation & Corrections. The other is an attorney who has worked as a court monitor or special master for federal and state courts in cases involving unconstitutional conditions of confinement in prisons and jails, as an expert witness in cases involving such facilities, and as a consultant to correctional agencies attempting to improve their standards of operation. Yet, we have readily reached agreement on the issue of the quality of security provided by the Arizona Department of Corrections.

Despite several quite serious problems and a number of non-systemic issues about which we shall make recommendations below, we agree that the ADC is an exceptionally well-managed agency. From the top down, professionalism pervades the operation of almost the entire system. In particular, given the drawbacks relating to the poor design of several older prisons and the very difficult staffing issues the department faces, wardens and deputy wardens are achieving more than they could reasonably be expected to in some of the units we visited. Indeed, both of us have seen other jurisdictions accomplish less with greater resources.

Our favorable impressions of staff relate as well to line officers whom we encountered over the course of our evaluation. There is a sense of pride and loyalty that pervades these men and women and that speaks well for the efforts of Director Stewart and his subordinates to create a cohesive corrections team with high morale.

No doubt, there are philosophical underpinnings of the ADC with which each of us would disagree to a greater or lesser extent. This report relates only to the department's security operations, however, and

the ultimate conclusion we have reached is this: given the near-intractable problems the department faces in areas over which it has less-than-complete control, the ADC is making highly commendable and largely effective efforts to provide a safe and secure environment for prisoners and staff and to protect the public from harm. These are the fundamental objectives of a correctional system, and - as we indicated much earlier in this report - their achievement is a foundational requirement for providing useful services and programs to inmates that ultimately may enhance their successful reintegration into the community.

It is in the context of this appreciation of the efforts the ADC is making that we offer the following recommendations relating to systemic problems we observed during the course of our audit:

1. continue to treat as one of the department ' s highest priorities the abandonment of ASPC-Phoenix and the construction of new and appropriate physical facilities for the reception process and for the treatment of the special-needs prisoners now assigned to that complex;
2. replace the dormitories at the South Unit at ASPC-Florence or provide additional security staff to enhance the safety of staff and prisoners in that unit;
3. seek legislative approval for the designation of the tents at the North Unit at ASPC-Florence as being temporary, and replace those and all other tents throughout the ADC as quickly as possible;
4. increase security staff to provide enhanced surveillance of the quonset huts at the East Unit at ASPC-Florence and ultimately replace these housing units;
5. increase security staff to provide enhanced surveillance of the modular housing units at the Echo Unit at ASPC-Tucson and ultimately replace these housing units;
6. improve security staffing throughout the system by taking the following steps:
 - A. conduct a new zero-based post analysis at all ADC prisons to determine the number and nature of all security positions required to operate at Level A (which should reflect the highest level of operation that is appropriate and consistent with the State of Arizona ' s public policy);

- B. develop an accurate shift relief factor based on actual historical experience within the ADC;
 - C. request funding for all necessary security positions identified following the conduct of the post analysis and the development of the shift relief factor described above;
 - D. increase incentives, including compensation, until the department has succeeded in bringing its security position vacancy rate to less than 5%; and
 - E. in the interim, instruct wardens to take all necessary steps to avoid ever operating a facility at less than the full complement required for Level D operation; and
7. develop and implement uniform policies requiring medical staff to use a liquid form of narcotics and psychotropic medications whenever possible, as well as to dispense unit doses and to apply a "watch/swallow " regimen in connection with all such medications.

In addition, we recommend that the ADC take steps to address the following non-systemic problems we have identified in this report:

- 8. instruct all staff who carry firearms to keep their weapons in hand, attached to them by a sling, or in a rack at all times;
- 9. increase to the greatest possible extent the number of random and for-cause cell searches housing unit staff perform at ASPC-Florence and at other facilities encountering difficulty in making frequent searches;
- 10. staff all control rooms at the Santa Rita Unit at ASPC-Tucson;
- 11. install a pass-through port in the main control room at the Cimarron Unit at ASPC-Tucson; limit the number of staff who can enter this control room; and add the telephone number of the Deputy Warden to the list of employees ' telephone numbers in that control room;
- 12. begin testing alarm systems on every shift at the Cimarron Unit at ASPC-Tucson;
- 13. in order to assist the control room officer, add one member to the DART squad at any facility at which there is only one correctional officer posted

- in the control room the DART squad must enter to obtain protective gear and weapons;
14. ensure that at least two informal inmate counts supplement the three daily formal counts current ADC policy requires;
 15. improve the compound lighting at the South Unit at ASPC-Florence for the period that unit remains in use;
 16. ensure that all manhole covers at all facilities are secured ;
 17. address the security concerns we identified regarding the lock shop at ASPC-Tucson;
 18. increase the number and frequency of emergency key runs until each facility achieves consistent efficiency during these exercises;
 19. cease the use of double-occupancy cells for inmates in security detention status, as well as for inmates who are acutely mentally ill;
 20. immediately eliminate the two-tiered double bunks in the Baker Ward at the Alhambra/Flamenco Unit at ASPC-Phoenix;
 21. develop a uniform policy regarding staff ' s obligation to review and sign for post orders;
 22. improve the security of the storage of mops, mop buckets, brooms, and caustics at facilities where this is a problem;
 23. stop the use of inmates to deliver commissary, a practice we observed only at ASPC-Florence;
 24. ensure that staff check fire extinguishers with the appropriate frequency and note these inspections on the extinguisher or on a tag provided for that purpose;
 25. address the security concerns our report identifies concerning the tool room at ASPC-Tucson; in particular, cease the practice of permitting inmates to enter any tool room other than to perform porter ' s duties under staff ' s direct observation and supervision;
 26. institute the practice of making Asecurity challenges@ at all ADC prisons;

27. take steps to permit staff at ASPC-Lewis to keep the central control room door closed when visitors are coming into the complex; this may require additional staffing or a physical modification of the control room;
28. secure with grill work the rear windows in the Lincoln Dormitory at the South Unit of ASPC-Florence, extend the microwave alarm system to cover the area between these windows and the adjoining fence, and add wire to that fence;
29. remove the tree that grows next to and over the wall near the Lincoln Dormitory at the South Unit of ASPC-Florence;
30. in order to improve security at the main vehicle entrance of ASPC-Tucson, install a dead-man barrier, retrain vehicle entry officers, relocate the complex storehouse outside the vehicle entrance, and permit only one vehicle to enter the sally port at a time;
31. provide a mirror and hand-held metal detector for the sally port at the South Unit at ASPC-Florence;
32. adopt a uniform practice of using a chase car whenever inmates are being transported by bus; and
33. check all perimeter security systems at all units on every shift.

Respectfully submitted,

Vincent M. Nathan


William H. Dallman



Photograph 1
Double-tiered bunk bed in Baker Ward at Alhambra/Flamenco Unit



Photograph 2
Typical Room in Papago Unit at ASPC-Douglas



Photograph 3
Metal ballpoint pen in cell in Central Unit at ASPC-Florence



Photograph 4
Secured Restraint Equipment in the
Detention Unit at ASPC-Douglas



Photograph 5
Control Center in SMU II at ASPC-Eyman



Photograph 6
Secured keys in Northwest Control
Room at ASPC-Eyman



Photograph 7
View from control room at Santa Rita Unit at ASPC-Tucson



Photograph 8
Very large yard in Cook Unit at ASPC-Tucson



Photograph 9
Open gate to lock shop area at ASPC-Tucson



Photograph 10
Open door to lock shop at ASPC-Tucson



Photograph 11
Inmates distributing commissary in Central Unit at ASPC-Florence



Photograph 12
Perimeter fencing at ASPC-Lewis



Photograph 13
Blind area near Lincoln Dormitory in East Unit at ASPC-Florence



Photograph 14
Tree growing next to fence near Lincoln Dormitory in South Unit at ASPC-Florence



Photograph 15
Complex vehicle entrance at ASPC-Tucson